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Chapter 1 
 
Politics of Citizenship  
 
 
On March 13, 2000, the following headline appeared in The New York Times: “A Swiss 
Town Votes to Reject Dozens of Would-Be Citizens.” What followed in the article must have 
sounded very odd to the non-Swiss reader: “Provided with information about an applicant’s 
salary, tax status, background and hobbies, voters in an industrial suburb of Lucerne decided 
that only four families, all of Italian origin, were suitable to become Swiss—8 individuals out 
of a total of 56. The rest, many from the former Yugoslavia, were voted down, most by con-
siderable margins.”  
Indeed, the way one gets a passport in Switzerland is very different from the procedures in 
other countries. To our knowledge, Switzerland is the only nation-state in the world where 
naturalizations happen at the local level. Every municipality, be it a town of 100,000 or a vil-
lage of 400 inhabitants, is accorded the right to decide who can become a Swiss citizen. As 
the regulations on the national and cantonal (sub-national) levels are very sparse, each politi-
cal local entity decides according to which formal procedure and criteria its alien residents are 
naturalized. ‘Popular votes’ are only one possible form of decision-making procedure—but 
the most controversial one, leading time and again to violent political debates and to a great 
deal of astonishment beyond Swiss borders. Given the high degree of autonomy possessed by 
municipalities in this policy field, the naturalization-procedures, the applied criteria, and con-
sequently the ratio of rejected candidates vary greatly from one municipality to another. 
The main goal of this study is to explore these municipal naturalization procedures and to 
demonstrate that local political struggles leading to specific national self-understandings ex-
plain why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive naturalization policy than others. 
Before we lay out our arguments in more detail, however, this first chapter will present the 
peculiarities of municipal naturalization procedures in Switzerland and raise the question of 
how the case of Switzerland’s local naturalizations enables us to make a more general contri-
bution to the study of citizenship and nationalism. 
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What is to be explored?  
A Swiss is not only a citizen of his or her country but also of a canton (sub-national state) and 
of a municipality. Nowadays, due to increased mobility, most Swiss are no longer citizens of 
the municipalities where they live but of a municipality from which their families originate. It 
also happens (rather rarely) that Swiss citizens apply for local citizenship in their new home-
municipality. The singularity of local citizenship is partly a relic of former times when each 
town and village was responsible for taking care of its poor and when only citizens (and not 
the inhabitants) of a municipality were allowed to participate in local politics. Already in 
1551, the Diet1 of the Swiss Confederation required that every municipality nourish and lodge 
its poor (Simon-Muscheid 2002: 508-509). It was therefore in the interest of every municipal-
ity to control access to local citizenship and to send beggars and other people in need back to 
their home-municipalities (Kleger and d’Amato 1995: 260; Gruner 1968: 29-31).  
The way political rights were attributed at the local level changed when the modern Swiss 
federal state was founded in 1848. The first constitution held that each Swiss who moves to a 
new canton is accorded full civic rights after two years of residence. From 1874 on, all Swiss 
obtained local and cantonal political rights after three months of residence in a new canton 
(Aargast 2004: 53). Nowadays, a Swiss immediately profits from the political rights of his or 
her new home-municipality. In other words, the ‘municipality of citizens’ ceded political 
competencies and other responsibilities to the ‘municipality of inhabitants’. As for the ques-
tion of poor relief, in most cantons the situation changed only in the second half of the 20th 
century. In the aftermath of the First World War, it was more and more common that local 
authorities also took care of Swiss who were living in, but were not citizens of, their munici-
palities. Only in 1975, however, did the Swiss Confederation obligate municipalities to sup-
port all Swiss who are in need and live on their territories (Argast 2004: 54). Today, the fed-
eral constitution stipulates that the cantons are responsible in the domain of poor relief (Cat-
tacin and Tattini 2002: 826). While some cantons are exclusively responsible in this policy 
field, many cantons delegate the financing and organization of benefit payments and poor 
relief of local residents to their municipalities. 
From the foundation of the modern Swiss state in 1848 until 1874, the federal state had no 
competences for establishing citizenship regulations. The federal constitution specified only 
that citizens of a canton who were at the same time citizens of a municipality were also citi-
                                                
1 The Diet was a regular meeting of representatives of the cantons of the Swiss Confederation. It had only lim-
ited governmental capacities and operated essentially as a meeting place for strictly instructed ambassadors of 
the sovereign cantons. 
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zens of the Swiss federal state (Steiner 2004a: 15-16). Since 1876, Swiss citizenship is regu-
lated at the federal, cantonal, and local levels. The Swiss Confederation regulates the granting 
of citizenship through descent, marriage, and adoption and enacts minimal regulations on 
naturalizations of foreigners that can be amended by the cantons and the municipalities.2 The 
cantons have the competences to regulate the naturalization procedures at the local level, but, 
in fact, hardly interfere with local naturalization politics.3 The ordinary naturalization of alien 
residents is thus to a very large extent the responsibility of the municipalities. 
What does the naturalization procedure look like in Switzerland?4 The sequence of decision-
making with regard to naturalizations between the three political levels differs from canton to 
canton. However, in each case the procedure on the local level constitutes the crucial part of 
the process. Whereas the decisions of the Confederation and the cantons constitute rather 
formal and administrative procedures on the basis of very few but clearly specified criteria 
that are checked either before or after decisions are taken at the local level, the municipalities 
make mainly political decisions. The federal law on citizenship merely stipulates that only 
those foreign residents can be naturalized who have lived in Switzerland for at least twelve 
years, respect the legal order, do not compromise the interior and exterior safety of the coun-
try, and are integrated and familiar with the Swiss habits and customs. The first three criteria 
are quite clear, easy to verify, and are always checked by the federal administration. As for 
the questions of integration and familiarity, not only do they constitute vague requirements, 
but they also are judged exclusively by local actors. Which local actors are involved in the 
decision-making processes? The local administration is in most cases in contact with the ap-
plicants during the entire naturalization procedure. They inform them about the formal aspects 
of the process and check whether certain criteria for naturalization are fulfilled. Often they 
also discuss with candidates whether they have any chance of getting a Swiss passport and 
make recommendations to political bodies involved in the process. In almost all municipali-
ties a naturalization commission composed of local politicians discusses in detail the dossiers 
and makes recommendations to those who make the final decisions. Sometimes dossiers are 
circulated several times between the various collective bodies involved in the decision-
                                                
2 See articles 37 and 38 of the Swiss Constitution from 1999 and articles 14 and 15 of the Federal Law on the 
Acquisition and Loss of the Swiss Citizenship (141.0) from 1952. 
3 A big exception is the canton of Geneva, where municipalities are not involved in the decision-making proce-
dures and naturalizations are centralized at the cantonal level. 
4 More detailed descriptions of the local decision-making processes in the context of naturalizations can be found 
in Chapter 6, which discusses citizenship politics in four municipalities. Various local naturalization procedures 
are presented in Steiner and Wicker (2000; 2004) and Achermann and Gass (2003). For an overview of the for-
mal aspects of the procedures in all 26 cantons see Boner (2000), Schaffhauser (2001) and Schweizerischer Ge-
meindeverband (1998).  
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making processes. It might also happen that the local parliament or the executive body makes 
recommendations before the final decisions are made. Final decisions are made in some mu-
nicipalities by the entire population, either by ballot or during a municipal assembly. In other 
municipalities, it is the local parliament or the executive body which decides who can become 
a Swiss citizen. It appears that various actors are involved in municipal naturalizations and 
that the evaluation of the candidates’ dossiers occurs at different stages. Naturalizations can 
therefore be compared to decision-making processes in other political fields where political 
actors have to come to an agreement as to which policy has to be pursued.  
The candidates often have to pass a kind of exam or interrogation to verify that they are famil-
iar enough with the Swiss political system, Swiss history, and the language of the particular 
region. The local administration and decision makers decide whether and to what extent can-
didates have to pass such tests or interrogations. The criteria can therefore differ among mu-
nicipalities even within the same canton. Formal regulations at the local level are rare and 
when they exist the criteria that have to be fulfilled are formulated in a very general way. De-
cisions depend therefore even more on the interpretations of municipal politicians or the opin-
ions of the local population. 
There exists a wide range of different naturalization policies, from very generous to very re-
strictive. In some municipalities, a complete integration of the naturalization candidates is 
presumed after twelve years of residence in Switzerland. In other municipalities, applicants 
have to prove their degree of integration by passing tests or by showing how well they are 
acquainted with the Swiss citizens of their municipality. However, it would be too simplistic 
to range the municipalities exclusively along such a scale, since naturalization procedures also 
differ with regard to the issues that mould the respective debates. In some cases, the question 
of whether applicants can be naturalized who are benefiting from social security or disability 
insurance is at the center of debates. In still other municipalities, language ability constitutes 
the crucial element of the contest. Switzerland has four national languages: German (spoken 
by 64 percent of all Swiss), French (19 percent), Italian (8 percent) and Rumantsch Grischun 
(0.6 percent). The language used by all Swiss Germans in their daily (and also professional) 
life is Swiss German, a strong dialect very different from the High German that is spoken in 
Germany and used in written German. All Swiss-Germans, however, also speak High Ger-
man. This particularity adds to the complexity of naturalization, since in some municipalities 
it is a controversial issue whether candidates have to speak Swiss German or High German. 
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In the last few years, after discriminatory decisions were made, the Swiss system of naturali-
zation has aroused a great many political and judicial debates, especially when candidates 
from the former Yugoslavia have been refused Swiss citizenship in municipalities where the 
population has decided on applications by closed ballot. Opponents of this system criticize the 
arbitrariness of the municipal decision-making processes because they expose the candidates 
to the attitudes of the local population and politicians. They demand that procedures be stan-
dardized and decisions be made exclusively by the local administration or by the executive 
body and no longer by the population. In July 2003, the Swiss Federal Court rendered a ver-
dict according to which popular votes by ballot on naturalization requests violate the Swiss 
Constitution. In May 2004, it further declared that decisions during municipal assemblies 
have to be made by open ballot. Since the Swiss Federal Court regards naturalizations as 
purely administrative procedures, it has declared that justifications for the decisions, and pos-
sibilities for appeals against such decisions on this subject, must be made available. These two 
rights, according to the Swiss Federal Court, are not guaranteed by the system of votes by 
ballot.  
Advocates of the existing system object that these verdicts violate the autonomy of the mu-
nicipalities and the democratic rights of the Swiss citizens. They claim that the population of 
each municipality should have the right to decide according to which procedures and criteria 
foreigners are naturalized. Since the verdicts of the Federal Court, municipalities where the 
population had decided naturalization status by closed ballot have abolished or suspended this 
procedure. It is, however, unclear whether popular votes remain prohibited or whether they 
will be reintroduced in the near future. In the canton of Schwyz, a popular referendum has 
been accepted in 2005 according to which the system of popular votes can be reintroduced. At 
the national level, popular and parliamentary initiatives demand that each municipality can 
decide according to which procedure alien citizens are naturalized. 
A more general debate is also being carried on about whether it is too difficult and arduous to 
get a Swiss passport and about whether naturalizations should be facilitated. Proponents of a 
more liberal citizenship policy argue that the naturalization procedures at three levels are too 
complicated and time-consuming and that requirements for naturalization exceed those of 
other countries. Indeed, different studies have come to the conclusion that Switzerland, like 
Germany, constitutes an example of ethnic citizenship politics and pursues one of the most 
restrictive naturalization policies in Western Europe (Koopmans et al. 2005; Giugni and Passy 
2006; Steiner and Wicker 2000). This might partially explain why Switzerland has a very low 
naturalization rate. In the last ten years, on average, only 1.9 percent of the foreign population 
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has obtained the Swiss citizenship. In Germany, a similar percentage of foreigners have been 
naturalized, and in Italy, Portugal, and Spain the naturalization rate has been even lower in the 
same time period. In most other European countries, however, between 3 percent and 6 per-
cent of the alien residents have been naturalized. The average naturalization rate amounts to 
7.8 percent in Sweden and 8.1 percent in the Netherlands (SOPEMI 2006: 290). 
One naturalization criterion that stands out is the fact that one can apply for Swiss citizenship 
only after 12 years of residence in this country. Aside from Austria and Italy, where potential 
candidates have to wait for ten years, most Western European countries require only between 
three and seven years (Weil 2002: 7). Even in Germany, known for its restrictive citizenship 
policy, alien residents nowadays can get a German passport after only eight years. Opponents 
of the existing system make the further criticism that, besides Austria and Luxembourg, Swit-
zerland is the only country in Western Europe where no facilitating dispositions for immi-
grants of the second generation exist (see Weil 2002: 6). Only some cantons facilitate the ac-
quisition of the Swiss citizenship for young foreigners. Since 1980, three attempts to facilitate 
the naturalization of the second and third generations at the national level have been rejected 
by the Swiss population. The main political actor who habitually mobilizes against facilitated 
naturalization is the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), one of the major political forces in Switzer-
land. Members and supporters of this populist right-wing party fear mass-naturalizations, 
warn of the depreciation of the Swiss citizenship, and argue that people who have grown up in 
this country are not necessarily assimilated enough to become Swiss. These arguments are in 
line with the party’s more general demands for a limitation of both naturalizations and immi-
gration. In particular, the growing immigration from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, 
which started in the 1980s, has provoked, time and again, violent debates about the capacity 
to integrate those people into Switzerland. Nowadays, alien residents who have emigrated 
from the countries of the former Yugoslavia make up over 25 percent of all foreigners living 
in Switzerland, and outnumber even Italian residents (20 percent), who constituted the major 
immigration group in the 1950s and 1960s (BFS 2005: 16-17). This new pattern of emigration 
also has had an impact on the naturalization rates: whereas until the first half of the 1990s 
most candidates for naturalization came from EU countries, from the second half of the 1990s 
onwards more and more people from the Balkans have applied for Swiss citizenship (see 
Piguet and Wanner 2000: 31). In 2004, for example, almost 40 percent of all naturalized can-
didates emigrated from a country of the former Yugoslavia (BFS 2005: 41). 
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Why explore local naturalization politics? 
When comparing naturalizations in Switzerland with citizenship regulations in other coun-
tries, one quickly realizes that a full understanding of the Swiss system can only be gained by 
taking a look at the local level, where the most important decisions are made. Only by going 
to the municipalities can we explore which are the relevant criteria for naturalization and to 
what extent the practicing of citizenship is commensurate with the general picture of a restric-
tive Swiss naturalization policy.  
While our study seeks to render the quite awkward naturalization procedures more compre-
hensible, it also intends to make a more general contribution to current academic discussions. 
Switzerland and its highly decentralized citizenship politics constitute a unique case, but this 
does not suggest that inferences from the findings of this case are not possible. On the con-
trary, it should be considered as a unique research opportunity, allowing us to discuss citizen-
ship and nationalism from new perspectives. Taking a closer look at naturalization processes 
is revealing in that it enables us to go beyond formal regulations and citizenship laws and 
shows us how national citizenship models are interpreted and put into practice. Indeed, natu-
ralization is the crucial moment when it becomes clear how citizenship of a nation-state 
works, for it is at this moment that a nation-state decides whether a candidate might become a 
member of its community. Such a moment can show us a lot about the dominant national self-
understanding and about which aspects of citizenship really matter. Going local also allows us 
to go beyond classic works on citizenship or nationalism, which often adopt macro-
sociological and historical approaches. Investigating the application of citizenship laws in the 
clearly delimited field of Swiss municipalities and talking to local decision makers enables us 
to explore how ordinary citizens think about citizenship: How do they see the candidates for 
naturalization, how do they conceive of their nation, and which criteria do they consider as 
crucial for becoming a member of their community?  
Studying naturalizations in Switzerland further permits us to abolish the idea of homogeneous 
nation-states and to demonstrate that citizenship can take different forms and meanings within 
a nation-state, not only over time but also over space. Diverging applications of citizenship 
laws and understandings of nationhood are not found only in Switzerland. In fact, naturaliza-
tion politics in many nation-states, as is the case in many policy fields, are decentralized to a 
certain extent. In federal states such as Switzerland, its constitutive units often implement 
federal laws. As many studies have shown, such a situation leads to a variety of applications 
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even if the federal state precisely stipulates how the law has to be executed (see Perret et al. 
2007; Kissling-Näf and Wälti 1999).5  
With regard to the implementation of naturalization laws, the one case that probably comes 
closest to the Swiss system is Germany, where the citizenship law is regulated at the national 
level but executed by the Länder (sub-national states) (see Hagedorn 2001a; 2001b; Ludvig 
2004; Dornis 1999; 2001; Bultmann 1999). The Länder are accorded the competence to orga-
nize the naturalization procedure and to decide who fulfills the criteria for being naturalized 
and who does not. A crucial difference between the two countries is, however, that in Ger-
many an administrative body decides on applications. This does not foreclose the possibility 
that different standards may be applied: various studies have shown that naturalization rates 
and citizenship politics differ significantly between the Länder (Hagedorn 2001a; 2001b; 
Dornis 1999; 2001). A case in point is the granting of dual citizenship only as an exception. 
According to the federal law, naturalized Germans have to give up their old nationality. Ex-
ceptions can only be made when the former home country does not allow naturalization of 
their citizens in another country. Nonetheless, the acceptance of dual citizenship varies a lot 
between the Länder—in 1995, for example, between 9 percent and 80 percent (Hagedorn 
2001: 109-110). This is just one example of how the federal citizenship laws are applied dif-
ferently. Moreover, various studies have shown that the ethnic citizenship model that com-
pletely denies the possibility of identifying oneself with two nation-states is not the precon-
ception of every regional decision maker. 
The varying applications of federal citizenship laws in Germany are often explained by the 
political orientation of the regional governments and the attitudes of the authorities that are 
involved in the decision-making process. Hagedorn (2001a; 2001b), for example, observed 
changes in naturalization policies when the political majority of a Land switched from right to 
left or vice versa. More interestingly, she has shown that the number of naturalized foreigners 
depends on the attitudes of the representatives of the regional administrations (see also Bult-
mann 1999: 196-202). Thränhardt (1999) has even revealed that in one Land differences exist 
at the local level between different naturalization offices, depending on the resources of the 
competent authorities, and how they control the documents of the applicants. Dornis (2001: 
76-85) explored how language tests and the verification of the candidates’ documents varies 
among the Länder, and discovered that individual officers regularly encourage applicants to 
                                                
5 Strictly speaking, in Switzerland naturalization politics does not constitute a classic case of executive federal-
ism, as the federal state does not explicitly delegate this task to the cantons and municipalities. On the contrary, 
local citizenship regulations existed long before regulations on national citizenship came into being. 
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withdraw their application if the officers have the impression that they have little chance of 
being naturalized. Hagedorn (2001b: 40) reports that it sometimes happens that the authorities 
protract the procedures on purpose when they consider the regulations too generous for cer-
tain candidates. 
In other countries, divergent practices of citizenship can be observed, too. North (1985; 1987) 
examined the administrative structure of the American naturalization program, and came to 
the conclusion that the formal procedures and the approaches of the examiners vary a great 
deal among district offices. There are differences with regard to how language tests are evalu-
ated and how and when people are persuaded to withdraw their dossiers when they seem not 
to be qualified for naturalization. He has demonstrated that rejection rates vary between zero 
and 11.5 percent (North 1985: 38-39). Differing implementations of the naturalization laws 
can even be observed in highly centralized states such as France. Weil (2004: 377-387) ob-
served applications that clearly contradict the idea of a voluntaristic citizenship model with 
which France is often associated. In some regional offices, candidates are even manifestly 
dissuaded from applying for French citizenship. While Costa-Lascoux (1996: 149) reports 
that the assimilation of candidates is tested very differently from one regional office to the 
other, Hagedorn (2001b: 43-44) found that candidates are often refused for lack of assimila-
tion. Since the degree of assimilation is exclusively judged by regional officers, arbitrary de-
cisions cannot be excluded (see also Fulchiron 1996). 
All of these studies partly explain differences in naturalization politics by the different atti-
tudes of the regional authorities towards the question of who has the right to become a citizen 
of their country. Variations in the national self-understanding can be observed not only in the 
context of naturalizations but also, more generally, when we analyze local integration politics 
and how municipalities manage ethnic diversity (e.g. Ireland 1994). It is often argued that 
cities have always been more confronted by problems related to migration than nation-states 
are,6 and thus constitute more interesting cases to analyze (Rogers and Tillie 2001; Rogers 
2000; Penninx et al. 2004b; Favell 2001). In those studies, it is argued that the local political 
structures shape the ways migrants are integrated. Although an influence of the national citi-
zenship regime on local politics can sometimes be detected (e.g. Garbaye 2004), various em-
pirical studies have demonstrated that forms of local integration and citizenship policies can-
not be explained (at least not exclusively) by their embedment in a national system. The es-
                                                
6 For this reason, Bauböck (2003) suggests strengthening municipal autonomy in immigration and foreign pol-
icy. Among other suggestions, he proposes formalizing local citizenship, which would be based on residence and 
disconnected from nationality. 
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says collected in Penninx et al. (2004a) demonstrate that in various countries local politics 
towards immigrants varies a lot and that this heterogeneity is mainly attributable to differ-
ences between local political systems and prevailing citizenship paradigms. Ireland (1994), 
Koopmans (2004) and Bousetta (1997) demonstrate that local integration regimes and citizen-
ship frameworks have an impact on the way, and on the degree to which, immigrants partici-
pate in political debates. Garbaye (2000) has explored how two cities in France and Great 
Britain manage ethnic diversity and identifies three elements that explain the different ap-
proaches: the relations between central and local governments, the organization of political 
party systems and the organization of local government. It is particularly interesting to ob-
serve that even in a country such as France, cities make differential use of their existing dis-
cretionary power to integrate foreigners (Moore 2001; 2004). 
Revealing heterogeneous implementations of naturalization laws and the variation of citizen-
ship paradigms at the local level in other countries makes the case of Switzerland appear 
much less exceptional. Our project can therefore be incorporated into a wider study field of 
local citizenship and integration politics. In contrast to other studies that have concentrated 
their focus on large cities, mainly due to the fact that these political units are confronted with 
a relatively high percentage of immigrants or alien residents (see Alexander 2004: 60), our 
study explores relatively small local units. This is mainly due to the fact that the average 
number of inhabitants in a Swiss city is much lower than that in a city in the other countries. 
On average, a Swiss municipality has 2,100 inhabitants.7 Fifty percent of the roughly 2,800 
municipalities in Switzerland have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants and there are only five towns 
with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Despite their small size, Swiss municipalities constitute 
pertinent cases for the study of naturalization processes, as they have a relatively high ratio of 
foreign residents. In this regard, too, Switzerland constitutes an exceptional case. Whereas in 
most European countries between 2 percent and 9 percent of the population are non-citizen 
residents, Switzerland counts a foreign population of almost 20 percent.8 Such a high percent-
age of foreigners can also be observed in relatively small towns and villages.9  
                                                
7 Compared with other European countries, only France has more small municipalities with an average number 
of 1,500 inhabitants, while in Austria and Germany on average 3,300 and 7,300 people live in a municipality, 
and Swedish municipalities have on average 29,800 inhabitants. The number rises to 123,000 in Britain (Ladner 
1991: 47). 
8 Part of this high ratio might be explained by the fact that Switzerland is a small, rich country in the middle of 
Europe that attracts a lot of foreign workers, whose numbers therefore grow faster as a percentage of the popula-
tion than they do in bigger countries. It can also be explained by the low Swiss naturalization rate.  
9 For example, the 14 case studies we will present below have on average 15,000 inhabitants and a ratio of for-
eigners that varies between 9 percent and 39 percent (25 percent on average). 
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Small municipalities not only have a high percentage of foreigners and thus have to deal like 
bigger towns with a lot of naturalization requests, they also display a very distinct political 
system, making the study of local politics highly relevant. The distribution of competences 
with regard to naturalizations, for instance, reflects Swiss federalism, which attributes sover-
eignty to both the cantons and the municipalities (Kriesi 1998a: 50-89). The degree of local 
autonomy varies from canton to canton, but is everywhere very high compared to other coun-
tries. Municipalities not only implement federal and cantonal laws, they also autonomously 
organize themselves, raise their own taxes, and administer the municipal assets. Swiss mu-
nicipalities enjoy a great many responsibilities, and even enact laws in the following domains: 
primary education, culture, sports, environmental protection, poor relief, police, construction 
of roads, church and naturalization (Ladner 1991: 40; Kriesi 1998a: 68).10 Each municipality 
has its own administration and executive body (local government), which is composed of 
elected local politicians and is, aside from the sovereign, the most powerful local political 
body. The mayor, as one member of the local government, has a particularly powerful posi-
tion, as he or she is directly elected for this office. The mayor presides over the executive 
body and, in some cantons, holds specific responsibilities in certain policy areas (Geser 
2002:448-449). In small municipalities, the legislative body consists of all local Swiss citi-
zens, and in larger municipalities local parliaments are elected. Unsurprisingly, in a country 
with such a distinct system of direct democracy, decisions that are not made by the local par-
liament or during a local assembly are made by ballot by the local population. At the local 
level, commissions are also important political bodies, which are composed of local politi-
cians or local citizens that are appointed in various policy domains to assume the functions of 
supervision and consultation. Naturalization commissions, for example, discuss applications 
for Swiss citizenship and make recommendations to the political body that makes the final 
decisions. 
Given the distinct political structures at the local level it is hardly astonishing that municipali-
ties can also be distinguished by their party systems. Most municipalities have their own sec-
tions of cantonal and national parties. Parties or political associations also exist that are not 
politically integrated beyond the local boundaries. However, the four major political parties in 
Switzerland are also the most important political forces at the local level. Of all local sections, 
over 80 percent belong to the Liberal Party (FDP), the Social Democrats (SP), the Christian 
Democrats (CVP) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) (Ladner 1991: 133). Of course, local 
                                                
10 For an overview of the competences of Swiss municipalities, see also Linder (2005: 160-163), Geser (2002: 
427-432) and Meylan et al. (1972). 
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sections are not as well organized as the cantonal or national parties. However, and especially 
in small municipalities, their influence is rather strong, as they often are the only politically 
active, collective actors, and also assume important social functions. Even very small local 
unities with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants have more than one political party (Geser 2002: 
438). Given Switzerland’s distinct federalism, cantonal and municipal sections of a party are 
for the most part independently organized and sometimes differ in their political orientation 
(Ladner 1991: 120-121). As a consequence, local sections might pursue a citizenship policy 
that is not in complete accordance with the positions of their national party or with those of 
other local sections. 
 
Culture and Power: How to explain local naturalization politics 
Given the large autonomy of municipalities, the distinct local political system, and the rela-
tively high ratio of foreigners, we can conclude that naturalization politics is a central political 
issue even in small municipalities. We have seen that naturalizations constitute a very timely 
topic in Switzerland and a unique research opportunity for studying the practice of citizen-
ship, the way ordinary citizens conceive of citizenship, and the variation of citizenship poli-
tics within a nation-state. Hence, it is all the more astonishing that this topic has been so in-
adequately studied. The political debates on legal norms have been accompanied by judicial 
studies treating the question of the constitutionality of local naturalization procedures (Auer 
and Arx 2000; Thürer and Frei 2004).11 At the same time, ethnographic studies have gone 
beyond the legal aspects of citizenship and demonstrated, among other things, the complexity 
of local citizenship politics by means of single case studies (Arend 1991; Centlivres 1990; 
Centlivres et al. 1991; Steiner and Wicker 2000; 2004; Achermann and Gass 2003). Espe-
cially the works collected in Steiner and Wicker (2004) and the case study of the town of 
Basel in Achermann and Gass (2003) deliver helpful insights into the various aspects and 
moments of municipal naturalizations. However, these studies do not provide, or only poorly 
develop, theoretical frameworks for a comparison of local procedures; they treat the question 
of why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive policy than others only at the margins, if 
                                                
11 Further legal aspects of laws about naturalization were reviewed by Burckhardt (1914), Ilg (1922), Ruth 
(1937), Benz (1986), Fasel (1989), Grendelmeier (1969), Burger (1971) and Hottelier (1991). The development 
of the norms of naturalization during the 20th century are analyzed by Arlettaz (1990), Wanner (1997), Kreis and 
Kury (1996), Wanner (1998) and Steiner and Wicker (2000). A history of the naturalization processes in the 
second half of the 19th century in the canton of Valais is provided by Windisch (2004). Additional work dis-
cusses the concepts of assimilation, integration, and the national identity of foreign residents in Switzerland 
(Arlettaz 1985; Centlivres et al. 1991; Kleger and D'Amato 1995; Ossipow 1996). 
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at all. So far, Piguet and Wanner (2000: 66-74) and Bolliger (2003) provide the only, even if 
explorative, investigations that attempt to explain policy outcomes in citizenship politics. 
Our study seeks to explore local naturalization politics more systematically and takes the 
question of causality more seriously, in an effort to explain why in some municipalities more 
candidates for naturalization are rejected than in others. We have seen that studies exploring 
divergent regional and local immigration, integration, and naturalization politics explain dif-
ferences in policy outcomes with differing conceptions of citizenship. In a similar vein, we 
hold the conviction that the way alien residents are naturalized depends on the prevailing na-
tional self-understanding which is, in turn, the outcome of political struggles. According to 
this view, it is ideologies and ideas about citizenship and nationality that shape how issues 
related to immigrants are resolved. Brubaker’s (1992) comparison of citizenship politics in 
Germany and France is probably the most prominent study adopting this approach. According 
to him, differences in citizenship politics and immigrants’ attitudes towards naturalization are 
due to the fact that France represents a republican, expansive, and assimilationist model of 
citizenship, while Germany defines citizenry as a community of descent that is very restrictive 
towards non-German immigrants. Similarly, Favell (1998) explains the divergent responses to 
ethnic and racial groups in France and Britain in terms of each nation’s public philosophy and 
political tradition. According to him, it is France’s republican tradition that favors a policy of 
integration rather than accommodation and consequently opposes separate Islamic institutions 
because this arrangement would violate the state’s ideological commitment to integrating in-
dividual outsiders into the French political culture. On the other hand, in Britain, more em-
phasis is placed on allowing separate groups to retain their distinctive identities. As a conse-
quence, Islamic groups and the development of independent Muslim communities are recog-
nized through public policy. Other scholars take the argument a step further and contend that 
institutionalized conceptions of citizenship even shape the collective action of immigrant 
groups trying to change public policy (Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Giugni and Passy 
2006). 
To distinguish different forms of national consciousness, the distinction most commonly 
made regarding nations is between ‘civic-territorial’ and ‘ethnic’ types of nationalism and 
citizenship, which are conceived, respectively, as free associations of human beings and as 
fixed and indelible organisms. While most researchers in this field nowadays agree that these 
two types constitute ideal types, we will further argue that they pose analytical problems, 
since they are normatively loaded and seem to be mutually exclusive, whereas every national-
ism is shaped by both principles. Moreover, taking those categories too seriously risks the 
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danger of a culturalist approach, which perilously implies homogeneous and static citizenship 
politics. While ideological accounts have a high impact on how foreigners are naturalized, we 
must not forget that conceptions of citizenship take different forms within a nation-state and 
change over time. To account for these aspects we have to bring to mind the contentious and 
political nature of citizenship: the outcome of a specific naturalization policy is the result of 
ongoing political struggles over the questions of who we are and who belongs to us. To un-
derstand those struggles, we first have to clarify what they are about. As we will demonstrate 
in Chapter 2, naturalization is about the symbolic and emotional aspects of full membership in 
a nation-state. During the entire history of humankind, people have organized themselves in 
cultural groups and excluded those who were not considered to belong to them. In this age of 
nationalism, in which societies are organized in nation-states, this exclusion happens by 
means of national citizenship. National citizenship is tightly linked to the ideas of popular 
sovereignty, equality, and self-determination. During naturalization procedures, governmental 
actors struggle over the question of who belongs to the sovereign body, who profits from 
equal rights, who is allowed to participate in the democratic processes, and simply who be-
longs to “them”. This makes national citizenship a salient and contentious closure mechanism.  
Chapter 3 elaborates on these ideas and provides instruments to analytically grasp struggles 
among municipal politicians in the context of local citizenship politics. Inspired by Berger 
and Luckmann’s (1967) social constructivism and Bourdieu’s (1977; 1990) idea of the ‘logic 
of practice’, we will propose an empirical research program concentrating on interaction 
processes and accounting for both the individual perceptions and the larger social environ-
ment partially shaping the actors’ understandings of citizenship. We thereby follow Bru-
baker’s (2004) plea for a more thorough constructivist approach in the study of ethnicity and 
nationalism, seeking to circumvent both clichéd constructivism and hidden essentialism. 
While we are highly inspired by his cognitive approach, which proposes nationalist ways of 
thinking as forms of classification, we will try at the same time to avoid the pitfalls of meth-
odological idealism. To understand nationalism and citizenship politics, we not only have to 
demonstrate how people think about these social phenomena, but also how a dominant view 
emerges within a group and how these processes depend on material aspects and are influ-
enced by power structures. Such a theoretical extension is necessary, since constructions of a 
nation do not happen in a cultural vacuum and national traditions cannot be invented ad libi-
tum. It is Bourdieu’s analytical tools of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’, and ‘field’ that will help us under-
stand how individuals are both actors and agents producing and reproducing the social world 
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in a socially and culturally constituted space. Our analytical framework will allow us to ac-
count for both structure and agency and how actors interact in a social environment. 
To investigate struggles over the question of who belongs to a nation, Switzerland provides a 
unique ‘laboratory’, because in it the functioning of the contentious closure mechanism of 
national citizenship can be observed in clearly distinguishable local fields. How we go about 
analyzing local citizenship politics in Swiss municipalities will be laid out in the last part of 
Chapter 3. It will become clear that given our theoretical framework and the complexity of 
local naturalization politics, we have to approach the object of our study from various per-
spectives, at different analytical levels, and by analysis of both quantitative and qualitative 
data. In a first step (Chapter 4) we will analyze data from a large-N survey to get a more gen-
eral view of what determines the outcome of naturalization politics, while Chapter 5 then 
compares prevailing understandings of citizenship and local power structures in 14 munici-
palities, Chapter 6 will illustrate our arguments and discuss in detail four case studies. Finally, 
in Chapter 7 we will concentrate our attention on individual politicians and show to what ex-
tent their individual understandings of citizenship are shaped by local citizenship politics. 
However, let us first discuss in more detail our theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 2 
 
From Citizenship to National Self-Understanding 
 
 
What is citizenship? 
To tackle this question let us directly start with Charles Tilly’s definition addressing various 
important aspects of citizenship that will be specified in the course of this and the next chap-
ter. Tilly (1999: 252-253) defines citizenship as referring to a relation between governmental 
agents12 and whole categories of persons identified uniquely by their connection with the gov-
ernment in question. The relation between government and its subject population can be 
considered as a contract involving transactions that cluster around mutual rights and obliga-
tions and drawing visible lines between insiders and outsiders. According to Tilly, such a con-
tract is never completely specified. Rather, it might vary in range, depend on unstated as-
sumptions about context, be modified by practice, and be constrained by collective memory.  
What immediately strikes us is that Tilly’s view goes beyond many other definitions that ad-
dress solely or mainly the legal and formal status of individuals (Brinkmann 1986) or the 
rights and obligations as related to such a status (Andrews 1991; Turner 1997). Moreover, it 
becomes clear that Tilly proposes a definition about what citizenship is and not about what it 
should be. By doing so, Tilly avoids the certainly interesting but, for an empirical research 
scarcely useful, normative arguments of who should be granted citizenship rights.13 Rather, it 
                                                
12 Tilly (1999: 252) differentiates between government and state, designating the former as any organization that 
controls the coercive means within some substantial territory and reserving the latter for those governments that 
do not fall under the jurisdiction of any other government. Thus, Switzerland qualifies as a state, whereas Swiss 
municipalities can be considered as governments. Such a differentiation highlights the fact that citizenship is not 
necessarily and exclusively related to a state. Similarly, Mackert and Müller (2000: 12) make a distinction be-
tween the concept of citizenship (they use the English notion) and the widely used German translation of 
‘Staatsbürgerschaft’ (literally translated: ‘States-Citizenship’) that is often used as a synonym. While the latter 
clearly designates citizenship in a state, the former can be understood as a membership status of various territo-
rial and/or social entities (cities, European Union, etc.). Similar discussions turn around the question of whether 
citizenship should and could be disentangled from the idea of nationality (Habermas 1992; 2001; Wiener 1999; 
see also Calhoun 2004b; Soysal 1994).  
13 For an overview of the normative debates on citizenship, see Mackert and Müller (2000: 19-31). On individual 
and collective citizenship rights, see Kymlicka (1995: especially ch.3; Shapiro and Kymlicka 1997; Glazer 
1997), and on the debate on liberal, republican, and communitarian ideas of citizenship-rights see, among many, 
Miller (1995; 2000), Bauböck (1996), Kymlicka (1995: ch.4), Taylor (1994), Walzer (1983: ch.2) and Young 
(1998). 
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opens the way for an empirical investigation of how governmental agents decide which cate-
gories of people can be considered as part of the nation.  
What further stands out in Tilly’s definition is the contractual nature of citizenship, underscor-
ing thereby that citizenship is not just about a mere aggregate of persons who happen to be-
long legally to a state. Nation-states are not simply territorial organizations but rather mem-
bership organizations or associations of citizenship in which all citizens are equal and have 
the same rights through their direct relations with the state. Indeed, most citizens of a state are 
also residents of the state’s territory. However, their relation to the state involves more than 
their passing or extended residence alone. Otherwise, one would automatically lose his or her 
citizenship by leaving the territory of the state. As will become clearer in the course of this 
chapter, in the age of nationalism citizenship is about the symbolic and emotional aspects of 
full membership, and it is about the questions of who belongs to the sovereign body, of who 
benefits from equal political rights, and simply of who belongs to ‘us’. Conversely, the over-
lapping of different forms of peoplehood (mainly the sovereign body and the nation) makes 
national citizenship a particularly salient closure mechanism, excluding all those who do not 
belong to ‘us’. 
Speaking of ‘full membership’ means that we are mainly interested in citizenship in a narrow 
sense: We will investigate the processes of becoming a full member of a nation-state and the 
procedures of the acquisition of individual citizenship rights. We will not discuss the proce-
dures of entering the territory of a nation-state or collective rights and duties of migrants and 
permanent alien residents. To understand naturalization processes, and mainly its variation in 
range, we will have to account less for formal rules but rather for governmental actors, how 
they practice citizenship politics, and how such policies are influenced, respectively, by un-
stated assumptions about context and collective memory (as Tilly argues), or by national self-
understandings (as we will put it). Ultimately, it is by looking at how a nation sees itself that 
helps us understand who is admitted. Ethnic and civic-territorial understandings of nationhood 
are two classic categories of classifying citizenship politics. By pointing to the analytical am-
biguities of these two concepts, we will plead for an approach that allows us to go beyond this 
dichotomy. Leading up to the next chapter, we will argue finally that such a new approach is 
demanded to account for the struggles between governmental actors that result in specific 
degrees of social closure and openness. 
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Becoming a new member: from local to national citizenship 
Naturalization is the very moment when an alien resident becomes a full member and when 
both parties—the government and the new citizens—sign a contract and agree to respect the 
others’ rights and declare to follow their obligations. Naturalization is the transition from one 
citizenship status to another or the acquisition of a second one if dual citizenship is permitted. 
It has to be distinguished from ascription of citizenship by birth. Virtually everyone becomes 
citizen of a country at birth, either of the country of his or her parents or of the country where 
one is born. The admission procedure to a new citizenship status involves two crucial steps: 
first, an alien citizen has to decide for him-or-herself whether he or she wants to apply for a 
new citizenship and, second, the respective government has then to make a decision whether 
it wants to accept him or her. The government is in the stronger position since it has the 
power of the last word. This is why we shall concentrate our empirical analysis on govern-
mental actors. Authorities are free to decline an application after a candidate has made a first 
move showing his or her willingness to become citizen of that state—and even if the applicant 
fulfills all conditions (Bauböck 1994: 72). This makes decisions about naturalization discre-
tionary rather than strictly consensual.14 The acquisition of citizenship is not really optional, 
either. Foreign citizens of a country, it is true, have the choice of whether they want to apply 
for citizenship and are seldom forced to acquire a new nationality; however, individual candi-
dates do not have the power to influence the naturalization procedures, nor can they really 
choose between different nation-states.15 If migrants have any choice at all, it is in their deci-
sions to migrate to a specific country based on considerations about territorial access or eco-
nomic opportunities. They might emigrate to a third country if they do not encounter the posi-
tive economic or social conditions they expected to find in this first country to which they 
emigrated, but it is hardly imaginable that considerations about opportunities to become a full 
citizen will motivate such decisions.16  
Referring to citizenship politics, Bauböck (1994) proposes to imagine a world of voluntary 
associations with completely open boundaries of membership. These associations would take 
binding decisions for their present members and be open for all individuals who wished to 
                                                
14 A distinction has to be made between discretionary and as-of-right systems. In the former, candidates can be 
rejected even if certain conditions are fulfilled. In the latter, mostly concerning candidates of the second genera-
tion, individuals have a right to citizenship when they meet certain conditions; negative decisions must be justi-
fied and can be appealed. Ordinary naturalizations (first generation) happen in many countries, including Swit-
zerland, according to a discretionary system (Weil 2002; Brubaker 1989: 108-109). 
15 This does not mean, however, that migrant movements and their claims have no impact on citizenship politics 
over a longer period (Joppke 1998; 1999; Kastoryano 2002).  
16 In our project, we have even received the impression that it is rather exceptional that potential candidates 
move to another municipality where the chances to obtain Swiss citizenship appear to be higher. 
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join them. As individuals have different needs and preferences, not everybody would like to 
join all associations. On the other hand, nation-states would adapt their criteria for adhesion to 
attract more, or specific, naturalization candidates. According to Bauböck, such a model, 
reminiscent of the liberal market regulated by offer and demand, would face the problems of 
collective action. Associations producing a lot of benefits for their members would be desired 
by non-members and overwhelmed by free riders; even more so, if a general right of exit 
would make it impossible to distribute burdens or duties necessary for the production of some 
collective benefit. In order to avoid such a self-destroying model and to deter any free riders, 
specific criteria have to be established that have to be fulfilled before one can be accepted.  
The free rider problem and how it is solved by access regulations might be illustrated with the 
example of citizenship in medieval towns and their practice of poor relief. In his discussion of 
the evolution of citizenship in Germany and France, Brubaker (1992: 64-72) gives the exam-
ple of German imperial legislation that in 1530 required every town and commune to nourish 
and lodge its poor. There was no doubt that each town was responsible for its municipal citi-
zens. But did other inhabitants also belong to “its” poor? In order to avoid a situation in which 
too many migrant poor would populate a territory, each town had do define who ‘its’ poor 
citizens were and, obviously, had an incentive to define membership as restrictively as possi-
ble. While it had sufficed for a long time to live in a town to be considered as a member, from 
that time forward towns increasingly made membership contingent on formally approved 
domicile.17 The municipal closure against migrant poor was problematic insofar as an expul-
sion or a too restrictive definition of citizenship would displease other towns that would have 
to house these people. States began therefore to interfere in communal citizenship. Not only 
were membership policies more and more coordinated on the state level, but practices of poor 
relief also became the responsibility of states. This development lifted the problem of citizen-
ship definition and exclusion of the poor from the municipal to the state level. As the towns 
had done before, the state now had to define who ‘its’ poor were. Also, as in the inter-
communal disputes, states could no longer simply expel their poor without imposing costs on 
neighboring states. Numerous treaties between states at the beginning of the 19th century 
articulated the principle that states could only expel into the territory of another state a 
member of that second state. 
Prak (1999: 22) illustrates similar social exclusion mechanisms in his discussion on the mu-
nicipal citizenship in the Dutch town of Bois-le-Duc. Since there was no way to stop the in-
                                                
17 The actual legal reality was much more complex, since there was not only the status of citizens and non-
citizens but also those of privileged inhabitants and others. For details see Brubaker (1992: 203n43). 
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flux of lower-class immigrants, in 1772, the local authorities stipulated that one could only be 
treated in the hospital—which was mainly an institution for the poor—after ten years of resi-
dence in town. To be eligible for municipal poor relief, one had to wait for 15 years. While 
long-term residents profited from those social services, becoming a full citizen of Bois-le-Duc 
included significant additional advantages. Unlike ordinary inhabitants, native or purchased 
citizens could be admitted to the guilds and elected to the city’s more important offices. A 
further advantage was that they could be tried only by local courts. Such judicial differences 
between citizens and other inhabitants also came along with social inequalities. As Prak 
(1999: 21) notes, the distribution of wealth between natives and immigrants were quite equal. 
However, if one compares the naturalized immigrants with the mere inhabitants, it appears 
that the former were much better off than the latter. Whereas the citizens were overrepre-
sented among the upper middle class and the elite, the lower middle class and the poor were 
overrepresented by the inhabitants. Clearly, the attribution of citizenship seemed to be in fa-
vor of the wealthy. The various citizenship regulations not only prevented the municipal re-
sources from being exhausted, but the political and economic exclusion mechanisms also 
aimed to protect the local citizens and deter possible free riders. Citizenship was an instru-
ment of social closure whose application reflected the material interests of the local citizens. 
Like Germany, the Dutch Republic witnessed a transfer of citizenship regulations from the 
local to the national level at the end of the 18th century. However, this transfer was not only a 
shift of competence, but it also brought forth a new meaning of citizenship. Prak (1999) ex-
plicates that new ideas about citizenship began to emerge among radical opponents of the 
regime during the 1770s and 1780s. They developed a model of political participation by all 
the people against a hierarchical model of clientelism. Against a vertical conception of citi-
zenship that was of a corporate nature and confined to certain localities, they put forward the 
idea of a horizontal, general, and national conception of citizenship. This modern understand-
ing of citizenship was inspired by thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment and reached a high 
point in the French Revolution. Citizenship was central to the theory and practice for the time 
after 1789 because the French Revolution sought the establishment of equality before the law 
and a general membership status for all permanent residents. These ideas began to dominate 
the debate in the Dutch Republic after the invasion of the French revolutionary armies. Citi-
zenship status was no longer restricted to the urban elites but was thrown open to rural folk. 
More generally, citizenship became strongly politicized whereas before it had just been an 
economic and social institution. This might be illustrated by Prak’s (1999: 22-23) discussion 
on the treatment of Jews. Before the transfer of citizenship regulations, shopkeepers in Bois-
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le-Duc claimed that their business were undercut and disadvantaged by the illegal practices of 
Jews who came and went without paying any taxes. In 1777, the guild’s directors successfully 
requested that the admission of Jews be terminated. Whereas Bois-le-Duc considered Jews 
explicitly as outsiders, in the new conception of the national citizenship there was no refer-
ence to Jews. In 1796, the National Assembly decided that Jews could become equal citizens 
of the Batavian Republic, arguing that citizenship was an individual quality and that provin-
cial and local bylaws concerning Jews must not interfere with national policy.  
 
Two modes of social closure: immigration policy and national citizenship 
The new form of citizenship that emerged all over Europe from the second half of the 18th 
century onward has not been a full break with the local citizenship models, in that it still func-
tioned as an exclusion mechanism for poor and inferior social people from outside the nation-
state’s territory. Like the towns before them, nation-states had to decide who belonged to 
them and who could benefit from their institutions. However, the exclusion of economically 
undesirable people occurred more and more at the territorial boundaries of a nation-state. 
From this policy, though, it should not be deduced that access to the territory, on the other 
hand, equated with the acquisition of full membership. Rather, a system with two modes of 
social closure—once at the territorial border and once inside the territorial borders—has 
emerged. According to Mackert (2004: 258) and Brubaker (1992: ch.1) these internal and 
external exclusions have different meanings and reflect the dual nature of nation-states. When 
we dissect the nation-state we have got, on the one hand, the state that is—following Weber’s 
(1946: 78) definition—a territorial organization, which exercises legitimate control over its 
own territory undisturbed by internal power competition or external intervention. On the other 
hand, we have got the nation that is a community of sentiment tending to produce a state of its 
own (Weber 1946: 176). When a state and a nation coincide territorially and demographically 
we then can speak of a nation-state.  
The regulation of immigration into a territorial community has a decisive bearing on the life 
chances for migrants, since the access to a state includes such basic goods as security, public 
order, and a promising labor market. The regulation of immigration is crucial not only insofar 
as it concerns the labor market but also welfare state politics, and nation-states have various 
material interests in facilitating and restricting immigration. This differentiates nation-states 
from medieval polities where rules were exercised over particular sets of persons and not over 
territories; mere presence did not include political, administrative, or legal inclusion. In mod-
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ern times, jurisdiction has depended more and more on the spatial coordinates of the action 
and less on the personal status of the agent. Therefore, the territorial state has every interest in 
controlling the flow of persons across its boundaries. The refusal to let in migrants or to expel 
them is not unproblematic, since immigration policy of a particular state also concerns other, 
mainly neighboring states. The various bilateral and multilateral treaties on immigration un-
derscore to what extent different states have an interest in the degree of openness of a particu-
lar state’s borders. The European Union is probably the most illustrative example of a com-
mon immigration policy between various nation-states that have lost some sovereignty in this 
field.  
While external closure serves vital and tangible nation-state interests, closure inside of a na-
tion-state’s territory—what we henceforth call national citizenship—cannot be attributed to 
material interests. When one takes into consideration that nowadays in Western European 
nation-states permanent alien residents—‘denizens’ as they often are called—have almost the 
same social rights as ordinary citizens,18 it becomes clear that the attribution of citizenship 
must be influenced by other factors. Denizens, ordinarily, are allowed to remain indefinitely 
in a country and to participate in social and economic life on the same terms as ordinary citi-
zens. It is political participation in particular that is not possible for alien residents.19 This 
does not mean that in individual cases pragmatic interests might not motivate an alien citizen 
to apply for citizenship. Having a Swiss passport, for example, might facilitate traveling and 
increase one’s chances on the job market. From the perspective of the nation-state, however, 
there are no differences in terms of material interests whether its permanent alien residents are 
naturalized or not.20 Citizenship therefore cannot be considered in a purely functional context, 
that is, its contribution to the opportunities of immigrants or the exclusionary capacity of a 
state. Rather, it has to be analyzed in a political-cultural context. Since hardly any material 
interests are at risk, symbolic stakes can be considered as crucial when it comes to naturaliza-
tion: Future citizens are not selected (primarily) on their economic or kinship status but on the 
basis of cultural categories that are considered as a crucial part of the nation. Before we dis-
                                                
18 On rights for non-national residents in various nation-states see Bauböck (1995) and Guiraudon (1998; 2000); 
see also Howard (2006: 445). 
19 There are, however, a considerable number of nation-states where all or part of the permanent residents get 
electoral rights on the local and regional and more seldom on the national level (Bauböck 2005). In Switzerland, 
denizens have political rights at the local and regional levels in some cantons. 
20 By this we mean that no costs arise for the state when permanent residents are naturalized. On the contrary, in 
some (rather exceptional) circumstances the state might even profit from naturalizations when the candidates 
have to pay to get a passport. Until recently, naturalizations in some few Swiss municipalities were quite costly. 
For some municipalities, naturalizations were an important source of income (see Steiner 2004b). Since 2006, 
and according to the Federal Law on the Acquisition and Loss of the Swiss Citizenship (141.0; art. 38), only 
taxes covering the costs of the proceedings are allowed to be collected at the federal, cantonal, and municipal 
levels. Fees can be waived for impecunious persons at the federal level. 
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cuss in more detail the criteria that have to be fulfilled to become a new citizen, let us now 
explore to what extent this new closure mechanism relies on a different understanding of 
community than its local predecessor. 
 
A new form of political community: popular sovereignty, equality and self-determination 
National citizenship is very closely related to the age of nationalism. To understand the role 
and meaning of national citizenship, we therefore have to make clear what we understand by 
nationalism. There are almost as many definitions of it as scholars in this field (for an over-
view see Jafferlot 1997; Smith 1998; Spencer and Wollman 2002). Most researchers are pre-
occupied with uncovering its origins and explaining its emergence. Some see it as a result of 
enduring ethnic identities (Geertz 1963; Smith 1986; Hutcheson 1994; Armstrong 1982) 
whereas others link it to the needs of generating a ‘high culture’ for modernization and indus-
trial development (Gellner 1983). Still others argue that nationalism derives from the rational 
workings of the world economy or consider it as separatists’ responses to unequal economic 
development (Hechter 1975; Nairn 1977). Tilly (1975; 1990), Mann (1993; 1995), Giddens 
(1985) and Breuilly (1993) explore the relationship between nationalism and sources of power 
such as war, elites, and modern states. Greenfeld (1992) puts forward the argument of the 
status anxiety and ressentiment of new elites claiming distinction from older elites by legiti-
mating themselves as representatives of the new nations, and Hobsbawm (1990) explains it as 
a result of the invention of an ideology to legitimate states within capitalist economic rela-
tions. A last group of scholars includes Kedourie (1960) and Juergensmeyer (1993), who con-
sider nationalism as a belief system and a form of religious surrogate or secular religion.  
All of these approaches contribute in one way or the other to a better understanding of the 
creation of nationalist movements and the emergence of nation-states, but none of them ex-
plains them entirely.21 They help us understand the various dimensions and contents of those 
social phenomena but they do not explain the form itself that would enable us to better under-
stand the role of national citizenship (see Calhoun 1997: ch.1). While ‘form’ stands for the 
undifferentiated primal element of nationalism, contents or dimensions are the particular 
shapes that are assumed. Under ‘dimensions’ of nationalism we might categorize such diverse 
phenomena as inter-state wars, separatist movements, singing national anthems at soccer 
                                                
21 Smith (1998: 223) concludes his overview on the various approaches of nationalism with the rather pessimistic 
observation that “the field [of nationalism] is so riven by basic disagreements and so divided by rival ap-
proaches, each of which addresses only one or other aspect of this vast field, that a unified approach must seem 
quite unrealistic and any general theory merely utopian.” 
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games, or the hissing at national flags on national holidays. The ‘content’ of nationalism con-
sists of the meanings that are associated with the different dimensions. Crucial in the course 
of the next chapters will be the ‘content’ of the closure mechanism of citizenship (another 
dimension of nationalism), for example, the question of whether a rather restrictive or a rather 
generous understanding of citizenship prevails in Swiss municipalities.  
While questions of content and dimension will preoccupy us extensively below, they are in-
adequate for grasping the more general character of nationalism, namely that it is a modern 
version of ethnicity. Following Jenkins (1997), we define ethnicity as a first-order dimension 
of human experience and a principle of groups living together: It is a form of cultural under-
standing, social organization, and political contestation. This definition draws heavily on We-
ber’s (1978: 385-398) and Barth’s (1969) understanding of ethnicity as social organization of 
cultural difference and group claims based on the belief in shared culture and common ances-
try.  
Throughout history, human beings have organized themselves in groups with cultural or sym-
bolic meanings. By underscoring this basic principle of nationalism, we do not speak out on 
the stability and fluidity of groups or the mechanism producing them, nor do we claim that 
there is a specific content for a cultural group in general or a nation in particular.22 Our argu-
ment is simply that human beings have always been culturally organized—mostly in ethnic 
groups and nations. There are similarities between these two versions of ethnicity: The search 
for historic origins and the socio-cultural organization to mobilize part of the masses have 
been part of both versions of ethnicity (Smith 1984; 1986: ch.6). However, the differences 
between them are crucial: Nations are distinguished by action oriented towards political 
autonomy, and this aspect makes nationalism entirely modern. Emphasizing the political and 
modern character of nations also enables us to separate them from other categories of collec-
tive identification such as class for example. 
‘Modern’ does not imply that drawing on older communities or traditions is irrelevant for 
nations. A reproduction of traditions and mobilization of a (suitable) cultural and heroic past 
and a certain way of resorting to an ethnic community to legitimate their existence can be 
observed in every nation-state. Nor does ‘modern’ mean that nationalism is necessarily and 
exclusively the outcome of other modern developments such as industrialization (Gellner 
                                                
22 Our argument is thus far away from any socio-biological arguments. Claiming that human beings have a natu-
ral tendency to organize themselves in groups does not entail that there is any natural characteristic automatically 
unifying a group of people. As we will argue in the course of this and the next chapters, the definition of what 
constitutes a nation (or any other group) is not a given but the result of political struggles over cultural bounda-
ries (see also our arguments on xenophobia in Chapter 7).  
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1983), print-capitalism (Anderson 1991[1983]), or new communicative facilities (Deutsch 
1966). Rather, following Wimmer (2002) and Calhoun (1997; see also 1993), it can be argued 
(1) that nationalist principles structure modernity, i.e., the idea of nation and claims to na-
tional identity are the basis for modern politics and culture, and (2) that nationalism is the 
result of the overlapping and fusion of other modern notions of peoplehood. The first argu-
ment draws on Gellner’s (1983: 1) seminal definition of nationalism which holds that the po-
litical and the national unit should be congruent.23 This does not simply mean that nations 
tend to produce states of their own and that modern societies are organized within nation-
states. Following Wimmer (2002: 4-5), it rather can be argued that nationalism is modern be-
cause it ties institutions of inclusion such as citizenship, democracy, and welfare to national 
forms of exclusion. Calhoun (1997) adopts an even broader understanding of nationalism as a 
modern phenomenon and argues that ‘national’ ways of thinking or the ‘discourse’ of nation-
alism structure not only political life but also everyday experiences (see also Billig 1995). The 
emergence of national citizenship and its exclusion mechanism is indeed a corollary of state 
formation. However, its deeper functioning, and this is our second argument, can fully be un-
derstood only when we see nationalism in combination with other notions of peoplehood: the 
people as a sovereign entity, the people as citizens of a state holding equal rights, and the 
people as a community held together by common political destiny and shared cultural features 
(Calhoun 1997; Wimmer 2002). In other terms, nationalism as a modern version of ethnicity 
is tightly linked to the ideas of popular sovereignty, equality, and self-determination this—and 
this makes national citizenship a highly salient closure mechanism. 
By defining nationalism as a modern form of ethnicity, we make no particular claims about 
the period of its emergence, although it can certainly be agreed that most nationalisms did 
fully develop only in the wake of the French Revolution.24 For some scholars, nationalism 
made its appearance earlier.25 Seton-Watson (1977) and Johnson (1993), for example, demon-
strate that national feelings had already emerged in England and France in the 17th century. 
For Greenfeld (1992), the British rebellion against monarchy in the 17th century constitutes 
the beginning of nationalism. Anderson (1991 [1983]) situates its origins a century later in the 
struggles of creole pioneers against Iberian colonialism. Hastings (1997) even argues that 
                                                
23 For similar definitions see also Breuilly (1993: 3); Hobsbawm (1990: 9); Calhoun (1997: 69; Hastings 1997: 
3-4). 
24 Or as Best’s (1982: 29) often quoted argument goes: “Historians of nationalism agree to differ in their esti-
mates of how much of it [nationalism] (and what sorts of it) already existed in the Atlantic world of 1785. They 
are at one in recognizing that the world by 1815 was full of it, and that although each national variety had of 
course its strong characteristics, those varieties had enough in common for it to constitute the most momentous 
phenomenon of modern history.” 
25 For a very thorough critique of modernist theories of nationalism see Gorski (2000).  
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such phenomena and the term ‘nation’ (as it is used in the modern sense) could be discerned 
at least from the 11th century onwards.  
Tracing the development of the meaning of the notion of nation provides a first opportunity to 
apprehend the modernity of nationalism. The term ‘nation’ has existed for a long time but has 
had various meanings and has referred to different groups of people (Greenfeld 1992: 4-9; 
Habermas 1991: 8-9). The initial use was derogatory and reserved for groups of foreigners in 
Rome coming from the same geographical region. The idea of common geographical origins 
was also part of a later use of the word ‘nation’: communities of students coming to several 
universities from the same region. In a further change, this concept partially lost its geo-
graphical connotation and began to stand for a political, cultural and social elite, namely, the 
representatives of secular and religious potentates at the Church Council. In England in the 
early 16th century, the word ‘nation’ and its counciliar meaning of an ‘elite’ was applied to the 
people of the country and subsequently made synonymous with the word, ‘people’. As Green-
feld (2002: 6) points out, prior to its nationalization, the term ‘people’ referred to the lower 
classes of a region. The elevation of the people to a nation made it the bearer of sovereignty 
and the basis of political solidarity. The people—formerly stratified along status—were now 
perceived as essentially homogeneous. In other words, the emergence of nation-states was 
closely coupled with the emerging idea that the legitimacy of the state ‘ascended’ no longer 
from God but from the people. Since the label ‘nation’ was attached to a specific people of a 
certain territory, the concept of nation referred not only to the sovereignty of a people but also 
to its uniqueness. The differentiation between these two meanings is quite crucial, for a ‘na-
tion’ can be considered as both a general organizing principle and a specific form of cultural 
community. Indeed, ‘nations’ are always associated with existing populations or countries. 
This does not mean, however, that certain elements determine what a nation is. It is rather the 
organizing principle which makes these elements into a unity and gives them a certain mean-
ing. Similarly, nationalism involves more than the construction of a particular national iden-
tity. It includes the general principle that the people organize their own cultural community. 
At first sight, this Janus-faced meaning of nationalism (or nation)—universalism and particu-
larism—might appear paradoxical but, in fact, it allows us to fully grasp its modern character: 
While nationalism goes hand in hand with the universalistic doctrines of sovereignty, equal-
ity, and democracy, these principles apply only to the people who belong to a particular na-
tion. In other words, only those persons who are part of the nation belong to the sovereign 
body, profit from equal rights, and are allowed to participate in the democratic processes. Ac-
cording to Anderson’s (1991 [1983]: 6) seminal definition, a nation is a community imagined 
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as both inherently limited and sovereign. Anderson (1991 [1983]: 7) explains the relation be-
tween sovereignty and nationalism by the fact that both concepts were born in the age of En-
lightenment: Nationalism grew partly out of popular challenges to the authority and legiti-
macy of the elite of modern states. From another perspective, one observes that the extension 
of the power of states through a standing army, bureaucracy, and the collection of taxes was 
only conceivable if politics was legitimatized by the population. To call up a popular army 
and collect taxes is only possible if the people consider themselves as a part of the nation and 
if they also consider themselves as the sovereign body. Nationalism plays a crucial role in the 
modern discourse of political legitimacy, for that state is legitimate which fits with and serves 
the interest of the people: “To ‘fit with’ the people meant both that the boundaries of the state 
matched those of the nation—an important aspect of the movement towards compact and con-
tiguous territories—and that the purposes of the state matched the interests of its citizens—
conceived not only as individuals but also as a singular nation or confederation of such na-
tions” (Calhoun 1997: 69-70; see also Schöneberg 1987: 49). To conceive of the citizens as a 
singular nation is commensurate with Anderson’s (1991 [1983]: 7) idea that a nation has to be 
imagined as ‘limited’. For even the largest nation has finite, if elastic, boundaries and would 
never imagine itself coterminous with mankind.  
The idea that each nation constitutes a particularly imagined community has to be seen in the 
light of liberalism and the idea of individualism, which were entwined with nationalism at 
least from the time of either the English or French Revolutions up until 1848 (Spencer and 
Wollmann 2002: 6-8). A lot of liberals made a connection between individual and national 
freedom and saw nations as ‘individuals’ with particular talents that had the right to unfold 
themselves in freedom. Nations were seen both as communities of individuals and as them-
selves being individuals—“both in the literal sense of being indivisible, and metaphorically as 
singular beings that move through history as ordinary people move through their biographical 
life courses” (Calhoun 1997: 44). As for individual persons, it was suggested that a healthy 
development of nations was only possible in freedom, that is, when national communities are 
conceded self-determination and sovereignty. According to Spencer and Wollman (2002: 6), 
the foundations of the rapprochement of liberalism and nationalism were laid by Kant, who 
insisted on the idea of individual autonomy and will and thus opened the way for others to 
think about nations along the same lines. Calhoun (1997: 45) sees the links between individu-
alism and nationalism most clearly in the works of Gottlieb Fichte and his notion of self-
recognition. For Fichte, nations are individuals with particular talents. To succeed and be-
come an extraordinary community, nations had to achieve a distinctive character in a process 
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of individuation. Even if some later nationalisms were connected more with collectivistic and 
authoritarian ideologies, rather than with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cos-
mopolitanism, the idea of constituting a self-determined nation remained (Kohn 1967; Green-
feld 1992). 
The ideology of individualism forged not only the conception of the nation but also the rela-
tionship between nations and between each nation’s constituent parts. Individuals are directly 
members of their nations, this relationship not being mediated through other social structures. 
Nationality is understood as an attribute of the individual, and because this attribute is the 
same for everyone, nationality makes all individuals potentially equal and consequently seems 
to erase structural inequalities. The new nation-states integrated all major exclusionary modes 
previously organized on different social levels and fostered internal integration and homog-
enization. Thus, the emerging national citizenship was no longer confined to the members of 
certain families or persons of high social status but extended to the lower classes (Bendix and 
Rokkan 1971; Bendix 1977). Nairn (1977: 41) formulates this idea as follows: “The arrival of 
nationalism in a distinctively modern sense was tied to the political baptism of the lower 
classes […] Although sometimes hostile to democracy, nationalist movements have been in-
variably populist in outlook and sought to induct lower classes into political life.” Demands 
for equality did not result uniquely from an economic dissatisfaction, as is put forward by 
Marxist theory, which concentrates on one of the major movements in the 19th century—
socialism—but completely ignores the second one, namely that of nationalism. As Bendix 
(1977) argues, the distribution and redistribution of rights and duties were rather the result of 
a political alienation of the working class and a rising awareness of not having a recognized 
position in the national community. Such distributive processes might be influenced by the 
structure of society—as the Marxian argument runs—but they are also affected “by concep-
tions of what the proper distribution in the national community ought to be, and by the give 
and take of the political struggle” (Bendix 1977: 88). Thus, it is in the course of political 
struggles about the definition of who constitutes the nation that the boundaries are drawn and 
certain parts of the population are included, while others are excluded. 
While at first citizenship excluded socially and economically dependent persons and for a 
long time women too, in the course of the 19th and 20th century such restrictions were gradu-
ally reduced, until eventually all adults had been classified as citizens. According to Mar-
shall’s (1950) famous trichotomy, citizenship rights successively included civic, political, and 
social rights. Whether this sequence over three centuries could be observed only in his study 
of England or could be observed in other countries as well might be subject to debates (see 
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Mann 2000). Moreover, it is certainly true that his trichotomy should be extended with eco-
nomic and cultural rights as mechanisms to include or exclude specific groups (Mackert 1999; 
Kymlicka 1995: 179-181). Nonetheless, Marshall’s (1950) theory enables us to dissect the 
various aspects of citizenship rights and, more importantly, to apprehend their integrative 
function in nation-states in which capitalist development led to class inequalities: Citizenship 
rights foster a sense of community based on loyalty to a nation that is a common possession. 
The evolutionary ascription of the same rights to all members of a nation-state is part of what 
Bendix (1977) and others call the ‘age of democratic revolution’. Since citizenship no longer 
referred to membership in corporate institutions, henceforth and especially with regard to po-
litical rights, an active participation in the affairs of the national community was required. 
Whether the basic ideas of democracy and nationalism are compatible is subject to academic 
debate (Spencer and Wollman 2002: ch. 5). At first, the logics that are commonly attributed to 
these two concepts—democracy as an inclusive and nationalism as an exclusive doctrine—
seem to be contradictory. In the context of the French Revolution, however, both democratic 
and nationalist struggles pursued the same aims: to abolish authoritarian rule and to establish 
self-determination of the people. We can thus agree with Greenfeld (1992: 10) and hold that 
“[n]ationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea 
of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon.” Moreover, it can be argued that nation-states provide 
the necessary framework within which democratic rights have been most effectively de-
manded, accorded, and sustained. Yet, given the fact that nationalism and democracy emerged 
in a specific spatio-temporal context indicates that the relation between these two principles 
might vary according to historical circumstances and the nature of the political process 
(Wimmer 2002: 2; Greenfeld 1992: 10-11; Spencer and Wollman 2002: ch. 5). In fact, de-
mocracy has not the same significance in all nation-states, and, of course, there can be nation-
alism without democracy. France and Germany are often brought up as two examples where 
democracy played a different role in the process of nation-state formation. In France, both 
ideas seem to be closely related because this country was the setting for both a democratic and 
a nationalist revolution. Consequently, nationalism there has been almost unthinkable without 
democracy; but only ‘almost’, for it has also undergone its anti-democratic periods. In Ger-
many, on the other hand, democratic and nationalist movements have evolved separately. At 
certain times, nationalism even took a radically anti-democratic turn—especially in the con-
text of the destruction of the Weimar republic and Hitler’s rise to power. Such variations of 
the relation between these two principles, however, do not belie the fact that nationalism is an 
essential component of democracy (Nodia 1994). While the latter concept stands for the idea 
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that the people decide what they want, the former defines who the people are who make those 
decisions. Miller (1995; 2000) goes even a step further in his argumentation. For him, the role 
of nations is not limited to telling us who is allowed to participate in the democratic process. 
Defending the idea of republican citizenship, he argues that a good democracy is one whose 
citizens are actively engaged in politics and that such an engagement necessitates a shared 
national identity among the participants to motivate them to work together (see also Calhoun 
2007). For a common national identity is the basis of mutual trust that is, in turn, a necessary 
condition to make a state work. From this it does not follow that democracy entails national-
ism. Rather, democracies are structured within nation-states. As a general rule, only those 
people are accorded political rights who are part of the nation26—and this is true in France as 
well as in Germany. Of course, the exclusion of people from democratic processes can be 
strongly contested when long-term residents of a state get no voting rights. To which atroci-
ties the confusion of the demos (the mass of the population) and the ethnos (the ethnic group) 
can lead has been demonstrated by Mann (2005) in his book on ethnic cleansing in the age of 
democracy.27 
To summarize the foregoing discussion, it can be stated that nationalism claims rights of self-
determination and legitimate rule by reference to the sovereign people of a country. In mod-
ern times, state power is derived from and exercised for a nation; or formulated differently, a 
nation-state claims to be the state ‘of’ and ‘for’ a particular, distinctive, and bounded nation. 
The closure mechanism of national citizenship can only be understood by the idea of this in-
terconnectedness. For to qualify to be or to become a full member, potential candidates have 
to be a member of the nation or to fulfill the membership-criteria. As we have illustrated with 
Prak’s example of citizenship politics in Bois-le-Duc, historic forerunners of nation-states 
were based on organizational forms, which conceived of a hierarchical order of unequal status 
as normal (see also Mackert and Müller 2000: 14). As we have seen, citizenship was mainly 
an economic regulatory mechanism open for the wealthy urban elite and closed for the poor 
and socially disadvantaged. Nation-states, on the other hand, are always conceived as “a deep, 
horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991 [1983]: 7)—regardless of actual social or economic 
inequalities. They are organized primarily as categories of equal individual members identi-
fied on the basis of various cultural attributes and exclude all those who do not belong to the 
nation (Calhoun 1997: 42-48; see also Gellner 1983: 57). Vertical boundaries dividing rulers 
                                                
26 Exceptions to this rule are nation-states in which all or certain groups of foreigners are allowed to participate 
in the democratic processes after some years of residence on the national, regional and/or local level (Bauböck 
2005). 
27 Schöneberg (1987: 49) argues that the principle of democratic majority leads to oppression and exclusion of 
minorities. See also Montagu (1997[1942]). 
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and ruled were replaced by horizontal boundaries separating nationals from foreigners. This 
new distinction has become particularly salient given the overlapping of various forms of 
peoplehood; the definition of who belongs to those who can be considered as equal members 
became of crucial political importance. 
 
Citizenship and national self-understanding: analytical ambiguities 
Claiming that human beings have a natural tendency to organize themselves in groups and 
that in modern times nation-states exclude undesirable people through citizenship mecha-
nisms does not help us understand who exactly is excluded. It only implies that even the most 
generous politicians demand applicants to fulfill at least some minimal criteria. Or as Wim-
mer (2006a: 341) has put it: “However widely the boundaries of the national community are 
imagined […] it remains a bounded community, with the large majority of the world’s popu-
lation on the outside.” It is hardly imaginable that a person with no Swiss passport, with no 
historical or emotional connection to Switzerland, and speaking no Swiss national language 
could immigrate to Switzerland and have any expectation of acceptance when requesting 
Swiss nationality. Closure mechanisms are always at work when somebody seeks to cross 
cultural boundaries. Consequently, we have to ask the following questions: How is a nation-
state imagined? Who belongs to the people that enjoy equal rights? In whose name does a 
state rule? And hence, who can be admitted to full membership? By looking for answers to 
these questions, we turn to the various contents of nationalism and to the particular under-
standings of citizenship. 
The most commonly used categories of nationalism or citizenship are ‘civic-territorial’ and 
‘ethnic’. Kohn (1967 [1944]), probably the most influential source of this opposition, speaks 
of Western and Eastern versions of nationalism, and makes a distinction between a ‘volunta-
rist’ type, which regards the nation as a free association of rational human beings entered into 
voluntarily and on an individual basis, and an ‘organic’ type, which views the nation as an 
organism of fixed and indelible character that was stamped on its members at birth. The two 
countries that are most often put forward as examples of these types are France and Ger-
many.28 While France represents a republican, expansive, and assimilationist model of citi-
zenship, Germany defines citizenry as a community of descent that is very restrictive towards 
non-German immigrants. What consequences such different understandings of nationhood 
                                                
28 Most widely cited is Brubaker (1992). Comparisons of citizenship models in France, Germany and other coun-
tries such as Britain, the United States, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be found in Koopmans et al. (2005); 
Giugni and Passy (2006); Greenfeld (1992); Joppke (1999); Kastoryano (2002) and Schiffauer (1993). 
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can have on citizenship politics has been illustrated by, among others, Brubaker (1992). He 
starts his study with the observation that, although both countries recruited foreign workers in 
large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, subsequently witnessed a growth of the migrant popu-
lation and consequently pursued an equally restrictive immigration policy, they differ in their 
sharply different citizenship policies. While Germany requires from potential applicants for 
naturalization ten years of residence and the renouncement of the original nationality, in 
France candidates have to live in the country for five years before they can apply and are al-
lowed to keep their old passport. Germany lacks a political support for naturalization and ex-
plicitly considers itself as not a country of immigration. In France, on the other hand, naturali-
zation is considered as a normal and desirable outcome of permanent settlement. Conse-
quently, immigrants’ attitudes towards naturalization differ in Germany and France. In 1985, 
only 6 percent of German migrant workers intended to naturalize, while they were about 25 
percent in France. Looking at the naturalization rates in the 1980s reveals that they are four to 
five times higher in France than in Germany. Brubaker (1992) explains this difference by dif-
ferent national self-understandings in these countries, which are, in turn, rooted in distinctive 
French and German paths to nation-statehood.  
Both concepts—the civic-territorial and ethnic models of citizenship—have become so habit-
ual in the meantime that it is often forgotten that they are invented (Calhoun 2004a: ix). They 
seem to be natural, whereas in fact they are based on political discourses. Therefore, they 
should not be treated as normative categories but as different styles in which nations are 
imagined (see Anderson 1991: 6). Brubaker (1992) has demonstrated how particular ways of 
thinking and talking about nationhood were reinforced and activated in specific historical and 
institutional settings. A similar position is taken by Greenfeld (1992; 1995), for whom the 
inventors of nationalism were psychologically insecure or socially subordinated parts of a 
specific society: the English protestant squires, the French nobility, the newly literate German 
classes, or the English Puritans in America. Insecurities arose in specific historical circum-
stances in which consisting identities or social orders disaccorded with the beliefs of those 
groups. The resulting ressentiments were relieved by using the idea of nationalism to invent 
new nations, and these new definitions of what constitutes a particular society mainly served 
to legitimatize the interests of the emerging elite. Whether nations were defined in civic-
territorial or in rather ethnic terms depended on the perception of a nation’s status relative to 
other nations. Ethnic nationalism emerged in societies that believed themselves—at the time 
of emerging national identity—to be inferior to existing nations. Civic nationalisms, on the 
other hand, emerged when achievements provided a society with sufficient reasons for na-
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tional pride. According to Greenfeld (1992), German ethnic nationalism was triggered in the 
aftermath of the defeats against Napoleon’s revolutionary troops and during a period of 
French hegemony. In such precarious circumstances, claims to a particularly restrictive Ger-
man identity, clearly delineating oneself in contrast to others, seemed to answer a great need. 
France, on the other hand, being at the time of emerging nationalism in a period of superior-
ity, was too self-conscious to fear cultural or political hegemony and took the liberty to define 
its nationhood rather generously, allowing the access to all those who were ready to share 
their political convictions. Thus, references to common blood or to political ideas are less 
inherent characteristics of German or French culture respectively, but rather the outcome of 
particular historical and political situations.  
Kohn’s geographical application (dividing the European countries at the Rhine) has become, 
in the meantime, a more overall account of nationalism and, alternately, is replaced by other 
typologies, such as cultural/political, illiberal/liberal, emotional/rational or bad/good national-
isms. The last distinction suggests to what extent those dichotomies are ideologically and po-
litically laden and have even passed into caricature. Eastern nationalism is often considered as 
too exclusionary, too collectivist, and too particularistic compared to the inclusionary, indi-
vidualistic, and universal Western nationalism. Civic nationalism is commonly located in the 
Enlightenment and connected with the concepts of individual liberty and the liberal revolt 
against absolutism, whereas ethnic nationalism is considered as opposed to these core values. 
Instead of distinguishing between inclusionary and exclusionary nationalisms that pose nor-
mative ambiguities, it is analytically more useful to discern the bases or criteria of inclusion 
and exclusion. While the distinctions of ethnic and civic nationalism do grasp important as-
pects of reality, it is suggested here that these supposedly fundamental differences are better 
understood as differences of degree and emphasis than principle. Each form of nationalism 
has its inclusionary and exclusionary aspects and each nation-state defines who its people are 
and, thus, specifies who is excluded. Smith (1995: 101) even suggests that civic nationalism 
can be as severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalism. As the example of France shows, 
civic nationalism might also require assimilation of ethnic minorities within the borders of the 
nation-state through acculturation to the dominant culture.29 As Kuzio (2002) and Kaufmann 
(2000) underscore, so-called open citizenship models such as the Canadian and the US-
                                                
29 For that reason, some introduce a second dimension in the citizenship typology and distinguish to what extent 
Western nation-states require cultural assimilation (Tilly 1995; Koopmans and Kriesi 1997; Koopmans et al. 
2005). Those models provide, indeed, a more detailed analytical framework for the study of citizenship politics 
as they account for both how discriminatory the individual access to citizenship is and to what extent cultural 
group rights are granted. This second dimension has not been retained for our analysis, however, since we are 
only interested in the process of becoming a full member of a nation-state. 
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American, excluded various groups such as blacks, Catholic conservatives or communists at 
various moments in their history. Moreover, in all nation-states with a supposedly civic form 
of citizenship, distinctions are made between foreigners from European or North-American 
countries and those from other regions. 
Even if we consider these two forms of nationalism as two ideal-types or end points of a con-
tinuum, the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ are ambiguous and their definitive meanings are elu-
sive. For Brubaker (1999: 59-63), the notion of ethnic nationalism can be interpreted narrowly 
or broadly. In the narrow interpretation, it refers to descent and biology; in the broad interpre-
tation, it is used as a synonym for ‘cultural’. Given the fact that very few nations invoke a 
common ancestor and that for many nationalists ‘common descent’ is only one among many 
claims (and often a minor one), the group of ethnic nationalisms defined this way would be 
severely under-populated; the group of civic nationalisms, on the other hand, would become 
too heterogeneous, since it would include any number of nationalisms emphasizing common 
culture. Applying the broader definition of ethnic nationalism leads to the problem that, in this 
case, virtually all nationalisms would fall in this category. Almost every nationalist movement 
invokes cultural characteristics that separate their people from other peoples. Moreover, cul-
tural differentiations have been relevant throughout human history. Thus, a ‘cultural defini-
tion’ would include communities that existed before the age of nationalism and others that do 
not consider themselves as nations. Furthermore, it first would have to be decided which cul-
tural characteristics divide such communities and how much homogeneity is required for a 
community to be considered a nation (Gellner 1983: 54). On the other hand, interpreting 
‘civic nationalism’ in a very narrow sense involving an acultural, voluntarist, and rationalist 
understanding of citizenship would define the phenomenon out of existence, too, since even 
classical cases of civic nationhood such as France or the United States involve cultural com-
ponents (Brubaker 1999: 59-63). From another perspective, if we define nations as groups 
that will themselves, we end up with too many observations, since such a definition also ap-
plies to groups such as conspiracies, gangs, teams, or religious communities. Thus, even if 
will were the basis of nations, it is also the basis of much else (Gellner 1983: 54). 
Dividing nation-states into ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ groups of nationalism seems to imply that ‘cul-
ture’ and ‘will’ are mutually exclusive and misleads us into dividing citizenship models into 
clearly defined groups. For Gellner (1983: 53f) and Smith (1986: ch.6), neither one of them is 
remotely adequate for fully grasping the complexity of nationalism. Rather, it should be rec-
ognized that each form of nationalism consists of a combination of these two principles; and 
this combination can change over time. There are very few examples that come close to the 
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extreme—the complete exclusion of those who do not belong to their ethnic community from 
the possibility of naturalization. On the other hand, every civic nation-state attributes citizen-
ship on the basis of at least some minimal cultural requirements. Smith (1986: 144-152) ar-
gues that what distinguishes nations from ethnies are ‘Western’ features and qualities of na-
tionalism such as territoriality and political culture. Even ‘original Western nations’, however, 
have reconsidered their ethnic bases and reasserted their cultural and historic unity against 
minorities and subversive ideologies. Ernest Renan—the advocate of subjective self-
understanding in constituting nationhood (through a daily plebiscite)—underscores that cul-
tural elements play a crucial role in modern nation-states. According to him, a nation is both a 
soul and a principle. The first one belongs to the past and represents the common possession 
of a rich legacy of remembrances, and the second one is in the present and stands for the de-
sire and will to honor this legacy. He even seems to switch to the other side when he argues 
that man does not improvise but that the nation is the end product of a long period of work, 
sacrifice, and devotion (reprinted in Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 17).30 
 
Citizenship as a contested instrument of social closure 
Given the fact that the concepts of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ citizenship as well as political and cul-
tural nationalism are analytically ambiguous and ideologically laden, we suggest a return to 
Weber’s idea of open and closed relationships in our study of the functioning of the closure 
mechanism in national citizenship (Weber 1978). Weber defines a social relationship as 
‘open’ to outsiders if participation in the mutually oriented social action relevant to its mean-
ing-content is not denied to anyone who wishes to participate and who is actually in a position 
to do so. On the other hand, a relationship will be called ‘closed’ for outsiders if participation 
of certain persons is excluded, limited, or subjected to conditions.  
Weber himself did not develop these concepts any further and mainly applied them in the 
context of economic closure mechanisms. Nonetheless, his arguments are very helpful in our 
discussion for three reasons: First, he provides neutral notions for the functioning of closure 
mechanisms. Second, speaking of open and closed relations implies that closure mechanism 
can be more or less open and closed. Accordingly, there can be more or less restrictive under-
standings of citizenship (cf. Howard 2006). Third, Weber accounts for actors who use those 
instruments of social closure according to their interests. This brings us back to the beginning 
                                                
30 Some argue that Renan’s arguments were developed in the highly political context of the annexation of Al-
sace-Lorraine by Germany (Weil 1996; Silverman 1992). Thus, Renan’s lecture can also be seen as a political 
intervention intended to counter German claims to this territory. 
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of this chapter where we discussed to what extent citizenship can be considered as an instru-
ment of social closure being operated by governmental agents. Those operations, as Weber 
would put it, are governed by both material and ideal interests; these in turn have been created 
by ‘world images’—or what we call in this context national self-understanding—that have 
determined, like switchmen, the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of 
interest (Weber 1946: 280). This becomes most clear when Weber presents closure mecha-
nisms in monasteries and religious sects, which have passed from a stage of religious prosely-
tizing to one of restriction in the interest of the maintenance of an ethical standard or for the 
protection of material interests. 
Introducing human action or agency in the study of nationalism and citizenship is indispensa-
ble for the following reason: Underscoring the continuity of closure mechanisms between 
total closure and total openness and its propensity of change over time contains the danger of 
fluidity and vagueness. Indeed, we sought to put in perspective seemingly fixed categories 
such as ethnic and civic-territorial understandings of citizenship. This does not mean, how-
ever, that we cannot observe enduring citizenship politics. As will become clearer in the next 
chapter, fluidity and persistence can be reconciled by accounting for how actors struggle over 
the meaning of citizenship. National self-understandings persist as long as they appear to be 
legitimate, and change when they are successfully challenged. This stands in blatant contrast 
to Gellner’s (1983) proposition of how to overcome the dichotomy of will and culture. He 
completely blinds out the role of actors, adopts a functionalist perspective, and argues that 
nations are indispensable for industrial societies requiring patterned homogeneity, individual 
mobility, and cultural standardization. Smith’s seminal contribution to this discussion in The 
Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986) seems to prioritize culture over agency (or will). However, 
he also speaks in detail of the malleability of particular ethnics and nations (1986: 210-211). 
He emphasizes the role of intellectuals (calling them the modern priesthood), rediscovering 
and transmitting to future generations the myths and symbols of modern nations that are far 
more politicized than ethnies. But he is quick in cautioning us—and rightly so—against an 
instrumentalist perspective: “Ethnies and nations are not fixed and immutable entities ‘out 
there’ […]; but neither are they completely malleable and fluid processes and attitudes, at the 
mercy of every outside force.”  
Brubaker’s (1999: 67-69) alternative to civic and ethnic nationalism does not account for 
agency but points to a further aspect that will become more relevant in the next chapter—
political struggle. Brubaker prefers to apply the concepts of state-framed and counter-state 
forms of nationalism. In the former, ‘nation’ is conceived as congruent with the state and as 
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institutionally and territorially framed by it. There is not necessarily anything ‘civic’ about 
state-framed nationalism; different linguistic, cultural, and ethnic aspects may be shaped by 
the state. ‘Counter-state’ nationalism imagines ‘nations’ in opposition to existing ‘state-
framed’ nationalisms. Similarly, counter-state definitions of nations may be drawn from vari-
ous ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ aspects of nationhood. Brubaker does not elaborate very much on this 
dichotomy but by giving various examples insinuates that counter-state nationalisms seek 
regional autonomy or secession from existing nation-states. By generalizing his arguments, 
we could understand by ‘counter-state’ nationalism a movement questioning the way in which 
individual aspects of nationhood are framed by the state. We then might assume that there are 
various actors (within a nation-state) challenging the dominant definition of a nation-state, 
and that such conflicts occur at different points in time. Such movements do not assert their 
claims to specific parts of a nation-state but to its very essence.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter started out to explore the idea of citizenship and its functioning in modern na-
tion-states. On the basis of Tilly’s definition, we first underscored the contractual nature of 
citizenship between governmental agents and categories of persons. Dissecting the two steps 
of naturalization—decision-making by both potential candidates and the authorities—revealed 
that the latter have the last word, and regulate the access to citizenship according to specified 
criteria. Contrary to medieval local citizenship-politics, national citizenship is no longer about 
an economic free-rider problem. Rather, considering nation-states as membership organiza-
tions where cultural and symbolic aspects are at stake, it is the national self-understanding—
i.e., the way a nation is perceived—that guides citizenship politics. To better understand the 
logic that follows the functioning of national citizenship, we explored the concept of national-
ism as a modern form of the principle of groups living together. We argued that modernity is 
structured by nationalist principles and that nationalism is the fusion of other notions of peo-
plehood. Accordingly, naturalizations have become a highly political issue because it is about 
the questions of who belongs to us, who is an equal citizen, who is allowed to participate in 
the democratic processes, and who belongs to the sovereign body legitimatizing the state.  
Citizenship models provide answers to these questions, as they represent different ways that 
community is imagined. The dichotomy of ethnic and civic-territorial models has emerged as 
the main theoretical framework to study contents of nationalism and citizenship. While these 
two models do grasp reality in a certain way, they pose various analytical problems: They are 
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normatively loaded; they represent ideal-types and not clearly distinguishable empirical cases; 
they seem to be mutually exclusive whereas in fact every nationalism is composed of both 
principles; and, finally, they suggest differences of principle whereas it would be more useful 
to consider them as differences of degree and emphasis. To overcome these problems, We-
ber’s concepts of open and closed social relations were introduced: Weber provides neutral 
terms and enables us to account for both agency and for different degrees of social closure. 
The aspect of agency is crucial for understanding why citizenship models emerge and change 
over time: For citizenship politics is led by the “unstated assumptions and collective memory” 
(Tilly) of the governmental agents regulating the access to the national community, and they 
might be challenged by various other actors with different national self-understandings. This 
argument comes close to Beissinger’s (2002: 19) approach of grounding “nationalism in an 
ongoing interaction between a national order and those who seek to overturn or alter that or-
der through the production of disruptive events.”  
A contentious approach to nationalism allows us to better apprehend how definitions are im-
posed and contested and enables us to reconcile cultural fluidity and cultural persistence. 
Moreover, it becomes clear that the categories of ethnic and civic-territorial understandings of 
citizenship are not inherent characteristics of particular nation-states but rather politically 
framed ideologies. Speaking of ‘political struggles’ does not necessarily imply violent con-
flicts between national or ethnic groups. As we have argued above, nationalism also structures 
our everyday life and politics—citizenship politics! How to grasp analytically these struggles 
over who might be granted full membership in a national community will be dealt with in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Nation as a Political Field 
 
 
From the practice of citizenship to the logic of practice 
This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework for the ways the closure mechanism of 
national citizenship is manipulated, how its manipulation depends on the prevailing national 
self-understandings, and, finally, how a specific use might be contested by other actors pos-
sessing another understanding of what it means to be member of the nation. All this brings us 
back to Tilly’s (1999: 252-253) definition of citizenship, which we have outlined at the be-
ginning of the previous chapter. While so far we have discussed a great deal the contractual 
nature of citizenship and its role in modern societies, we have only slightly touched on Tilly’s 
addendum that such contracts are never completely specified but rather modified by practice. 
This specification opens a window to follow a research strategy that has hardly been adopted 
so far in the study fields of citizenship and nationalism. 
To put the ‘practice’ of citizenship in perspective has both theoretical and empirical implica-
tions. As for the latter, it simply means that we have to concentrate on what people do, and to 
adopt a research program based on close observation and ethnographic studies. To concen-
trate on the activities of individuals might seem trivial, since, almost per definition, the social 
sciences deal with what people do, especially when we analyze social interaction, everyday 
life, or social behavior. However, in the fields of nationalism and citizenship the situation is 
quite different in this regard. Most studies follow a mere structuralist perspective, situate 
themselves on a purely macro-sociological level of argumentation, and concentrate mainly on 
the origins and developments of nations. As a consequence, a majority of studies adopt an 
historical perspective and analyze large evolutions, completely disregarding micro-
sociological aspects. Several authors in this field have recognized that research merely relying 
on macro-sociological data does not allow a full understanding of the functioning and evolu-
tion of nationalism and citizenship, since it is only by accounting for agency that processes 
and variations of nationalism can properly be understood. For Hobsbawm (1990: 10), nations 
constitute “dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be under-
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stood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, 
longings and interests of ordinary people.” Criticizing Gellner’s perspective of modernization, 
he argues that official ideologies of states and movements are not necessarily guides to what 
is in the minds of the even loyal citizens or supporters (1990: 11). He further states that na-
tional identity is not always a major part of the set of identifications that constitute the social 
being; national identification can change and shift in time. Anderson (1991[1983]) also be-
lieves that taking into consideration the attitudes of individuals is crucial for the understand-
ing of nations and nationalism. Since ‘communities’ are ‘imagined’ and individuals have a 
great capacity for invention, they do not simply reflect the macro-social forces. After all, na-
tions exist only through the minds of its citizens, or as Seton-Watson (1977: 5) puts it “[a] 
nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to 
form a nation, or behave as if they formed one.”  
Following the citizenship-as-practice idea does not mean to disregard the pitfalls of individu-
alistic or psychologistic approaches. Tilly (1999: 253) seems to be quite clear on that point 
when he reminds us that the practice of citizenship is constrained by collective memory and 
depends on unstated assumptions.31 This implies that we should not take what people do in 
their daily lives for granted but also account for the wider patterns of social life, for what peo-
ple do is located in a social space and shaped by social relations. This is what Bourdieu un-
derstands by the ‘logic of practice’ (Bourdieu 1977; 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). It 
is here that we are turning to the theoretical implications of the citizenship-as-practice idea. 
The ‘logic of practice’ refers to the interdependence of mental structures and institutional re-
quirements by recognizing that the emergence and conditionality of social structures must be 
relocated on the level of social actors (see also DiMaggio 1997: 277). In other words, Bour-
dieu proposes to go beyond the dichotomy of objectivist and voluntaristic approaches accord-
ing to which ethnically motivated actions are either determined by their cultural environment 
or the result of individual rationalized decisions. According to Bourdieu’s famous words, one 
can escape the alternative between objectivism and subjectivism by accounting for how in 
ongoing processes dominant interpretations emerge out of different representations of the 
social world. To study such processes Bourdieu’s analytical tools of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’, and 
‘field’ will help us understand how human beings both internalize external structures and pro-
duce and reproduce them by externalizing internal structures within the confines of a socially 
                                                
31 See also Tilly’s (2005: 3-6) criticism on what he calls dispositional accounts in Greenfelds (1992; 2003) ap-
proach to nationalism. 
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and culturally constituted space. These concepts will enable us to capture the dynamic nature 
of nation and to combine micro- and-macro-sociological elements in the study of nationalism. 
Elaborating on Bourdieu’s logic of practice, this chapter aims at providing a theoretical 
framework that enables us to closely look at the very moments when citizenship laws are ap-
plied and when it is decided to whom national membership status is given. For this purpose, 
we will first address the question of social constructivism. By reviewing some of the current 
debates, we will plead for a more thorough and coherent constructivist theory that closely 
follows Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) model, and which accounts for interaction processes 
between human beings that produce social reality. Their approach will enable us both to over-
come essentialist arguments and to avoid the pitfalls of instrumentalism and post-modernism. 
Their model will be complemented with the notion of power, in order to go beyond classic 
discourse analysis that is unlikely to explain why a certain interpretation of a social phenome-
non prevails. Without abolishing the notion of nation altogether, Berger and Luckmann’s ap-
proach to social constructivism enables us to follow Brubaker’s (2004: ch1; 1994) advice to 
treat nations not as bounded groups but as variables that may be molded across and within 
putative groups. The main arguments of this chapter will then be presented in two parts. First, 
we will emphasize that a cognitive approach to nationalism and citizenship crucially enables 
us to better understand citizenship politics. We will discuss concepts such as ‘scheme’, ‘cate-
gorization’, and ‘stereotypes’ to apprehend the actors’ point of view. Departing from the idea 
that individuals are both socialized and improvising human beings, we will then demonstrate 
that definitions of cultural boundaries are produced and reproduced in ongoing political strug-
gles leading to temporarily stable cultural compromises. 
 
Rethinking the social construction of nations 
For a long time now, the research fields of ethnicity and nationalism have been the settings of 
violent struggles between essentialists/primordialists and constructivists on the questions of 
whether or not nations can be considered as bounded and fixed groups or whether or not they 
constitute historically deep-rooted entities. An essentialist approach perilously implies homo-
geneous and static entities and does not allow us to account for variation over both time and 
space. Essentialist definitions of nations are often contestable because they are based on quali-
ties that putative nations share with other groups or on qualities that are not clearly shared 
among all recognized members of the nation (Calhoun 1993: 216). Considering ethnic groups 
or nations as fixed and bounded may lead to a risk of over-ethnicized interpretations of con-
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flicts and violence between ethnic and national groups, thereby obscuring either other possi-
ble explanatory factors such as material interests at stake or dynamics involved that could be 
better explained, for example, by warlordship or opportunistic looting (Bowen 1996). Disre-
garding framing dynamics or instrumentalization processes may lead us to mistake groupist 
rhetoric of political leaders for real groupness and putative groups of ethnopolitcal rhetoric for 
substantial things in the world (Brubaker 2004: 9-10). It also lets us falsely assume that the 
ascribed characteristics or features of such entities are an essential part of individual identi-
ties. Finally, it does not permit us to understand why ethnic or national identities arise and 
wane at different moments in time and never have the same salience for all the constituent 
parts of a group.  
Today, constructivists clearly dominate the field, arguing that groups are contingent and fluc-
tuating, as they need human practices to sustain their existence. In other words, individuals 
participate in the creation of their perceived reality of groups, dominant views on what consti-
tutes a group being maintained or challenged by social interaction. Essentialist arguments are 
no longer represented—at least not in the forefront of the theoretically more sophisticated 
debate. It has even been convincingly demonstrated in the meantime that Shils (1957) and 
Geertz (1963), who have often been accused of primordialism, were not saying that the world 
is constituted by an objective primordial reality, but were actually emphasizing the ‘partici-
pants primordialism’, that is, the idea that primordial attachments are felt towards co-ethnics 
(Gil-White 1999: 802-804; Smith 1998: 151-159). Ordinary people incessantly naturalize and 
essentialize their social environment. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 228) have called this 
“our primary inclination to think the social world in a substantialist manner”.32 As we have 
pointed out above in defining the concept of nationalism, human beings have a natural ten-
dency to organize themselves in groups and tag them with cultural or symbolic meanings. We 
may agree that primordialist thinking is an inherent and necessary functional aspect of the 
organization of society that gives human beings a sense of belonging and hence of security.33 
However, while such entities may appear as fixed to individuals, social researchers must take 
care not to run the risk of adopting such common sense concepts as analytical instruments, or, 
in Bourdieu’s terminology, take care to maintain a clear distinction between categories of 
practice and categories of analysis. 
                                                
32 Elias (1977: 111-112) even points out that essentialist thinking closely corresponds to grammatical patterns of 
Western languages. 
33 Or as Tamir (1995: 433-435) has put it, membership in a nation promises individuals redemption from per-
sonal oblivion, offers rescue from alienation, solitude and anonymity, and assures individuals that they enjoy 
equal status. See also Greenfeld (1992: 487-488) on national identity as a matter of dignity. 
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For Brubaker (2004: 8-9), essentialist ideas still covertly inform “much ostensibly construc-
tivist academic writing.” He observes a tendency to speak, for example, of Serbs, Muslims, 
Jews, Turks, etc. “as if they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even 
unitary collective actors with common purposes.” According to him, it often happens, espe-
cially in debates on multiculturalism and group right (be it by political actors or researchers), 
that groups are essentialized and legitimacy is lent to political discourses (Brubaker 1998: 
294-295; see also May et al. 2004: 10-11). As Brubaker (2004: 10) rightly points out, one 
cannot criticize politicians talking about group rights and the existence of groups, as this is 
precisely what their business is (and what scholars are to analyze). As for researchers, it is, 
indeed, a more delicate question. Brubaker explains the perseverance of (sometimes uncon-
scious) essentialist thinking with the fact that talking about nations itself easily misleads so-
cial scientists into adopting common sense views of a world partitioned into deeply consti-
tuted and quasi-natural entities. Brubaker (2003: 557) seeks to solve this problem not simply 
by expunging the misuses of these terms but—in a very Bourdieuian tradition—by “construct-
ing an analytical language that can do justice to the complexity of social affinities and affilia-
tions, without falling back on the easily accessible yet impoverished social ontologies—
individualist or groupist—on which moral and political theories too often rest.” Brubaker 
introduces the concept of ‘nationness’, which stands for a variable that may be molded across 
and within putative groups and thus provides us with a very useful analytical tool to appre-
hend the complexity of the social phenomena of nationalism.  
However, even if we agree that nations are not bounded primordial groups, this does not im-
ply that this notion has no analytical value for constructivists. In fact, we still need it to de-
scribe the reality we observe. When a certain number of individuals consider themselves as 
part of a nation, agree to share certain cultural characteristics and to build a community of sen-
timent (Weber 1946: 78)—and this happens nowadays quite often—which other term than 
‘nation’ could social researchers use to describe this social phenomena? ‘Nationness’ does not 
do the job. Rather, it shows us how to think and talk about nations. It rightly forces us to 
“treat nation not as substance but as institutionalized form; not as collectivity but as practical 
category; not as entity but as contingent event.” (Brubaker 1996: 16; our emphasis) ‘Nation-
ness’ is a conceptual tool to guide the work of researchers, but does not replace the concept of 
‘nation’. Moreover, what Sewell (1992: 3) said in his critique and reformulation of the con-
cept of ‘structure’ is also true for ‘nation’, namely that it is such a rhetorically powerful and 
pervasive term that any attempt to abolish it would be futile. Instead, we should try to over-
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come its weaknesses and redefine it in a way that allows us to better grasp social reality. 
Such a redefinition should prevent us from assuming essentialist convictions exist behind 
every scholarly use of the term ‘nation’. Smutny (2004: 83-88), for example, very much in-
spired by Brubaker’s new terminology, argues that some scholars adopt what he calls a ‘light 
essentialist’ approach. They try to distance themselves from substantialist thoughts by deduc-
ing ‘nations’ from other categories such as ‘people’, ‘communities’, or ‘ethnic groups’, 
thereby simply moving the essentialist bias to another level. For Smutny (2004: 85-86), 
Smith’s (1986) argument on the ethnic continuity of nations, for example, runs the risk of 
‘essentializing’ ethnic groups or what he calls ethnic cores. Indeed, Smith (1991: 39) asserts 
that a state’s ethnic core often shapes the character and the boundaries of the nation. In his 
defense, it has to be pointed out, however, that he clearly says that ethnic cores do not auto-
matically lead to the emergence of nations. Rather, modern nationalism resorts to ethnic 
myths (Smith 1991: 39; 1986: 148; more generally chapters 6 and 7), and the search for his-
toric origins and the socio-cultural organization needed to mobilize part of the masses has 
been part of both ethnic groups and nations (Smith 1986: ch.6). Smutny further accuses Alter 
(1994), among others, of ‘light essentialism,’ only because he asserts that “the nation is a po-
litically mobilized people” or that a nation “is constituted by the social group’s (the people’s) 
consciousness of being a nation, or their wanting to be one […]” (Smutny 2004: 86). For 
Smutny, this is evidence enough that Alter deduces nations one-to-one from the people 
thereby reifying social groups. Did he overlook that Alter speaks of politically mobilized peo-
ple and of social groups that gained consciousness and that he understands by ‘people’ simply 
a set of people of a certain category?  
Interestingly, Smutny (2004: 85n278) defends the authors he criticizes by acknowledging that 
they are all researchers who definitely distance themselves from essentialist arguments. 
Smutny then explicates that his accusation concerns mainly their „essentialist rhetoric”. It 
thus seems that he merely criticizes their use of notions such as ‘nation’ or ‘ethnic group’. 
Speaking of nations (especially when scholars do it nowadays), however, does not automati-
cally imply representing a “social and cultural world in terms reminiscent of a Modigliani 
painting as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic or cultural blocs,” as Brubaker as-
serts (1998: 293). Pointing to the dangers of reification, i.e. “the apprehension of human phe-
nomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms” (Berger 
and Luckmann 1967: 89), does not mean that groups are not real or that there are no cultural 
differences. It is rather the case that they cannot be considered as clear and fixed unities but as 
both fluid and manipulable. On this point most researchers in this field certainly agree. 
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Why then worry about essentialism when the large majority seems to agree that nations are 
socially constructed? In our opinion, concerns are still largely justified. The ongoing cam-
paign against essentialism—even if it often resembles straw man bashing—is itself a sign of 
discomfort towards current theoretical approaches in the field of ethnicity and nationalism. 
The unease with the current analytical frameworks is due not so much to some dissenters of 
the dominant view, but rather, can be explained by the fact that it is getting ever more difficult 
to understand what the idea of ‘constructivism’ really represents. Too often taken for granted, 
its meaning is seldom explained, i.e. what it really means to say that communities are imag-
ined, contingent, and fluctuating. This, in turn, has led to a certain naivety or over-
simplification of argument, or as Brubaker (2004: 3) puts it, “by virtue of its very success, the 
constructivist idiom has grown “weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable”.” Constructed phenom-
ena of any kind then get blurred and may hardly be analytically or intellectually grasped. Na-
tions appear as illusory communities and nationalism as a case of false consciousness or a 
mistaken identity. Such a situation is then mainly grist for the mills of those who criticize an 
apparently everything-goes constructivism and for whom traditions seem to be invented out of 
the blue.  
To counter such criticism we first and foremost have to delimit social from radical construc-
tivism. The latter has mainly been developed by Glasersfeld and Foerster (1999; see also 
Glasersfeld 1996). Similar to postmodernists, radical constructivists argue that we cannot 
know the reality of the human world. Objective knowledge is not possible because all our 
knowledge is constructed by cognitive processes of the human brain. Although there is an 
objective world out there, all we can do is offer representations of it. For Berger and Luck-
mann (1967)—probably the most important representatives of social constructivism—reality 
is also produced by people acting on their interpretation and their knowledge of it. However, 
Berger and Luckmann claim that knowledge about the social world is possible by revealing 
the ways in which actors contribute to the creation of their perceived reality. Such a method 
involves looking at the ongoing and dynamic processes in which social phenomena are cre-
ated and institutionalized by humans. Berger and Luckmann argue that all knowledge, includ-
ing the most basic—the taken-for-granted common sense knowledge of everyday life—is 
derived from and maintained by social interactions. When people interact, they do so with the 
understanding that their respective perceptions of reality are related, and as they act upon this 
understanding their common knowledge of reality becomes reinforced. Since this common 
sense knowledge is negotiated by people, human significations and institutions come to be 
presented as part of an objective reality. 
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Translated into our more specific research field, this model of how society works implies that 
we have to account for what we have earlier called the principle of nationalism, i.e., the social 
organization of cultural difference, and more specifically for how people imagine citizenship 
and nationalism and how the more general perceptions of these phenomena are the results of 
ongoing social interactions. Following our discussion on nationalism and national citizenship 
in the foregoing chapter, we can state more precisely that these confrontations constitute on-
going political processes in which claims are made about the categories that are included in 
the nation. Such an approach clearly refutes instrumentalist accounts with which constructiv-
ism is often related. Ethnic and national groups are not rational associations of self-interested 
actors or the artifacts of cultural engineers (Brass 1979; 1991; Nairn 1977; Hechter 1975)34. It 
also questions post-modernist and cosmopolitanist arguments, which, indeed, reject substan-
tialism but completely deny the existence of any cultural groups by considering ethnicity and 
nationalism as a matter of free-floating, ubiquitous and undetermined construction (see Cal-
houn 2003; 2004b). At the same time, Berger and Luckmann’s approach helps us describe 
groups of people considering themselves as a nation without automatically implying that a 
nation constitutes a bounded group. On the contrary, demonstrating interaction processes 
within a nation (in our case even within Swiss municipalities) challenges the idea of homoge-
neous cultural entities (cf. DiMaggio 1997: 267-268).  
There is one remaining problem: When we assert that common sense knowledge of everyday 
life is derived and maintained by social interactions, how can we explain that a specific per-
ception or opinion prevails? Berger and Luckmann’s model of society is problematic insofar 
as it concentrates on the symbolic aspects of the social worlds, thereby almost completely 
neglecting the material practices in which symbolization is embodied. Indeed, they discuss at 
length the question of legitimation. However, as Jenkins (1997: 137-139) rightly criticizes, 
power should be more prominent in their model. Accounting for power means going beyond a 
classic discursive approach that relies solely on the meanings and attitudes that are mobilized 
and evoked. Discourse analysis has indeed deconstructed the idea of cultural homogeneity 
and replaced it by notions of multiplicity and heterogeneity by demonstrating how multiple 
discourses exist in a certain place, dissolve, and reappear (Bhabha 1990; Chatterjee 1993). 
However, as Wimmer (2002: 24-26) rightly points out, it does not provide analytical tools to 
explain why a specific construction dominates. The social construction of the world is inti-
mately linked to the capacity to impose one’s definition onto others: “In this sense, national-
                                                
34 Not having the space to discuss in detail the contributions of those researchers, it has to be added that they 
pursue a rather moderate political instrumentalist approach.  
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ism is not simply about imagined communities; it is much more fundamentally about a strug-
gle for control over defining communities, and in particular, for control over the imagination 
about community.” (Beissinger 2002: 18)  
To combine discursive elements and power structures we will refer below to Bourdieu’s 
‘field-approach’, which accounts for both the symbolic and material aspects of interactions 
(cf. Swartz 1997). A nation is such a field in which people confront, in a socially constituted 
space, their opinions on what constitutes the cultural boundaries (cf. Spillman and Faeges 
2005: 435). Such a definition does not predefine which categories lie at the basis of a nation; 
it even leaves open which actors participate in the processes of labeling the nation and which 
arguments are mobilized. It merely expounds that people incessantly struggle in political 
processes over the question of who they are and whom they exclude and that the arguments of 
the more influential actors prevail. The claim that a nation is socially constructed thus invokes 
a specific process by which a national self-understanding is produced and reproduced in inter-
action processes (cf. Fearon and Latin 2000: 850). The precise mechanisms of these processes 
will be delineated in the remaining parts of this chapter.  
 
The actors’ perceptions and categorizations 
A social constructivist approach involves recognizing the importance that has to be accorded 
to the actors’ point of view (Borofsky 1994; DiMaggio 1997). When we investigate how the 
closure mechanism of citizenship is used and postulate that its application depends on na-
tional self-understanding, we first have to account for how social actors perceive citizenship 
politics and which categories are mobilized to regroup candidates for naturalization. Account-
ing for the ways cultural categories are applied is all the more crucial in the age of national-
ism, in which social structures are no longer defined by kinship networks and citizenship has 
ceased to be an economic regulatory mechanism.  
One of the first researchers in the field of ethnicity and nationalism who emphasized the ac-
tors’ perceptions was Barth (1969). Best-known is his prioritization of ethnic boundaries over 
groups. What is relevant is not the ‘stuff’ of a group, i.e., common language, culture, territory 
or history, but how certain characteristics become salient boundary markers between groups: 
“We can assume no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and cultural similari-
ties and differences. The features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ 
differences, but only those which actors themselves regard as significant […] some cultural 
features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and 
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in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied.” (Barth 1969: 14).  
The selection and use of cultural features happens through categorizations and by means of 
schemes (Lakoff 1987; DiMaggio 1997: 268-272). Jenkins (2004: ch.8) distinguishes catego-
rization from group identification. While the former stands for external definition, the latter 
points to internal processes of self-definition. Of course, both are closely connected, for how 
we define the others depends on how we see ourselves. Cultural boundary demarcation is thus 
not only a means to exclude those who do not belong to us; simultaneously it informs us 
about the identity that has been adopted by a group. More generally, categorizations are the 
processes through which we make sense of the complex social world. All our thoughts, per-
ceptions, and actions are structured through mediative filters, or what others call schemes and 
frames (Strauss and Quinn 1994; 1997; Goffman 1974). This fact becomes relevant, for ex-
ample, when we meet strangers: “The ability to identify unfamiliar individuals with reference 
to known categories allows us at least the illusion that we know what to expect of them.” 
(Jenkins 2004: 82)  
Such categorizations of individuals are akin to what others call stereotypical thinking (Hamil-
ton and Sherman 1994). Stereotyping is the partial or incomplete labeling of others, thereby 
simplifying and generalizing the view of others based on a restricted amount of information 
(e.g. external characteristics such as clothes, skin color, gender or behavior), clichés and 
prejudices. Indeed, stereotyping might result in discrimination, false assumptions, and drama-
tizing simplifications. However, today stereotypes are no longer considered as cognitive defi-
ciencies but as normal and ubiquitous mechanisms of the mind generating inferences and ex-
pectations (Hamilton and Sherman 1994: 2-3). They need not necessarily be hostile. Like 
schemes they are mental structures or templates that help us to interpret the world and render 
it more predictable. Since we are incessantly led in ambiguous and uncertain situations we all 
need instruments to explain and anticipate the behavior of others (Jenkins 2004: 128). Stereo-
typing is only one aspect of cognition and identification, but a highly crucial one in the con-
text of citizenship politics.  
Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that not only individuals get classified but also utter-
ances, situations, events, actions and state of affairs. Analyzing such categorizations not only 
helps us understand how people or things get classified, but also, more generally, it provides 
answers to the question of how people see the world (Brubaker 2004: 77). In the empirical 
chapters below, we will not only demonstrate how foreigners are categorized. We also will 
discuss in detail how membership criteria are established, and which are the opinions on the 
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recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Court, in order to understand how citizenship is per-
ceived, how local politicians see their own community, and how such understandings lead to 
different naturalization policies. 
Where do schemes, stereotypes, and attitudes come from? Why do people categorize strangers 
in a specific way? For Strauss and Quinn (1994: 284-285) schemes are the generic versions of 
past experiences and the internalization of collective representations. Thereby, they empha-
size that a cognitive approach is not identical with individualistic analytical models. Rather, 
schemes, stereotypes, and attitudes are “socially shared knowledge of social objects” (Bru-
baker 2004: 86). A common perception of the nation, for example, can be imposed through 
explicit teaching (see Gellner 1983: 140; Smith 1991: 118-119). Following this idea, Eugene 
Weber (1976) demonstrated how the compulsory education system in France led to the incor-
poration of the great majority of the population into the French nation-state.35  
However, most of our expectations about the world are learned in social interactions without 
explicit rules being taught us (Strauss and Quinn 1994: 286-287). Perspectives on others 
might be imposed by the state through what we have referred to earlier as constructions from 
above, i.e., categorization practices of authoritative institutions. The modern state has not only 
the monopoly of violence, but also seeks to legitimate symbolic force and control ethnic cate-
gorizations (Bourdieu et al. 1994: 8-12). By means of censuses or specifications in formal 
identity documents, for example, individuals can be obliged to choose a specific ethnic iden-
tity (cf. Anderson 1991[1983]: 164-170; Jenkins 1997: 69; Caplan and Torpey 2001).  
The way state institutions promote national identity, mobilizations by nationalist entrepre-
neurs, or more generally, discourses by the political elite concerning foreigners and immigra-
tion, might also shape individual schemes. However, the connection between official catego-
ries and popular self-understandings is seldom demonstrated in detail. Barth (1969) argued 
that a definition of identity cannot simply be imposed on a group, but has to be accepted by 
significant others before an identity can be said to be taken on.36 Ethnographic studies have 
shown that categories used by ordinary people in everyday life can differ substantially from 
official classifications.37 Sökefeld (1999) demonstrated the plurality of contradictory identities 
in northern Pakistan. Different ways of grouping ethnic categories have been investigated by 
                                                
35 Weber further highlights the roles of the conscript army and the centralized communication networks linking 
all the French provinces. 
36 For explanations on how elites can convince their followers to adopt false beliefs, see Fearon and Latin 
(2000). 
37 A case in which most individuals seem to share the same attitudes towards other ethnic groups is discussed by 
Gil-White (1999). 
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Sanjek (1981) in urban Ghana. Gorenburg (2000) revealed that support for nationalism within 
an ethnic group is neither constant nor random. To what extent caste classification depends on 
context has been reported by Levine (1987) and Berreman (1972). Brubaker et al. (2006) 
show in their study of an ethnically mixed town in Transylvania that despite elite-level na-
tionalist discourses against the ethnic minority, ordinary people of both the majority and mi-
nority do not seem to be preoccupied very much by questions of ethnic differences. As we 
will see below, such variation does not mean that the range of popular self-understandings is 
unlimited. 
Another way to explain the formation of shared knowledge constitutes the exploration of the 
interplay between self-identification and external categorization (Barth 1969). Such interac-
tions, though, do not happen only between groups of people considering themselves as differ-
ent from each other but also in various ways within a group (Tilly 2005: 7-8). As Jenkins 
(1997: 63-70) points out, the production of identity and ethnic categorization happens in a 
variety of contexts, or more generally through primary and secondary socializations (see also 
Berger and Luckmann 1967: 129-146). The former designates the first socialization an indi-
vidual undergoes in childhood when patterns for our receptiveness to being categorized are 
set. The latter stands for subsequent socializations in the various sub-worlds an individual 
encounters. Every individual is born in a socially structured world and takes over to a certain 
extent the world in which others already live. However, once-internalized structures do not 
remain unchanged forever. Each individual is incessantly confronted by new attitudes and has 
to find his or her way in new situations. Such confrontations happen at various levels and in 
different contexts. Social categorization can take place in routine public interactions, commu-
nal and associational life, or market relationships (Jenkins 1997: 66-67). For our study, the 
influence of the social environment of local settings on the attitude towards naturalization 
candidates will be of primordial importance.  
By distinguishing all different contexts in which individuals internalize schemes and stereo-
types, one runs the risk of ending up with individuals completely determined by their social 
environment. However, each human being is also an actor contributing to the production of 
the social world. Only by conceiving human beings as both agents and actors or socialized 
and improvising individuals are we able to capture the dynamic nature of nations. Relying 
solely on socialization would not allow us to comprehend the ongoing negotiation processes 
on cultural boundaries or the variety of attitudes within a group. People are not just imbibing 
culture; the culture in which they are socialized leaves much opportunity for choice and varia-
tion (DiMaggio 1997: 264-268). 
 53 
To capture the duality of internalization and externalization, Bourdieu has elaborated the con-
cept of ‘habitus’ that stands for a principle of generation and structuration. It is a system of 
dispositions that is adopted by an individual actor throughout his or her life and through the 
interiorization of his or her social environment. It can be considered as a general perception or 
action-scheme that structures an individual’s reactions to new situations. Emphasis is placed 
on structuration: Our habitus does not determine our actions, but structures them by providing 
a limited set of possible solutions or, in Swidler’s (1986) terminology, a toolkit of habits, 
skills and styles, which are applied in everyday thinking and activities. This ‘elbowroom’—
limited by the actors’ socialization and the constitution of the field in which they act—accords 
them the competence to assess pros and cons in a given situation and to develop strategies on 
the basis of their own interests. To be completely clear on this point: This does not mean that 
human beings are sometimes free and sometimes they enact learned structures; rather, their 
activities are always constrained by learned dispositions. Habitual responses do not represent 
hard-and-fast rules, but are acquired from everyday practices that are not highly precise. 
By the means of their habitus, actors tend to reproduce their own conditioning: Confronted 
with familiar situations, human beings act according to their past experiences and apply those 
schemes that were useful for solving previous, similarly shaped problems. Such a reproduc-
tion may be observed in traditional societies in which individuals do not very often need to 
improvise. This leads some to criticize Bourdieu for reintroducing structural determinism in 
his theoretical framework (Sewell 1992: 13-19; Jenkins 1992: ch.4; Wimmer 2002: 27; Bidet 
and Bailey 1979; King 2000). However, Bourdieu clearly goes a step further by arguing that 
we are all constantly confronted with new problems for which we have no ready-made solu-
tions at hand. When we find ourselves in unfamiliar situations, all we can do is to choose 
among our schemes and transpose them to the new situations (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 
129-135; Bourdieu 1989: 406; see also Sewell 1992: 17-18 and Swartz 1997: 211-214). By 
doing so, human beings produce structures and give social life a certain dynamic. This inces-
santly happens in modern and complex societies. However, even in very traditional societies 
improvisations occur. In his ethnological studies of the Kabyles in Algeria in the 1970s, 
Bourdieu (1972) observed that individuals exercised some degree of freedom even in seem-
ingly highly regulated domains as, for example, marriage. 
The idea of habitus can best be illustrated by Bourdieu’s own metaphor of sport games in 
which intense competition and engagement in a struggle with others is going on (see Calhoun 
2000). Bourdieu suggests that social life is like such a game, except that the stakes are bigger. 
To understand a game, we first have to look at the individual players and their abilities that 
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make the game dynamic and interesting. A successful player not only masters particular tech-
niques, he or she also has a sense of the game that is, for example, a constant awareness of 
and responsiveness to the play of one’s opponents. This sense of the game is the result of 
years of experience and practice and allows him or her to react quickly, almost automatically, 
to the actions of other players; deliberate decisions would be mostly too late. Indeed, a game 
in which players solely and strictly reacted according to practiced strategies would be quite 
boring. Moreover, it is hardly imaginable that any training or coaching could completely de-
termine the players’ game. Since no game is like another one, improvisation is constantly re-
quired. The unpredictable reactions of the players confronted with the constantly changing 
situations on the field make a game, like life, captivating and dynamic.  
Individuals are capable of exerting (consciously or unconsciously) some degree of social con-
trol over the social relations they are part of (Sewell 1992: 20-21). Since hardly any two hu-
man beings have undergone exactly the same socialization, when confronted with the same 
unresolved problems they react differently, due to their own mechanisms of social perspectiv-
ity (Hannerz 1993: ch.3). This explains the variable, conflictive, and processual character of 
nations or culture more generally. As the examples above illustrate, the connection between 
official categories and popular self-understandings vary in range between individuals and 
groups due to different perceptions and interpretations of the same cultural phenomena. Such 
a heterogeneity or inconsistency of schemes may also lead to conflicts between groups or in-
dividual actors: Dominant views may be questioned and new ones imposed. However, as we 
will see in the next parts, not any view can be conceived and/or imposed. 
 
Limited contestations 
To make it clear right from the outset, emphasizing the processual character of nations (Tilly 
2005: 23-44; Brubaker 1994) does not mean adopting a developmentalist perspective of mod-
ernist exponents such as Gellner (1983), Anderson (1991[1983]) and Hobsbawm (1990), 
thereby running the risk of falling into the teleological trap. Such a danger also exists when 
agency is accounted for. Greenfeld’s (1992) agent-centered accounts in the comparison of the 
emergence of nationalism in five countries, for example, pays indeed a lot of attention across 
time and place to the way ideas of the nation are originally conceived. However, by empha-
sizing that the character of every national identity is defined in the early phase of the emer-
gence of nationalism, once-established nations in her accounts seem impervious to subsequent 
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events. It is rather the opposite case: Struggles about nation incessantly change directions, 
wane, and reappear (see Tilly 1975; 2005). 
Brubaker (1996: 63) introduces, among other concepts, that of ‘nationalizing states’ to allow a 
better analysis of the situation of emerging nations in Eastern Europe in the last two decades. 
He prefers this concept to the one of ‘nation-state’ because the latter stands for an achieved or 
completed condition, while the former implies that this completed condition has then not yet 
been achieved in most Eastern European states. This differentiation is certainly of crucial im-
portance and highly useful. At the same time, it implicitly reveals an often-misguided view 
that considers nation-states as an achievement of a certain evolution. Nation-states continue, 
even when established and legitimized, to nationalize their territory. Therefore, it would be 
more appropriate to speak of ‘nationalizing nation-states’. But not only do nation-states inces-
santly nationalize their territory, the nationalization-process itself is subject to debates be-
tween various actors over its definition and meaning.  
This has already been recognized by Brubaker (1992) in his earlier work on citizenship mod-
els in France and Germany.38 Indeed, his citizenship models seem to be enduring but not im-
mutable: Interestingly, Brubaker reveals that they have been fluid and internally contested at 
different points in time. He convincingly demonstrates how particular ‘cultural idioms’ and 
ways of thinking and talking about nationhood were reinforced and activated in specific his-
torical and institutional settings. Speaking of ‘cultural idioms’ allows him to avoid the cul-
turalist trap and provides a finer theoretical grasp of contention and variability in the field of 
citizenship politics (Spillman and Faeges 2005: 431). Accordingly, citizenship models are not 
culturally determined but the outcome of political struggles and power relations between ac-
tors defending opposite ideas. The concept of ethnic citizenship was raised by some actors at 
certain moments in France as much as defenders of a republican model regularly appeared in 
Germany.39  
Yet, at the same time, Brubaker’s cultural idioms can be persistent over time and limit the 
discursive field within which debates are conducted. As we have already mentioned in the 
previous chapter, nationalism and ethnicity are about the social organization of cultural dif-
ference and similarity. However, too crude a dichotomy between the social and the cultural 
                                                
38 Nonetheless, some researchers in the field of citizenship studies (Koopmans et al. 2005: ch. 1; Hagedorn 2001) 
criticize Brubaker’s model and his argument of the citizenship’s historical rootedness for being too rigid and not 
allowing for variation over time. This interpretation might be explained by the fact that Brubaker does not allot 
the variability of citizenship models a very important place in his book. 
39 Different studies demonstrated that citizenship models in France, Germany and other countries have varied a 
lot within the last two decades (Weil 2001; Koopmans et al. 2005; Ludwig 2004). 
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should not be made, since the “‘cultural stuff’ […] and ethnic boundary mutually modify and 
support one another. The former establishes and legitimizes the contrast of the boundary; 
while the latter, often in response to external conditions, modifies or alters the relevance to 
the boundary of aspects of the former” (Handelman 1977: 200 quoted in Jenkins 1997: 20). 
Although the ‘cultural stuff’ does not automatically lead to group-identity, it is not irrelevant, 
either. Not all categories can be instrumentalized and mobilized, nor are ‘invented traditions’ 
fabricated or created, ex nihilo. Hobsbawm (1983) would certainly agree with Smith (1998: 
129-131) that such ‘inventions’ occur in a historically constituted field, and that the selecting 
and reworking of old traditions by modern elites and intellectuals must take place “on the 
wavelength to which the public is ready to tune in.” Struggles over cultural boundaries hap-
pen in a culturally and socially pre-constituted field. In such a field, certain ethnic distinctions 
may be particularly salient, reinforce cultural differences, and develop effects of path depend-
ency (Wimmer 2006b). Those could be considered the rules of Bourdieu’s sport games we 
have used as illustration above. To understand such a game, we have to account not only for 
the players but also for the rules that position the players and that set the limits for the indi-
vidual actions. On a more general level, this means that we not only have to look at the vari-
ous meanings that are given to a certain social phenomenon, we also have to account for the 
fact that this processes do not happen in a cultural and social vacuum. This argument is akin 
to what others call the influence of discursive frameworks or cultural idioms on the interests 
and actions of, and the relations between, individuals and groups (Skocpol 1985; Emirbayer 
and Goodwin 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005).  
However, not only is the scope for imposing new perceptions limited, the habitus of each in-
dividual allows only for a restricted use of new strategies. Since individuals have been social-
ized not in the same, but a similar, social environment, the variation over cultural schemes is 
not infinite. The example of Leach’s (1965 [1954]) study on the political systems of highland 
Burma is a case in point. Against the idea of cultural homogeneity, Leach successfully dem-
onstrated that the Kachin culture varies a great deal between local places. In particular, he 
investigated political organizations between lineages. Whereas in most groups they were hier-
archical, in some local settings an egalitarian view was asserted. Leach (1965 [1954]) ex-
plains this uneven implementation of political forms with the distribution of local resources 
and local conflicts. In spite of these different political claims, however, the range of political 
alternatives is limited. A comparison shows that a feudal hierarchy like that of the neighbor-
ing Shan society was not possible in Kachin society. Leach argues that attempts to institution-
 57 
alize feudal hierarchies in Kachin groups always failed because they would have gone against 
certain persistent presuppositions of the Kachin groups on how society should be organized.40  
 
The political field and cultural compromise 
To understand the structuration of the field of nation we first have to remind ourselves that 
today’s social organization of cultural groups is happening in the age of nationalism and by 
the exclusion of undesirable strangers through the mechanism of national citizenship. Most of 
us certainly agree with Brubaker (2004) that nationalism (and ethnicity) can exist without 
groups. It might be part of the discourses of nationalist entrepreneurs and political elites. 
Also, it might appear and disappear at various moments and have various meanings for differ-
ent people. However, when groups of people are culturally organized, they are most often 
called nations nowadays. This has not always been the case and might very well change in the 
future, for “[n]ationalism is a historical phenomenon. It appeared in one age and it can disap-
pear in another.” (Greenfeld 1992: 491). Whether or not and when nationalism will disappear 
is subject of debate and shall not occupy us here (see Smith 1995). But if it does, Greenfeld 
continues, “the world in which we live will be no more, and another world will replace it. 
This post-national world will be truly post-modern, for nationality is the constitutive principle 
of modernity. It will be a new form of social being and it will change the way we see society; 
to understand it, we shall have to begin anew.” 
Above, we have demonstrated how politically salient nationalism is. Nationalism not only 
structures modernity (Wimmer 2002), but also our everyday life (Calhoun 1997; Billig 1995). 
Being in the age of nationalism thus already limits the scope of the thinkable. It is almost in-
conceivable to organize society within other forms than nations. From this it does not follow 
that any specific nationalism comes to the fore: “Nationalism as such is fated to prevail, but 
not any one particular nationalism. We know that reasonably homogeneous cultures, each of 
them with its own political roof, its own political servicing, are becoming the norm, widely 
implemented but for few exceptions; but we cannot predict just which cultures, with which 
political roofs, will be blessed by success.” (Gellner 1983: 47) Any particular content of na-
tionalism might be challenged much easier than the form itself. This comes close to Spill-
man’s (1995: 144) argument of the limits that may be reached in questioning profound cate-
                                                
40 A similar example on limited variation over schemes is provided by Wimmer (1995) demonstrating different 
stories on the foundation of an Indian village in Mexico. 
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gories such as, for example, gender: “[I]t is much more possible to challenge meanings and 
values associated with gender than to constitute for oneself a genderless identity.” 
To understand which ‘culture will be blessed by success’ or why certain categories become 
more salient than others, power structures within fields of nation have to be accounted for. 
They help us understand why a specific construction of the world permeates a group and why 
frames are being changed, disappear, and reappear in diverse contexts. In such ongoing proc-
esses, power structures are not more substantial than any community or group. For the power 
of a group or an individual defending a certain idea is not an inherent characteristic of them 
but depends to a large extent on their position in these spaces of struggle. The ongoing inter-
actions in a social space point to the relational nature of power and ideas and underline that 
the production of a frame heavily depends on the relations between the different units (see 
Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Tilly 1994; 2005; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 15-19). Correspondingly, the emerging and waning of any specific frame can be ex-
plained by changing relations between the involved actors and thus by the formation and de-
formation of specific power structures.  
The relational character of power can best be captured by Bourdieu’s notions of capital and 
political field. Following our earlier discussions and definitions of the concepts of nation and 
nationalism, we can consider the nation as a part of what Bourdieu (1996) calls the political 
field. As all the other fields such as, for example, those of art, education, or media that have 
been explored by Bourdieu, the political field refers to a relatively autonomous sector of so-
cial activities with its specific rules. However, a distinctive feature of the political field is that 
confrontations of different ideas and interpretations of the social world can be observed more 
directly than in other fields. Much more explicitly than elsewhere, actors in the political field 
struggle for the legitimate manipulation of the comprehensive view of the social world (e.g., 
Kauppi 2003). Next to journalists and scientists, politicians perform the function of making 
visible their perception or action schemes, their visions of the divisions of the social world, 
and they work to transform them into categories applicable for all (Fritsch 2001: 21). 
Political struggles are not simply debates of convictions but rather confrontations of ‘power-
ideas’ (idées-forces) between progressives and conservatives or challengers and incumbents 
(Bourdieu 1996; see also Kauppi 2003). These power struggles are motivated by an internal 
asymmetry between established and newcomers. Ultimately, it is the political power of an 
idea that is crucial for the continuity of an old and the emergence of a new interpretation. In 
other words, the dominant world-view prevails not because it is truer than others but because 
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it appears more legitimate or convincing than others. A new comprehensive view of the social 
world can only be proved to be wrong with another power-idea. The power or the political 
capital of agents or groups that hold those convictions depends on their social and symbolic 
capital that, in turn, results from their position in the political field. Social capital stands for 
the relationships or the social network of agents and the resources that depend on specific 
social affiliations. The symbolic capital can be considered as the perceived and legitimized 
form of any capital, i.e., prestige and legitimacy. Political capital is mostly symbolic capital, 
since only legitimated and respected politicians can convince others of their interpretations of 
the social world. However, it is also social capital insofar as the power of actors depends on 
their positions and relationships with other political actors. It becomes clear that political 
capital constitutes a relational form of power. Far from being an attribute or a property of ac-
tors, power is thus unthinkable outside structures of force relations. Bourdieu proposes the 
differentiation between accumulated and delegated political capital. Whereas the former is the 
result of slow accumulation of symbolic, social and cultural capital, the latter is acquired by 
delegation and investiture. In this way, political capital becomes institutionalized in the form 
of posts and positions (e.g., Kauppi 2003).  
The powerful are those people who succeed in convincing the others of their interpretation of 
the world and thus influence the others’ choices against their original wills. Those have a lot 
of political capital who are perceived by the others as the legitimate holders of power. Ac-
cordingly, we will operationalize the influence of local politicians by their reputation. Speak-
ing of ‘legitimation’ implies that struggles about cultural boundaries is less about elimination 
and suppression of minority positions than about conviction. Since people are related to one 
another in a space of social relations and communication, such struggles can be considered as 
negotiation processes leading to cultural compromise. Wimmer (2002: 29) defines a cultural 
compromise “as consensus over the validity of norms, classifications and patterns of interpre-
tation that lasts beyond the open process of its production.” Put differently, a cultural com-
promise emerges when actors agree that certain modes of classifying the world makes sense 
to them. It can be conceived of as a temporal consensus abiding until new, more convincing 
arguments are put forward. Wimmer partially draws on Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action that stands for the idea that norms and values can be substantiated through a process of 
argumentative negotiation and thus in principle can be questioned. Contrary to Habermas, 
however, Wimmer (2002: 31) argues that norms can be questioned not by referring to univer-
sal standards of rationality, but simply by relying on norms and modes of validation respec-
tively habitualized as schemes of cultural givens. All this brings us back to our earlier argu-
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ment that human beings are socialized and incessantly internalize their social environment. In 
the meantime, however, we understand why specific schemes and perceptions are adopted. 
 
Empirical implications: The design of the study 
Nowadays, most scholars in the field of nationalism and citizenship agree that we are all con-
structivists. Thus, the question that needs to be asked is no longer whether but how nations are 
socially constructed. Indeed, the axiom of constructivism has reached a dominant position in 
this field even though some argue that essentialist arguments still exist in seemingly construc-
tivist approaches. But in any case, we have to specify what it means that nations are socially 
constructed, for ‘constructivism’ would lose its analytical power if it degenerated to a simple 
buzzword. Following this idea, this second theoretical chapter helped us understand the 
mechanisms of the social construction of a national self-understanding and how a specific 
naturalization policy is the outcome of political struggles. In this sense, we not only look at 
how citizenship is conceptualized and a nation is perceived. We propose to study the actual 
politics of citizenship, i.e., the ways in which ideas about the question of who might be admit-
ted are pitted against each other in local naturalization fields. To do this, we have to account 
for both the ideologies of municipal politicians and the local power structures. We thereby 
closely follow Bourdieu’s and Berger and Luckmann’s propositions of how to study the social 
world. Berger and Luckmann remind us that scholarly knowledge about the social world is 
possible when we analyze how knowledge is produced in interaction processes between hu-
man beings. In accounting for power structures, Bourdieu similarly argues that we have to put 
in perspective political struggles between the different visions of the division of the social 
world.  
How do we go about analyzing such struggles? First, we have to remind ourselves what kind 
of struggles we are analyzing. Above, we pleaded for studying citizenship politics at the mi-
cro-sociological level. However, the basic ideas of our theoretical framework can be applied 
at various levels and in different circumstances. Struggles about national cultural boundaries 
can be observed in the early phase of the formation of a nation, but also after the achievement 
of a clearly definable nation-state, when the national elite continues to nationalize its territory 
and when opposing powers try to question the ways a nation is defined. A successful opposi-
tion can lead to a reformulation of the national self-understanding, the attribution of more 
autonomy to, or even the secession of a part of, the national territory. But citizenship and na-
tionalism are not only about tumultuous events. Citizenship and nationalism can be much 
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more banal and very close to everyday lives (see Billig 1995). In our case, we are probably 
somewhere between everyday nationalism, that might be so familiar to everyone that it is eas-
ily overlooked, and violent contestations of nationalist politics. Naturalizations are part of 
daily politics and constitute decision-making processes during which politicians have to come 
to an agreement on which criteria have be fulfilled to get a passport. Such processes can be 
observed at various levels in both federal and centralized states. As for Switzerland, we have 
seen in the introductory chapter that the large autonomy of municipalities, the distinct local 
political system, and the relatively high ratio of foreigners make naturalizations a central po-
litical issue even in small municipalities. Switzerland thus provides a useful ‘laboratory’ to 
study decision-making processes, struggles over national boundaries, and the practice of citi-
zenship in clearly delimited fields. To be sure, Swiss municipalities are no nations. Yet, given 
the large competencies of Swiss municipalities in naturalization politics, we can apply ana-
lytical instruments at the local level we would use in other countries at the national level.  
Given the fact that local decision-making structures are not very much formalized, one has to 
look very closely at what happens in these municipalities. Detailed case studies and ethno-
graphic work are therefore indispensable. However, too close a look carries the danger of not 
seeing the wood for the trees, especially when we do not know a lot about local naturaliza-
tions. Hence, it is necessary to approach our object of study from different perspectives to 
better grasp the complexity of local citizenship politics and to test our hypotheses with differ-
ent data. We therefore decided to present naturalization politics in four steps: First, by dis-
cussing data of a large-N analysis; second, by comparing quantitative data collected in 14 
case studies; third, by illustrating our arguments with qualitative data of four case studies; and 
fourth, by analyzing individual data of local politicians. Combining quantitative and qualita-
tive comparisons helps us frame qualitative data within a quantitative profile and put some 
qualitative flesh on quantitative bones (Tarrow 2004). Both our large-N analysis and our case 
studies aim at reconstructing the local naturalization fields and at distinguishing the ideas of 
local actors and power-structures within municipalities. When we study the local naturaliza-
tion fields we will adopt a relational approach and resort to social network analysis in order to 
study the distribution of both symbolic and material resources in the social space of local citi-
zenship politics. Concentrating our attention on both the systemic level, i.e., the local natu-
ralization fields, and the individual actors enables us to conceive of local politicians as both 
improvising and socialized individual beings. On the one hand, they contribute to the produc-
tion and reproduction of the practice of citizenship and, on the other hand, their own under-
standing of citizenship is influenced by the prevailing naturalization policy.  
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In what follows, we give a short overview of how we collected data to analyze our theoretical 
constructs. In order not to confound the reader, the detailed operationalizations will be dis-
cussed in the individual empirical chapters at the places where the respective data are used. In 
Chapter 4, we start out to set the stage by analyzing data from a large-N survey in more than 
150 municipalities. The aim of this first survey was twofold: On the one hand, it enabled us to 
collect important data that has not been available so far41; on the other hand, data from this 
survey will help us specify the factors influencing naturalizations before we can fully apply 
our theoretical framework. Contrary to other studies (Piguet and Wanner 2000; Bolliger 
2004), and because we are only interested in the attitudes of local politicians towards appli-
cants for naturalization (and not why they apply for citizenship), we preferred not to analyze 
the naturalization rates but the rejection rates, which depend exclusively on the way local 
politicians handle the applications for naturalization. For each municipality we collected data 
on the number of rejected applications between 1990 and 2002. To obtain these data and fur-
ther information on the formal aspects of local citizenship politics, the administrations of 207 
municipalities have been contacted in the summer of 2003 to fill in a questionnaire.42 Despite 
the fact that citizenship politics constitutes a highly politicized issue, we did not face any ma-
jor difficulties in obtaining the requested information. 78 percent (N=162) of all 207 munici-
palities have responded, and 74 percent (N=154) provided us with their average rejection rates 
for the period between 1990 and 2002. 
For the selection of the municipalities, we resorted to a dataset comprising data of three na-
tional surveys in all Swiss municipalities in 1988, 1994, and 1998 executed by Ladner and his 
colleagues (see, among others, Ladner 1991). This dataset provides important information on 
the socio-economic and political structures of nearly 80 percent of all Swiss municipalities, 
which we used for our analyses. Since we have had almost no systematic information on local 
citizenship politics at our disposal, our only selection criterion was the size of the municipali-
ties. We assumed that the ways according to which decisions are taken and opinions are 
formed are different in urban and rural areas.43 Accordingly, we first selected all municipali-
ties in the dataset with more than 10,000 inhabitants (N=107). In addition, we randomly se-
lected 100 municipalities among the remaining communities with less than 10,000 residents 
that are documented in the Ladner file. 
                                                
41 Systematically collected data are provided by Boner (1999), Schaffauser (2001) and the Association of Swiss 
municipalities (Schweizerischer Gemeindeverband 1998). However, they list only very general information on 
the naturalization procedures at the local level. 
42 To attain a high rate of return we proceeded according to Dillman’s (1978: 160-199) total design method, 
which describes the step-by-step details of how to conduct successful mail surveys. 
43 As it turned out, however, no such difference exists (see Chapter 4). 
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As we will show below in detail, cultural and political factors are good predictors of the natu-
ralization policy that is pursued in a municipality, and socio-economic and socio-structural 
factors have no explanatory power. On the basis of these results, we have selected 14 munici-
palities, in which we have executed detailed case studies (see Chapters 5 and 6). For this sec-
ond phase of our study, we have selected the municipalities in a way to guarantee a large vari-
ety among the cases and to make sure that they are representative for the entire population of 
cases (King et al. 1994: 139-146; Collier et al. 2004: 94-95). For a small-N analysis, random 
selection is unwise as we would run the risk of missing typical cases and/or end up with few 
or no variation on our dependent variable. We therefore selected the cases on both the de-
pendent and the explanatory variables. Such a procedure bears some dangers, since it is easy 
to bias the results inadvertently. As King et al. (1994: 142) note, the most egregious error 
would be to select cases in which dependent and independent variables vary together in ways 
that are consistent with the hypotheses to be tested. To avoid this danger, we applied a 
‘mixed-selection procedure’, according to which cases are selected in two steps (King et al. 
1994: 143-144).  
First, we have selected municipalities on the basis of the variation of the three variables that 
had a significant impact on the rejection rate in our large-N analysis. As we will demonstrate, 
a restrictive understanding of citizenship, high influence of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), 
and popular votes lead to more rejections. As it appears in Table 3.1, we distinguished 
whether in the municipalities of our sample a restrictive or a generous understanding of citi-
zenship prevails, whether or not the SVP is influential in local politics, and whether decisions 
are taken by the population by ballot, during a municipal assembly, or by elected politicians 
(a parliament or an executive body). We then regrouped all cases of our sample according to 
these three characteristics (see Table 3.1). For some groups, we disposed of none or only one 
case. In a second step, in each one of these groups one municipality with a relatively high, and 
one with a relatively low, rejection rate was selected. In view of the more detailed case studies 
in Chapter 6, the pairs of municipalities within each group were selected in a way to make 
sure that they are in the same canton and similar with regard to socio-structural factors.44 We 
thus end up with municipalities in which decisions are taken by the population at ballot (4), or 
during a municipal assembly (4), or by their representatives in the local parliament or the ex-
ecutive body (6). In seven cases, a restrictive understanding of citizenship prevails, and in 
seven cases the attitudes towards foreigners is rather generous. In nine municipalities, the 
                                                
44 In one group we only disposed of municipalities from different cantons: Bernhightwo and Aargaulowtwo are 
however in the same region. 
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local section of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is powerful, and in five municipalities it plays 
a rather minor role. In order to preserve certain anonymity, we decided to rename the munici-
palities. The first part of the new name refers to the canton of the municipality, and the second 
part indicates whether the rejection rates in these municipalities are relatively high or low. 
 
Table 2.1: Selected municipalities 
Understanding 
of citizenship 
Influence 
SVP 
Formal decision-making procedure (rejection rates) 
  Popular votes  Municipal assembly Elected politicians45 
 
Restrictive 
Low 
 
Schwyzhigh (47%) 
Schwyzlow (26%)    
 
High 
 
Luzernhigh (24%) 
 
Bernhightwo (29%) 
Aargaulowtwo (1%) 
Zürichhigh (11%) 
Zürichlow (2%) 
Generous 
Low 
 
St. Gallenhigh (11%) 
  
Neuchâtelhigh (15%) 
Neuchâtellow (5%) 
 
High 
 
 
 
Aargauhigh (13%) 
Aargaulow (1%) 
Bernhigh (22%) 
Bernlow (0%) 
 
 
To get a clearer picture of naturalization politics in our 14 municipalities, we first analyzed 
documents such as voting bulletins and regulations, the ‘grey literature’ from the local 
authorities, and the local press. At the same time, we conducted expert-interviews with repre-
sentatives of the local administration to get to know better the local naturalization processes 
and especially the role, influence, and attitudes of the local actors. We also conducted expert-
interviews with representatives of the cantonal administration in the cantons in which our case 
studies are situated. This information allowed us to gain a more general view of the naturali-
zation politics in a certain region, and to find out whether there are regional patterns of citi-
zenship politics and whether there might be any external influences on the municipalities we 
were investigating.  
Once we gained an overview of the respective local naturalization policies between Septem-
ber 2004 and February 2005, interviews have been conducted with all actors that are involved 
                                                
45 Decisions are taken either by the local parliament or the executive body. 
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in the decision-making processes. Depending on the size of the municipalities 10 to 20 inter-
views have been carried out, mostly with the members of the local executive body, several 
members of the municipal parliament and the naturalization commission, representatives of 
the local administration, and representatives of political parties. 
With the selected actors face-to-face, we carried out interviews by means of standardized 
questionnaires.46 The interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. To operationalize the in-
dividual understandings of citizenship, in the first part of the interview we asked questions 
concerning their personal attitudes towards the naturalization politics of their municipalities, 
and about different criteria that may or may not be relevant for naturalization (open and 
closed questions). In the second part of the interview, they were asked to indicate which ac-
tors they were regularly in contact with, and whether they share the same opinions with these 
actors. Moreover, we asked all interviewees to tell us which actors they judged to have some 
influence in the local naturalization politics. These questions help us reconstruct the local 
power structures. In the third part of the interviews, we asked additional questions concerning 
their attitudes towards other policy domains or parts of social life that are related to questions 
of naturalizations. In the 14 municipalities, we conducted 180 interviews. Only ten persons 
refused to participate. 
The data collected in our 14 municipalities are analyzed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. In Chapter 5, 
we will investigate naturalizations in a comparative perspective and present the construction 
of two crucial indicators, which will be of relevance throughout of the remaining chapters: the 
individual understanding of citizenship (UC) and the relative power within a municipality an 
individual actors has. The understanding of citizenship will be measured by accounting for the 
attitudes towards eleven naturalization criteria. While it will be revealing how large the vari-
ety of naturalization policies can be, and how differently naturalization criteria are applied, 
we also have to find out which are the majority positions and which attitudes play a minor 
role. By accounting for the contact structure between politicians and the relative degree of 
influence of each actor, i.e., the reputation a person enjoys in a political field, we will get a 
much clearer picture of the various policy fields and a more pertinent indicator to predict re-
jection rates.  
Keeping a comparative perspective, Chapter 6 will allow us to look even closer at the individ-
ual decision-making procedures and at the different prevailing attitudes within four of our 
case studies. Using qualitative data, we will demonstrate how people think about the impor-
                                                
46 For the detailed questionnaire, see Annex. 
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tance of various naturalization criteria. Moreover, opinions on candidates from Muslim coun-
tries and the recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Court will help us understand to what ex-
tent local citizenship politics is discriminatory, how people with another cultural background 
are perceived, and whether local politicians consider naturalization procedures as political 
rather than administrative procedures.  
While Chapters 5 and 6 account for the entire local social structure and demonstrate to what 
extent individual actors contribute to the reproduction and production of the municipal natu-
ralization fields, Chapter 7 will concentrate on the individual level and investigate how the 
politicians’ attitudes are influenced by their social environment, i.e., how their habitus are 
shaped in the context of citizenship politics. Drawing on theories in social psychology and 
social network analysis, we will demonstrate that within a group of local politicians a cultural 
compromise might emerge on the question of who can become a Swiss citizen. Contacts with 
other actors during the decision-making processes are crucial when politicians exchange their 
views, try to convince others, and alter their attitudes in the light of convincing arguments.  
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 Chapter 4 
 
Explaining Rejection Rates 
 
 
A first glimpse at rejected applications 
Following the theoretical discussions in the two previous chapters two groups of arguments 
and approaches in the field of nationalism and citizenship studies will be challenged in the 
empirical part. First, our constructivist approach will be pitted against both essentialists’ and 
relativists’ reasoning throughout the following chapters. Second, this chapter more particu-
larly contrasts our theoretical framework to perspectives that explain tensions and conflicts 
between ethnic and national groups as directly related to socio-economic and socio-structural 
conditions. Exponents of such approaches argue that situations of crisis for example caused 
by a high unemployment rate or that feelings of threat triggered for instance by a high ratio of 
immigrants or alien residents spark negative attitudes and movements against foreigners. By 
analyzing data from our survey in 154 municipalities47, those hypotheses will be tested 
against our argument that you can explain the outcome of naturalization processes by political 
and cultural factors. More generally, this first empirical part helps us set the stage for the en-
suing analyses and get a rough idea which direction we have to take in the next chapters to 
unveil the causal mechanisms with which we can explain citizenship politics. Looking at such 
a large group of municipalities does not enable us to study local citizenship politics in detail, 
but it permits us to sort out variables that have no explanatory power and to specify what has 
to be explained. 
As we have already argued in the introductory chapters, data on local naturalization politics in 
Switzerland—with the exception of our study—are virtually inexistent and limited to some 
few case studies describing the formal naturalization procedures. To get a first impression of 
what is going on in these municipalities when it comes to decide whether a foreign resident 
might become a member of their community or not we have to resort to media reports. Since 
1985, the Endowment against Racism and Anti-Semitism (Stiftung gegen Rassismus und An-
tisemitismus) in Switzerland has gathered, among other things, information on rejected natu-
                                                
47 Remember that 162 municipalities (78 percent) have responded to our survey and 154 municipalities (74 per-
cent) have provided data on their rejection rates. 
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ralization applications and racist statements in the context of citizenship politics reported by 
newspapers.48 The national coverage of this collection of reports constitutes an ideal comple-
ment to our own survey, which for the sake of feasibility had to be limited to 154 municipali-
ties and for which we were not able to collect data on individual rejections.  
The presentations of these media reports are mostly skimped but nonetheless allow us to get a 
glimpse of how and why naturalization requests are rejected. Most articles are resembling and 
report time and again similar incidences. The following fictive report could be a very typical 
article of this electronic archive on rejected naturalization applications: “On September 12, 
1999, the Swiss citizens of the municipality of X rejected almost all naturalization requests of 
persons from the former Yugoslavia. Only the application of a young Muslim woman from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been accepted. All candidates from Italy, Portugal and Germany 
have been approved. A member of the local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) told the newspaper 
that the refused candidates were not integrated enough, did not take part in the communal life, 
and often did not greet when you met them in the streets.”  
While persons from countries of the European Union normally are naturalized without any 
dissenting votes, candidates from the former Yugoslavia or from Muslim countries often face 
a lot of difficulties to be accepted. Religion seems to be a crucial factor since Catholics from 
Croatia, for example, are sometimes naturalized with less opposition. Girls and young women 
who were born in Muslim countries but have grown up in Switzerland have more chances to 
get a Swiss passport than their brothers and mothers. Young women are considered more in-
tegrated and more decent persons. Young men are sometimes rejected on the grounds that 
they are aggressive and speed around with their cars. Muslim women, who immigrated to 
Switzerland as adults, often speak the regional language very badly. When they wear the 
Muslim headscarf in public they arouse suspicion among the local population. It sometimes 
happens that they are refused citizenship while their husbands, who are better integrated as a 
consequence of their contacts to Swiss citizens at their workplaces, are naturalized. If any 
actors speaking against certain applicants are identified in the newspaper articles, they are 
members of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP)—a major populist right-wing party—or minor 
right-wing movements. It is rarely reported that representatives of left-wing parties speak in 
favor of such applicants. To justify their negative attitude towards candidates from Muslim 
countries, the SVP politicians often argue that those persons are very different from Swiss 
                                                
48 We analyzed all 174 incidents reported between 1992 and 2005, which are accessible online on the following 
webpage: www.gra.ch (see also Stutz 2001). This time period corresponds more or less with the period for which 
we have collected our data (1990-2002).  
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citizens and are not accustomed to the Swiss mentality, customs and traditions. If any justifi-
cations for refusals are put forward at all, they are mostly kept very short and refer almost 
exclusively to the cultural and religious characteristics of the candidates. A last typical com-
munality of the reported incidences is that candidates for naturalization are exclusively re-
jected at popular votes at ballot or during a municipal assembly. No incidents are reported 
from municipalities where elected politicians decide on naturalization requests. 
Although these reports are kept very short, they allow us to dissect some crucial elements that 
we have to investigate in more detail in the following chapters: who are the actors influencing 
the naturalization policy? Which are their attitudes towards citizenship in general and natu-
ralization candidates in particular? How do the formal procedures have an impact on the out-
come of the decision-making processes? The dominant understanding of citizenship, i.e. the 
idea what makes a difference to be or to become a Swiss citizen, is certainly a crucial factor 
when it comes to establish criteria for naturalization. A restrictive understanding of citizen-
ship will be translated into higher barriers and entails a higher rejection rate. Given the politi-
cal character of naturalizations in Swiss municipalities, we also have to account for the atti-
tudes of the political actors who influence the decisions. Of particular interest is the role of 
local SVP representatives. The Swiss People’s Party is a crucial actor in naturalization politics 
in Switzerland and the only major political force seeking to limit naturalizations and immigra-
tion. The formal decision-making structures are of importance insofar as they provide differ-
ent opportunity structures facilitating or inhibiting mobilizations against naturalization or the 
activation of discriminatory attitudes. In the last years, the political and judicial debates in the 
context of local naturalization have mainly focused on those procedures in which the popula-
tion makes the final decision on naturalization requests by ballot or during a municipal as-
sembly. It is argued that such procedures enable discriminatory decision because people do 
not have to render an account for their decisions.  
Finally, we will also take a particular look at how candidates from Muslim countries are 
treated. An accumulation of negative reactions against persons from Muslim countries began 
in the mid 1990s when people from the former Yugoslavia gradually became the biggest 
group of naturalization candidates. The examination of the newspaper articles shows that 
there were hardly any incidents of negative decisions reported before 1996. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s Switzerland witnessed an increase of immigration from the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia and from Turkey. Akin to the immigrants from Italy in the 1950s and 
1960s those migrants have met a lot of resistance among the Swiss population. Can we con-
sider such incidents in the context of naturalizations as local clashes of civilization? We will 
 70 
analyze below whether the ratio of applicants from those countries influences the naturaliza-
tion policy. If our hypotheses are correct such candidates do meet with more resistance not in 
those municipalities where a lot of persons from Muslim countries try to get a Swiss passport, 
but rather in those places where local politicians perceive them as a cultural threat; and con-
ceptualizations of such a threat are expected to be very different from one municipality to 
another. 
In the next part we will present competing approaches explaining tensions and conflicts be-
tween national and ethnic groups. We will argue that socio-economic and socio-structural 
factors have no direct impact but might be mobilized by political actors to legitimate their 
claims. In a second part we will discuss in detail the operationalization of our dependent vari-
able, i.e. the outcome of naturalization processes. It will be argued that the rejection rate, i.e. 
the ratio between the submitted and rejected applications, constitutes a valid indicator since it 
only depends on the supply side, contrary to the naturalization rate which is heavily influ-
enced by the demand side. After a discussion of the variance of the rejection rates and the 
operationalization of the independent variables, we will test the various hypotheses presented 
in the course of this chapter. It will be demonstrated that the rejection rate can to a large ex-
tent be explained by three variables: the local dominant understanding of citizenship, the 
strength of the local Swiss People’s Party and the formal decision-making procedures. No 
significant values could be obtained for the perception of the unemployment rate, the ratio of 
local alien residents and the ratio of candidates from Muslim countries. It will further be 
shown that our explanatory model explains even better the rejection rate of candidates from 
Muslim countries. In the concluding part we will address the question of whether there are 
regional clusters of municipalities with similar naturalization policies. 
 
Competing explanations 
In the above-presented example of rejected naturalizations the representative of the local 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP) was reported to justify the rejection of most candidates from the 
former Yugoslavia with cultural and religious differences between Swiss citizens and foreign 
residents emigrated from Muslim countries. He held the opinion that such persons do not fit in 
their community. This statement is in line with our main hypothesis according to which the 
outcome of naturalization processes can be explained by how the cultural frontiers are drawn 
within a municipality. This explanation stands in contrast to a whole group of grievance theo-
ries that stress the objective economic or socio-structural conditions triggering xenophobic 
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and discriminatory attitudes towards foreigners. The self-interest theory states that individuals 
develop negative affects toward others with whom they are in competition and conflict (for an 
overview see Horowitz (2000 [1985]: 105-135). Economic success of foreigners, firms seek-
ing to replace highly-paid workers by cheaper ones or challenges to the dominant group’s 
exclusive claim to privileges may result in frustration, relative deprivation, and prejudices 
(Blumer 1958; Bonacich 1972). The realistic group theory (Bobo 1983) argues that subordi-
nate groups may be a threat to real resources and accepted practices of the dominant group. 
Prejudice is a response to collective threats against the real interests of the dominant group. 
However, it is often emphasized that individuals whose interests are not directly threatened 
may also express racial prejudice (Sears and Funk 1991) and that dominant groups may re-
quire immigration restrictions although they profit from the lower production costs (Quillian 
1995: 588). Therefore, Blumer (1958) and Quillian (1995) argue that prejudice is not neces-
sarily linked to the individual interests of group members but is rather the result of a feeling 
that their prerogatives are threatened by the subordinate group. This feeling of threat is largely 
influenced, according to Quillian (1995), by both the relative size of the subordinate group 
and the economic circumstances of the dominant group (see also Blalock 1956; 1967). 
In a similar vein, theories of internal colonialism and cultural division of labor explain antipa-
thy against foreigners or ethnic groups by the combination of unequal industrialization and 
cultural differences (Hechter 1975). According to these theories, economic disparities or ne-
glect of certain regions by the dominant group lead to mobilization and conflict, if the ne-
glected group is segregated along ethnic lines. Horowitz (2000 [1985]) makes a distinction 
between ranked and unranked ethnic groups. The distinction is based on the coincidence of 
social class with ethnic origin. In ranked systems the two coincide and are therefore less sta-
ble and concerned with power and domination. Connor (1984) and Montlibert (1981) criticize 
the supporters of economical interpretations of nationalism and ethnic movements. They state 
that nationalist movements can emerge independently from any economic discrimination. 
There are enough examples of ethnic groups, for example the Catalans, requiring more auton-
omy although they are highly privileged regions. Often, secessionist movements originate in 
regions which would hardly be capable of survival or which even profit economically from 
the hitherto common state—as the Slovak part of the former Czechoslovakia demonstrates 
(Wimmer 2002: 99). On the other hand, not all economically or culturally neglected groups 
are the source of ethnic conflicts (Horowitz 2000 [1985]: 194). Hechter’s (1975) segregation 
theory is also refuted by the competition theories (Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1982; 1992). Ac-
cording to this approach, not the segregation of ethnic groups, but confrontation and competi-
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tion are causes of conflict. Bonacich (1972) argues that employers maintaining low labor 
costs by employing cheaper work forces encourage violence against other ethnic groups. Ol-
zak (1992) expands on this subject, arguing that economic competition between ethnic groups 
leads to conflict. Competition for its part is the result of socio-structural changes undermining 
traditional local identities and opening the opportunity for ethnic identities. She enumerates 
four processes that influence competition and ethnic conflicts: large number of immigrations, 
economic crisis, augmenting resources of the ethnic groups and organizational structures (po-
litical parties and social movements). But, conflicts over jobs or housing frequently disappear 
as rapidly as they arise. Wimmer (2002: 99-100) argues that so-called socio-structural strug-
gles are often less concerned with individual economic goods than with the political, legal and 
moral goods of the modern nation-state. 
From our point of view, tensions or conflicts between ethnic and national groups are never the 
logical or direct consequence of socio-economic or socio-structural conditions. This does not 
mean, though, that such elements are completely irrelevant. Perception of threat and eco-
nomic crisis might be two fundamental elements for the understanding of hostilities between 
ethnic groups, but their relation can only be explained by the framing processes conditioning 
the presence of perceptions of threat and conceptualizing social causations. Stereotyping and 
discrimination are relatively open to manipulation and can be constructed by political entre-
preneurs, if the latter manage to link them to specific issues. Watts (1997) sketches a model of 
xenophobia that easily visualizes this argument. He distinguishes political xenophobia from 
potential xenophobia. By the former he understands a desire to discriminate, exclude, legislate 
against or persecute an out-group, whereas the latter could more generally be named affect or 
prejudice. Watts (1997: 76-77) elaborates on that second concept “that any form of affect 
(emotional response) such as prejudice or, in this case, xenophobia, exists in the individual 
and in the political culture as a response disposition—a potential for emotional reaction to 
social stimuli that can be called up or evoked by relevant social processes. It is not ever-
present, and it is not automatic; it is only a potential source of emotional and behavioral en-
ergy and requires activation before it becomes actual.” Such activation happens, for example, 
when a group of people is being convinced that foreign residents are responsible for their 
economic deprivation.  
Of course, such activation cannot occur just by pushing the right button. One has to ask how 
and why people differ in their propensity to adopt negative out-group stereotypes, and why 
some are consequently mobilized by political actors. First, it seems plausible that it is easier 
to mobilize people in regions with economical problems. Second and more important, the 
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larger social context has to be accounted for. To that end, Watts (1997: 82-87) expands his 
model with what he calls the ‘environmental gradient’, which stands for the contextual factors 
that augment or dampen aggression or discriminating behavior. Watts argues that the degree 
of political xenophobia is related to social inhibition forces, i.e. official mechanisms of re-
pression and punishment of racist behavior. In other words, xenophobic expression depends 
directly on the degree of social legitimization of such discourses. In a similar vein, Koopmans 
et al. (2005) demonstrate that the success of right-wing parties mobilizing against immigra-
tion can be explained to a large extent by discursive opportunity structures and dominant na-
tional understandings of nationhood. In their study right-wing parties appeared to be stronger 
and more radical in countries with an assimilationist citizenship policy and less legitimate in 
countries with a multiculturalist tradition. Similarly, pro-migrant and anti-racist mobilization 
seems to be strongest not where the positions of the migrants are weakest but where citizen-
ship models stand for an open and accessible nation.  
All this reminds us that ‘threat’ cannot only be framed in economic but also in cultural terms. 
This becomes particularly relevant in the context of citizenship politics since naturalization in 
modern nation-states is less related to economic interests than led by questions concerning 
national identity. Thus, it can be expected that mobilization against naturalization of foreign 
residents is more likely to be successful in municipalities where the attitude prevails among 
the Swiss population that they constitute a culturally homogeneous community. In other mu-
nicipalities where the local cohesion is less pronounced or where a multiculturalist and/or 
egalitarian understanding of citizenship prevail, foreigners might not be considered a cultural 
threat. To understand how many and which applicants are naturalized, we need to account for 
the local discursive opportunity structures or what we call the prevailing local understanding 
of citizenship. Moreover, we have to find out whether there are particular influential political 
actors who defend a restrictive naturalization policy and succeed in convincing the population 
or other politicians. 
 
What is to be explained: The rejection rate  
Before we can test the different hypotheses and measure the influence of the various explana-
tory factors on the local naturalization policy, we have to specify what we are going to ex-
plain respectively how we operationalize our dependent variable, i.e. the outcome of naturali-
zation politics. At a first glance, the naturalization rate, i.e. the ratio between the yearly num-
ber of naturalizations and the averaged foreign residents, appears to provide a useful indica-
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tor. These data have already been used in other studies on local naturalization politics (Piguet 
and Wanner 2000; Bolliger 2004) and are easily accessible since they are provided by the 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office. However, the application of this indicator poses a problem as 
it depends on both the demand and the supply side. A low naturalization rate might be ex-
plained by a restrictive naturalization policy and/or because the demand on the part of the 
foreign population is low. Moreover, since the ratio is measured within the overall foreign-
resident population, changes of the naturalization rate might tell us more about the immigra-
tion flows (the denominator in the calculation) than about the desire of foreign residents to 
become naturalized (Ludwig 2004: 509-510; see also Bultmann 1999: 206-212). For the fol-
lowing analysis, however, we need an indicator that depends on the supply side only, for we 
are not so much interested in why somebody applies for the Swiss citizenship. We would 
rather like to know why in some municipalities the naturalization policy is more restrictive 
than in others. Therefore, we propose to analyze the local naturalization policy by means of 
the rejection rate, that is the ratio between the rejected and the submitted applications.49 Once 
the applications are handed in, naturalization candidates have no longer control over them; 
whether they are rejected or not depends entirely on the supply side, that is the local citizen-
ship policy. 
Although the validity of this indicator is much better for what we seek to explain, it is not 
fully unproblematic for two reasons. First, it does not consider that certain candidates inter-
rupt their applications during the procedure. It may happen that applicants are recommended 
to withdraw their dossier when it appears that they do not fulfill all criteria for naturalization 
(often because of insufficient command of language). Unfortunately, we do not dispose of 
such information. In the interviews with the responsible officials at the local administrations it 
appeared that most municipalities do not exactly know how many dossiers are not passed 
through to the final decision. However, most of them told us that withdrawn applications are 
normally resubmitted some years later, for example, after candidates have improved their lin-
guistic proficiency. As we analyze a relatively long period of twelve years, such applications 
should not strongly affect the validity of our indicator. Second, our indicator does not con-
sider either that some alien residents might not apply because they do not expect to be natural-
ized in municipalities with a restrictive naturalization policy. Such a deterrence effect is diffi-
cult to measure and could only be analyzed by interviewing potential candidates who did not 
                                                
49 As for the submitted applications only those have been considered that entered the naturalization procedure. 
The persons in charge at the local administrations who filled in the questionnaires were asked not to include 
applicants who submitted incomplete dossiers or did not fulfill the criteria pertaining to the number of years of 
residence. 
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apply for the Swiss citizenship. Such data has not been collected systematically so far, since 
studies analyzing the reasons to acquire the citizenship of one’s host country have either left 
out this question or concentrated on freshly naturalized candidates.  
Yang (1994) provides one of the most elaborate studies to explain the likelihood of citizen-
ship acquisition in the United States.50 He incorporates in his analytical framework not only 
the immigrants’ individual characteristics, but also accounts for the larger social contexts in 
both the countries of origin and destination. In particular, he investigates whether the size of 
the immigrant community in the host country and the political, social and economic situation 
in the home countries influence the individual desires to apply for citizenship. Considering the 
individual factors, he demonstrates that higher education (however, only to a certain degree), 
higher social status, home-ownership, having children, being married and having served in the 
U.S. Armed Forces increase the likelihood for an application. Moreover, he confirms the ur-
ban concentration hypothesis predicting a positive association between the size of the immi-
gration community and the likelihood of its members’ naturalization (see also Bultmann 
1999: 208-209). In such groups assimilation into a new culture is facilitated and members are 
provided with better information concerning the benefits, procedures and experience of natu-
ralization. As to the country-of-origin characteristics, the results suggest that unfavorable 
conditions in the home country have a strong influence on immigrants’ naturalization deci-
sions. Interesting as these results are, we do not learn whether the formal naturalization pro-
cedure influences in any way one’s propensity to apply for citizenship. 
In Switzerland, ethnographic studies not only investigated the motivations of potential candi-
dates to apply for the Swiss citizenship, they were also interested in the factors leading candi-
dates from the idea for applying to the actual application (Centlivres et al. 1991: 157-160; 
Achermann and Gass 2003: 173-179). Interestingly, they reveal that such decisions are not 
always consciously taken and cannot be explained by clearly distinguishable factors. Rather, 
they often seem to be accidental and the result of a combination of causal factors and specific 
circumstances. It was found that foreign residents often apply only after they accidentally 
acquired necessary information about the formal procedure or after friends or relatives have 
drawn their attention to the opportunity to naturalize themselves. These studies also discuss 
the discomfort naturalization candidates have with some aspects of the procedure and reveal 
that some applicants experience the naturalization procedure as exhausting, complicated and 
                                                
50 For an overview of the few and mainly descriptive and impressionistic studies on the reasons for naturalization 
in the United States see DeScipio (1987). Wunderlich (2005) provides a detailed study on the subjective dimen-
sions of naturalization procedures in Germany. 
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even humiliating to a certain extent. Although such information reveals attitudes of candidates 
towards the naturalization procedure, those are the statements of persons who were not de-
terred from submitting their application. They do not necessarily help us know whether or not 
and how many potential candidates did decide not to submit an application. On the other 
hand, however, these studies show that potential candidates seem to know the naturalization 
procedures and how difficult it is to get naturalized because they are often in contact with 
persons who have already been naturalized. Therefore, one can assume that some people are 
deterred from submitting an application in municipalities with a restrictive citizenship policy. 
But it is unlikely that such a deterrence effect lowers the rejection rate since it cannot be as-
sumed that the local decision-makers would accept more applicants if such persons submitted 
a naturalization request. On the contrary, it is likely that even more candidates would be re-
jected in municipalities with a restrictive understanding of citizenship, assuming that such 
deterred persons would constitute borderline cases. In this case, the rejection rate would be 
even higher in such municipalities, and the difference between local settings with a generous 
and restrictive naturalization policy even more pronounced.  
Let us now take a closer look at the rejection rates of the municipalities in our sample. To 
make valid explanations, we have to be sure that there is enough variance in the dependent 
variable and that the differences of rejection rates are significant. This refers to a central as-
pect of this study, namely that we can observe different practices of citizenship within a na-
tion-state. Not even the most orthodox essentialist or culturalist would assert that all citizens 
of a nation-state have exactly the same understanding of citizenship. To counter their argu-
ments, it has to be demonstrated that the differences are significant. To that end, we have to 
ensure that high rates are caused by a relatively high number of rejected applications. Keep in 
mind that 50 percent of the roughly 2’800 municipalities in Switzerland have less than 1’000 
inhabitants. Consequently, the number of naturalization applicants is very low in these mu-
nicipalities. The rejection of one or two candidates would already have a high impact on the 
rejection rate. For example, in one municipality of our sample only four dossiers have been 
submitted between 1990 and 2002, and one of them was rejected. Without looking in detail at 
this particular case, it would be too risky to conclude that this municipality pursues a restric-
tive citizenship policy by rejecting 25 percent of the submitted applications.  
Surprisingly, we found that in almost all municipalities where only up to ten applications 
were submitted between 1990 and 2002, none of them were rejected (Helbling and Kriesi 
2004: 46-48; see also Piguet and Wanner 2000: 56-58). Does this mean that small communi-
ties pursue a more generous citizenship policy? Given the very small number of candidates, it 
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is hard to tell, since the acceptation rate depends on very few individual cases. Of course, it 
might be that in such municipalities foreigners are better integrated, as it might be assumed 
that they have more contact with the local population and get faster accustomed to local cus-
toms and traditions. Therefore, they meet with less resistance of the local population when 
they seek to become a full member of their municipality. However, an opposing argument is 
also quite conceivable. It might be that in such places of mostly rural character the municipal 
citizens are less willing to accept new members because they are less used to be in contact 
with foreigners and much sooner consider their municipality as a homogeneous community 
than citizens of larger towns do. Considering the small size of these communities, negative 
decisions are anticipated more easily and potential candidates deterred from submitting their 
dossiers.  
To be sure that there are significant differences among the various rejection rates, we decided 
to sort out those cases in which less than ten applications have been submitted in the period 
under investigation from 1990 to 2002. These cases correspond roughly to the group of mu-
nicipalities in our sample with less than 1’000 inhabitants. From the 154 municipalities that 
provided data on submitted and rejected applications 48 cases are not considered for the fol-
lowing analyses. In the remaining 106 cases an average number of 336 applications was sub-
mitted, the standard deviation being 391. The rejection rate varies between 0 and 50 percent, 
has a mean rate of 9.6 and a standard deviation of 10.6. We thus can be sure that the rejection 
rate varies a lot and that the variation is caused by a considerable number of rejected applica-
tions. Excluding cases with few applications for naturalization entails of course that we can-
not make any statements about citizenship politics in very small municipalities. 
 
Operationalization of the independent variables  
Asserting that cultural and political factors explain the rejection rates and that the outcome of 
local citizenship politics is the result of ongoing struggles over the cultural boundaries of 
these communities implies that we take a closer look at the prevailing understandings of citi-
zenship, the political actors implied in the naturalization politics and the formal decision-
making structures. To control for socio-economic and socio-structural factors, we will con-
sider the perception of the unemployment rate, the percent of local foreign residents in the 
local population and the share of naturalization candidates from Muslim countries compared 
to all naturalization candidates between 1990 and 2002.  
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The local understanding of citizenship is measured by means of municipal results of national 
referenda on aliens’ acts, immigration and facilitated naturalization between 1982 and 2002.51 
These referenda provide information on the attitudes of the respective municipal Swiss popu-
lation towards alien residents and on the significance of their national identity. If in a munici-
pality laws on facilitated naturalization are rejected and laws limiting immigration are ap-
proved, this indicates that the majority of Swiss citizens have a restrictive understanding of 
citizenship. We carried out a factor analysis with the yes-percentages of votes. The second 
resulting factor matched fairly well our conceptualization of the understanding of citizenship 
and was therefore retained for the following regression analysis.  
The nominal variable of the formal procedures has been transformed in dummy-variables. 
Remember that decisions are taken either by the entire population (at ballot or during munici-
pal assemblies) or by elected politicians (by the local parliament or the executive body). In 
our analysis below we retained the variables for ‘popular votes by ballot’ and ‘municipal as-
semblies’ in order to test whether or not more candidates are rejected when the population 
takes the decision. As for the local political actors, we have only data at hand that provide us 
with information on the power of the local parties in municipal politics in general (and not for 
the domain of naturalizations in particular).52 This is a rather crude indicator, since the power 
structure within a municipality runs only partly along the party lines, as we will see in our 
case studies. However, it is the most valid indicator that we have at disposal for a large-N 
analysis. This indicator relies on the perception of the strength of the respective parties. The 
municipal secretaries have been asked for each political party to indicate how important they 
are.53 Ladner (1991: 237-238) has shown that the evaluations of the municipal secretaries are 
congruent with the real power distribution. Such an operationalization is better than account-
ing for the seats of the different parties in the local parliament or the executive body insofar as 
the number of received votes does not necessarily reflect the power of these parties. Particu-
                                                
51 References to such referenda are also made in other studies to measure locally prevailing attitudes toward 
foreigners or citizenship politics (Ireland 1994: ch.6; Cattacin and Kaya 2005: 309-318; Piguet and Wanner 
2000: 66-73; Bolliger 2004). The Swiss Federal Statistical Office provided the data for this indicator. The fol-
lowing referenda were considered for the measurement of the indicator: Aliens Act (1982), Federal Resolution 
on the facilitation of certain naturalizations (1983), Federal Law on the residence and establishment of foreigners 
(1987), Asylum Act (1987), Initiative on the limitation of immigration (1988), Revision of the federal regulation 
of the facilitated naturalization of young foreigners (1994), Federal Law on sanctions against migrants (1994), 
Initiative against illegal immigration (1996), Asylum Act (1999), Initiative against the misuse of asylum rights 
(2002). 
52 The variables on the perception of the strength of political parties and of the unemployment rate have been 
taken from a dataset provided by Andreas Ladner and his collaborators at the University of Berne who carried 
out three national surveys in all Swiss municipalities in 1988, 1994, and 1998 (see Ladner 1991). 
53 The municipal secretaries have been asked how important, according to their opinion, party X is in the politi-
cal life of their municipality—whether they are ‚very important’, ‚important’, ‘rather unimportant’, or ‚unimpor-
tant’. For the regression analysis the party variables have been dichotomized (important/unimportant). 
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larly in small towns and villages the position of individual actors is often more important than 
the size of the party. As for the unemployment rate, the secretaries of the local administrations 
have been asked to what extent their municipalities have been affected.54 Contrary to the ef-
fective unemployment rate, this operationalization allows us to better measure the perception 
of the local economic situation that might also be influenced by the situation at the regional 
level. For the share of foreigners, we simply resorted to the percentage of the population liv-
ing in a municipality that is of foreign origin.55 To account for the impact of the number of 
candidates from Muslim countries we resorted to the ratio between applications from immi-
grants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey and all submitted applications.56 
 
Results 
In the following paragraphs we will test the various arguments presented in the chapters 
above. Particularly, we would like to show whether the local rejection rates can be explained 
by cultural and political or socio-economic and socio-structural factors. Since we lack data for 
the relative power of political parties for a considerable number of cases, we retained only the 
variable for the influence of the Swiss People’s Party for the regression analysis in Table 4.1. 
More detailed analyses have shown that other political parties have no significant influence at 
all on the rejection rate. As we dispose of information of the strength of the SVP only for a 
restricted number of municipalities, we had to make sure that both the full and the restricted 
samples are part of the same population. Thus, we ran the regression analysis for both sam-
ples (see Models 1 and 2). Since it might be assumed that the power of the SVP has an influ-
ence on the local understanding of citizenship and formal decision-making procedures, the 
respective variable has been included separately in Model 3. The individual coefficients 
change only slightly between the three models. Therefore, it can be presumed that both groups 
are from the same population and that the indicator of the strength of the SVP has no signifi-
cant impact on other variables. 
 
 
                                                
54 The municipal secretaries have been asked whether their municipalities have been affected ‘very much’, 
‘partly’, or ‘not at all’ by increasing unemployment. This variable has been dichotomized (not affected/partly or 
very much affected). 
55 Unfortunately, we had no variable at hand that measures the perception of the presence of alien residents. 
56 We are conscious of the fact that all candidates emigrated from the countries of the former Yugoslavia are not 
Muslims, nor are we sure whether all Muslim applicants are religious. Unfortunately, we do not dispose of data 
providing information about the religious affiliation of the individual candidates. However, as a matter of fact, 
Muslims from Kosovo constitute by far the largest immigrant group from the former Yugoslavia. 
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Table 4.1: Rejection rates of all applications: Non-standardized regression coefficients, standard error 
in brackets 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Popular votes at ballot 23.3*** (3.7) 26.2*** (4.3) 28.4*** (4.1) 
Municipal assembly 3.5 (2.3) 2.7 (2.7) 2.5 (2.5) 
Understanding of citizenship 3.3*** (1.1) 4.7*** (1.3) 4.6*** (1.2) 
Influence of the SVP - - - - 5.4** (1.8) 
Unemployment rate 0.0 (1.8) 0.2 (2.2) 0.0 (2.0) 
Ratio of foreign residents 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 
Ratio of Muslim candidates 4.3 (3.7) 2.2 (4.2) 0.0 (4.0) 
Constant 1.8 (3.2) 3.7 (3.6) 0.3 (3.6) 
R2 (adj.) 0.43 0.50 0.55 
N 103 74 74 
Notes: Level of significance: ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; only municipalities have been retained in which at least 
ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002. We lost three cases in Model 1 because data for one or 
several independent variables were missing (listwise deletion). 
 
So far, the results in Table 4.1 confirm our hypotheses and disconfirm competing explanation 
models: it appears that the perception of the employment rate, the ratio of foreigners living in 
a municipality and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries have no direct influence on 
the naturalization policy. Rather, political and cultural elements help us predict the outcome 
of naturalization policies: in municipalities with a restrictive understanding of citizenship 
among the population more applications are rejected. Moreover, it is demonstrated that we 
have to account for the dominant actors and their attitudes: municipalities in which the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP) is an influential force in local politics refuse more persons the Swiss 
citizenship. 
The rejection rate increases immensely when the entire population takes decisions by ballot, 
which confirms the commonly held opinion that direct democratic decisions lead to a more 
restrictive naturalization policy. However, we observed no significant increase of rejected 
candidates in municipalities in which the population decides in municipal assemblies. This 
can be explained by the fact that in municipalities with votes by ballot the individual deci-
sions are taken in complete anonymity, whereas in municipal assemblies one’s show of hands 
is exposed to other citizens. But what about those assemblies at which decisions are taken by 
closed ballot? With the data from this survey we are unfortunately unable to distinguish such 
cases and to systematically investigate this aspect. But anticipating our case studies of the 
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next chapters allows us to shed some light on this question. In our sample of case studies we 
have four municipalities where decisions are taken during local assemblies: in two of them 
always by open ballot and in the two others always or sometimes by closed ballot. In the for-
mer two hardly any candidates were rejected during our period of investigation, whereas the 
latter two constitute cases with a relatively high rejection rate. Table 4.2 lists the 14 case stud-
ies in descending order of the rejection rates and for the sake of comparison juxtaposes them 
with the formal procedures. Having more detailed information about the decision-making 
processes at hand, we can distinguish the municipalities in which decisions in municipal as-
semblies are taken by closed or open ballot. We immediately see that in municipalities in 
which decisions are taken by popular votes or during municipal assemblies by closed ballot 
feature higher rejection rates than the other cases. A bivariate analysis of the variables ‘rejec-
tion rate’ and ‘decisions by closed ballot’ reveals a relatively high correlation (r=0.7, 
p<0.006).57 
 
Table 4.2: Formal procedures and rejection rates 
 Rejection 
Rate 
Formal procedure Decisions by 
closed ballot 
Degree of dissatisfaction with 
decisions of Federal Court 
1 47 Popular vote Yes 60 
2 29 Municipal assembly Yes 90 
3 26 Popular vote Yes 56 
4 24 Popular vote Yes 50 
5 22 Parliament No 44 
6 15 Executive body No 6 
7 13 Municipal assembly Yes 73 
8 11 Popular vote Yes 81 
9 11 Parliament No 30 
10 5 Executive body No 18 
11 2 Parliament No 41 
12 1 Municipal assembly No 32 
13 1 Municipal assembly No 37 
14 0 Parliament No 25 
 
 
                                                
57 For a multivariate analysis see Chapter 5, Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
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The fact that anonymous decisions can have an impact is illustrated by one municipality in 
which decisions are often but not always taken by closed ballot. In this municipality it has 
happened in recent years that individual citizens requested the decisions be made by closed 
ballot. Each time the request was accepted, all applications of citizens from Muslim countries 
that were up for decision were rejected. During other assemblies, when the population voted 
by open ballot, almost no candidates were refused. A representative of the administration of 
this municipality told us that the persons who demanded a vote by closed ballot were known 
as quite xenophobic and normally did not attend the local assemblies. The exceptional ap-
pearance of such ‘extreme voices’ at these two particular assemblies provided an opportunity 
for a majority of the population to reject applicants from Muslim countries. It seems that in 
this municipality during the municipal assemblies—with the exception of the two votes by 
closed ballot—the social control avoided not only discriminatory decisions but also requests 
for votes by closed ballot.  
Another case provides a similarly revealing example. In this town, the municipal parliament 
decided on naturalization applications until 1999, when the majority of the population voted 
in favor of a referendum, launched by a right-wing party, which required that henceforth deci-
sions should be made by closed ballot. This change of procedure generated a lot of media 
attention and public debates in Switzerland, since after the change the population of this par-
ticular town regularly took discriminatory decisions refusing most or all candidates from 
Muslim countries. Decisions by closed ballot can also be an issue in local parliaments. In one 
of our case studies, the local SVP successfully instituted a requirement in 1998 that decisions 
of the parliament were no longer to be taken by open ballot. They argued that some deputies 
preferred not to expose their views to colleagues and the media. Unfortunately, our data does 
not allow us to verify if this change of procedure had an effect on the rejection rate.  
Although our data clearly reveal that decisions by closed ballot have a high impact, we con-
sider the formal procedure as an opportunity structure and not as a factor that automatically 
leads to very high rejection rates. Generally, it can be argued that decisions by closed ballot 
enable more restrictive and even discriminatory decisions because they do not have to be jus-
tified. However, it depends after all on the attitudes of the local population whether restrictive 
and discriminators decisions are taken or not. To have an effect, an opportunity not only has 
to be provided, it also has to be grasped by xenophobic actors. As one of our case studies 
shows, where most decisions are taken during municipal assemblies by open ballot, decisions 
by closed ballot do not necessarily lead to a higher rejection rate. In the past it happened sev-
eral times in this municipality that representatives of the SVP required that decisions be made 
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by closed ballot. While their requests were accepted each time no candidates were rejected 
during these assemblies.  
Interestingly, in municipalities in which all or most decisions are taken by closed ballot an-
other understanding prevails of what it means to become Swiss. While the various under-
standings of citizenship will be addressed in more detail in the next chapters, we would like to 
emphasize one particular aspect which is directly related to the formal procedure. In contrast 
to cases where decisions are taken by the local parliament, the municipal executive body or, 
during assemblies by open ballot, the influential actors in the other municipalities defend the 
positions that, first and foremost, naturalized Swiss citizens become members of their local 
community. Therefore, they prefer the entire population taking decisions by closed ballot. 
This explains why a majority of politicians in these municipalities did not welcome the ver-
dicts of the Swiss Federal Court, which in July 2003 and May 2004 decided that popular votes 
and decisions by closed ballot during municipal assemblies violate the Swiss constitutions. 
Table 4.2 reveals that in all municipalities in which decisions are taken by closed ballot, half 
or more of the local actors are unsatisfied with these decisions. The correlation between these 
two variables is very high (r=0.83, p<0.000). In the other municipalities only a minority is 
against the principles required by the Federal Court. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 
6, politicians opposing the decisions of the Federal Court argue that the local population 
should decide according to which procedure and criteria alien residents should be naturalized. 
They clearly consider naturalizations as political decision-making procedures the outcomes of 
which do not have to be accountable to others. It thus seems that diverging attitudes are hid-
den behind the formal procedures applied in the various municipalities. 
 
We have seen above that many incidents and controversies in the context of local naturaliza-
tions refer to a particular group of people, namely the increasing number of immigrants from 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. A look at the data from our survey shows 
that 36 percent of all applications in Swiss municipalities between 1990 and 2002 were sub-
mitted by people from those countries. When it comes to the number of rejected dossiers, the 
ratio of these people rises to 56 percent. This makes clear that the majority of rejections con-
cerns candidates from Muslim countries. Thus, it should be tested whether or not the models 
in Table 4.1 mainly explain the rejection rates of applications of candidates from Muslim 
countries.  
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The results of this test are presented in Table 4.3. It immediately becomes clear that our ex-
planatory model predicts the number of rejected applications of candidates from Muslim 
countries even better than the general rejection rate. The explained variance rises to 66 per-
cent in Model 3. Looking at the individual coefficients it appears that the value of the indica-
tor for popular votes at ballot increases strongly, although it is already relatively high in Table 
4.1. The coefficients of the other explanatory factors—the understanding of citizenship and 
the influence of the SVP—do not change a lot. This reveals that candidates from Muslim 
countries face a particularly hostile naturalization procedure in municipalities where the entire 
populations decides on such requests. Popular votes not only entail a restrictive naturalization 
policy but are also the cause of discriminatory decisions against candidates from the former 
Yugoslavia and Turkey. We have also tested our hypotheses for all rejected applications 
without those of candidates from Muslim countries. As we expected, the individual coeffi-
cients and the explained variance are very low. Concerning the level of significance of the 
coefficients, however, we observed the same pattern as in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. It can be con-
cluded that the proposed explanatory model explains the rejection rates for different groups of 
naturalization candidates and is a particularly good predictor for the number of rejected can-
didates from Muslim countries.  
 
Table 4.3: Rejection rates of candidates from Muslim countries: Non-standardized regression coeffi-
cients, standard error in brackets 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Popular votes at ballot 44.5*** (5.0) 51.3*** (5.3) 53.2*** (5.3) 
Municipal assembly 3.9 (3.0) 1.4 (3.3) 1.3 (3.3) 
Understanding of citizenship 2.0 (1.4) 4.1* (1.5) 4.0** (1.5) 
Influence of the SVP - - - - 4.5* (2.3) 
Unemployment rate 0.4 (2.5) 1.1 (2.7) 0.9 (2.6) 
Ratio of foreign residents 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 
Ratio of Muslim candidates 9.0 (4.9) 6.1 (5.2) 4.3 (5.1) 
Constant -0.5 (4.2) 3.7 (4.5) 0.8 (4.7) 
R2 (adj.) 0.52 0.64 0.66 
N 103 74 74 
Notes: Level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; only municipalities have been retained in which 
at least ten applications have been submitted between 1990 and 2002. We lost three cases in Model 1 because 
data for one or several independent variables were missing (listwise deletion). 
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External influences I 
One important aim of this chapter has been to get a first idea in which direction we can find 
causal mechanisms explaining citizenship politics in Swiss municipalities. It helped us to set 
the stage for more detailed discussions in the following chapters. We were able to demon-
strate that the outcome of naturalization policies is influenced by cultural and political factors. 
Thus, it appeared that we mainly have to look into how people think about citizenship and in 
which way political actors influence the decision-making processes. This is in line with our 
hypotheses according to which we have to account for conceptualizations of nationhood and 
political struggles over cultural boundaries in order to understand how many and which for-
eigners are accepted in a nation. Although we speak of ‘cultural factors’, we clearly delineate 
our theoretical framework from culturalist approaches by relating those ‘cultural factors’ to 
political processes. Indeed, the results in Table 4.3 point to particularly high tensions between 
Swiss citizens and foreigners from Muslim countries. Rejection rates increase exceedingly 
when the population takes the decisions. This confirms other studies that revealed that the 
accommodation of migrants from Muslim countries poses particular problems to European 
nation-states (Koopmans et al. 2005: ch.4). But this has nothing to do with a clash of civiliza-
tions. The study by Koopmans et al. (2005) has shown that first, groups demands by migrants 
are much lower as is often preached by culturalists, and second, that the intensity of group 
demands by Muslim immigrants varies a lot between different countries and depends on the 
respective citizenship models. The idea of a homogeneous Swiss culture defending itself can 
also be rejected when we take a closer look at our case studies. As we will see in the next 
chapters, migrants from Muslim countries are perceived very differently from one municipal-
ity to another.  
In the meantime, we would like to deal with a further important question. We demonstrated 
above that municipalities indeed autonomously decide according to which criteria and proce-
dures foreigners can acquire the Swiss citizenship. Only very few cantonal and national regu-
lations interfere with the local naturalization policy. Therefore, a high variation of local citi-
zenship politics can be expected. Though, this does not necessarily exclude any regional clus-
ters. This question is of crucial importance since we have to know whether local naturaliza-
tion processes are isolated events or are influenced from the outside. It is often put forward 
that the population of the French speaking part of Switzerland has another relationship with 
its nation and with its foreigners than the population of the German speaking part, both being 
inspired by the German and French understandings of nationhood, respectively. The often-
evoked trench between these two language regions, when it comes to questions about the po-
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litical opening towards Europe, could also be relevant in citizenship politics. Consequently, it 
may be argued that municipalities in the French part of Switzerland are inspired by the French 
republican citizenship model and thus pursue a more generous naturalization policy than 
Swiss German municipalities being influenced by the German ius-sanguinis principle.  
 
Table 4.4: External Influences: Non-standardized regression coefficients, standard error in brackets 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Language region 
 
6.2 
(3.2) 
 
 
1.1 
(3.0) 
Rural municipality 
 
 6.8* 
(3.1)  
0.9 
(2.6) 
Number of inhabitants 
 
  0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
Popular votes at ballot 
 
  
 
28.3*** 
(4.4) 
Municipal assembly 
 
  
 
2.6 
(2.6) 
Understanding of citizenship 
 
  
 
4.7*** 
(1.2) 
Influence of the SVP 
 
  
 
5.9** 
(2.1) 
Unemployment rate 
 
  
 
0.3 
(2.2) 
Ratio of foreign residents 
 
  
 
0.0 
(0.1) 
Ratio Muslim candidates 
 
  
 
0.2 
(4.4) 
Constant 
 
12.9 
(4.0) 
4.3 
(1.4) 
6.3 
(1.4) 
-1.7 
(5.6) 
R2 (adj.) 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.53 
N 74 74 74 74 
Notes: Level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Data for ‘Rural Municipality’ are drawn for 
Andreas Ladner’s dataset (see Ladner 1991). 
 
Model 1 in Table 4.4 reveals, however, that the chances of becoming a Swiss citizen do not 
significantly change between these two language regions. More detailed analyses have also 
 87 
shown that there is no significant difference between the Italian and German speaking mu-
nicipalities. In Table 4.4 the influence of the degree of urbanity and the size of the municipali-
ties is also tested. The number of inhabitants has no impact at all on the local citizenship pol-
icy (Model 3). While it appears in the bivariate analysis that rural municipalities reject sig-
nificantly more applicants than towns (Model 2), this influence completely disappears when 
we control for the factors discussed above (Model 4). 
Although there seem to be no regional clusters, it is not improbable that local actors copy 
practices from neighboring municipalities or that contacts to other actors in the same region 
influence peoples’ attitudes. We will come back to this question at the end of the next chapter, 
which presents naturalization politics in 14 municipalities in more detail. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Comparing Local Citizenship Models 
 
 
Introduction 
Having confirmed in the preceding chapter that naturalization politics can be explained with 
political and cultural variables and that socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no 
explanatory impact, in the following chapters I will analyze in more detail the local struggles 
over the definition of cultural boundaries. Relying on data collected in 14 case studies, we are 
now going to study the national self-understandings of local politicians in relation to the crite-
ria they establish to select candidates for naturalization. Besides the symbolic and cultural 
aspects of citizenship within our municipalities, we will also account for the local influence 
structures, which will enable us to distinguish dominant discourses from minority discourses. 
By describing in this chapter the variety of citizenship policies and the prevailing conceptions 
between municipalities, the relevance of this study once again will be underscored and some 
more flesh will be added to the bare-bones analytical arguments sketched out above.  
More generally, this chapter aims at disaggregating the concepts of citizenship and national-
ism in order to show that they can have various meanings in different situations and in differ-
ent places. Going beneath the national level enables us to rectify the results of various empiri-
cal studies which have shown that despite its linguistic and religious diversity, Switzerland, in 
general, demands a relatively high assimilation from naturalization candidates (Koopmans et 
al. 2005: 35-41; Giugni and Passy 2006: 60-63). This and the next chapters will illustrate that 
all kinds of citizenship politics can be observed in Switzerland, and that it oversimplifies the 
facts to put Switzerland in one specific category. By going to the municipalities and speaking 
to local politicians, we followed Eric Hobsbawm’s advice that natiohood cannot be under-
stood when we study the official regulations by themselves but only when we account for the 
ideas and interests of ordinary citizens. By analyzing local decision-making processes, we 
will also come closer to the idea that naturalization policies in these local settings constitute 
political fields, as conceptualized by Bourdieu, in which struggles over the cultural bounda-
ries of these communities are going on.  
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This chapter also lays out the basis for the next two by presenting indicators for the under-
standing of citizenship and the degree of influence of each local actor. By means of the ‘repu-
tational approach’ borrowed from the community power studies, we will detect the political 
capital of each local politician. By means of social network analysis and more specifically 
block-modeling, we will be able to trace the structures of the policy fields of naturalization 
politics in our 14 municipalities. After the construction of the two main indicators—
understanding of citizenship and influence—we will then test whether it makes a difference or 
not to account for power structures when we measure the influence of the understanding of 
citizenship by the ratio of rejected applications. In line with our theoretical arguments, it will 
be shown that it does not suffice to solely retain the attitudes of the local decision makers.  
In the concluding part of this chapter, we will then come back to the question of external in-
fluences. Although we gained the impression during the collection of our data that hardly any 
exchange exists between municipalities with regard to citizenship politics, and that discourses 
at the local level are sometimes little influenced by the debates led at the national level, one 
element could be detected that is common to all our case studies, which points to the fact that 
all 14 municipalities belong to the same nation-state: When it comes to the question of what 
local politicians are most proud of about Switzerland, a majority of each municipality men-
tioned Swiss direct democracy and the high degree of liberty which people in this country 
enjoy.  
 
Understandings of citizenship 
To use municipal results of national referenda on aliens’ acts, immigration, and facilitated 
naturalization for the operationalization of the local national self-understanding, as we have 
done in the previous chapter, is, admittedly, a rather crude proceeding; however, it is the best 
that could have been done with the data we had at our disposal for such a large-N analysis. 
Having spoken to 180 local politicians, we are now in position for a more pertinent operation-
alization. As we already know, each municipality establishes naturalization criteria independ-
ently. The federal law on citizenship merely stipulates that only those foreign residents can be 
naturalized who have lived in Switzerland for at least twelve years, respect the legal order, do 
not compromise the interior and exterior safety of the country, and are integrated and familiar 
with the Swiss habits and customs. The first three constitute quite clear criteria that are easy 
to verify and are always controlled by the federal administration.  
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As for the questions of integration and familiarity, not only do they constitute vague require-
ments, they are judged exclusively by local politicians and the municipal administration. 
Given the fact that virtually no formal or written regulations exist at the local level, and in line 
with our earlier plea for a cognitive approach, we rely exclusively on the attitudes of local 
decision makers towards naturalization criteria to establish an indicator that informs us about 
the prevailing understandings of citizenship. Since we are only interested in the processes of 
becoming a full member, this operationalization of the understanding of citizenship does not 
take into consideration cultural group rights or the legal status of foreign residents as other 
studies have done (see Tilly 1995; Koopmans et al. 2005).  
Which criteria are applied? How do local politicians evaluate applications? In the example of 
rejected applications presented above, we have come to know that the representative of the 
local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) justified the refusal of almost all candidates from the former 
Yugoslavia by their lack of integration, their unwillingness to take part in the municipal life, 
and their bad manners in everyday life. Several aspects are addressed here, which are often 
relevant when it comes to naturalizing foreigners: When is a person integrated enough to be-
come a new member of a nation? Does integration mean being familiar with the basic social 
rules or does it require an active participation in the new society? Is a naturalized person pri-
marily a citizen of Switzerland or of his or her municipality? The general position of the SVP 
(at the national level and in most municipalities) is very well illustrated by this example. How 
do other local politicians think about naturalization, and which are the prevailing positions in 
our case studies? To find answers to these questions we confronted local politicians with a 
range of naturalization criteria. The revealed attitudes show how cultural boundaries are 
drawn in relation to how high the barriers are set for accepting new members. 
Unfortunately, there exists no pertinent theoretical framework for selecting and classifying 
naturalization criteria. Howard (2006: 446-447) classifies citizenship policies according to 
three criteria: (1) whether or not jus soli is granted, i.e., whether children of non-citizens who 
are born in a country’s territory can acquire the country’s citizenship; (2) the minimum length 
of residency requirement for naturalization; and (3) whether or not naturalized immigrants are 
allowed to hold dual citizenship. For Howard (2006: 446-447), these three criteria constitute 
the most general elements of a country’s citizenship policy: “They capture the two main 
modes of citizenship acquisition (by birth and by naturalization), as well as the primary deter-
rent that can potentially discourage immigrants to naturalize even if they are eligible (dual 
citizenship).” While these three elements can certainly be considered as crucial aspects of 
naturalization regulations, there are more relevant criteria. Without giving any specific justifi-
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cations, Koopmans et al. (2005: 35-41, 52-54) further retained three criteria for their classifi-
cation of naturalization policies: (1) welfare and social security dependence as an obstacle to 
naturalization, (2) privileged access to nationality for co-ethnics58 and (3) knowledge of the 
national (or regional) language.59 Contrary to Howard (2006: 446-447, 452n22), who classi-
fies countries along a restrictive-liberal range according to the number of criteria that have to 
be fulfilled, Koopmans, et al. (2005) make a qualitative distinction and use their criteria to 
find out whether a country pursues an ethnic or rather a civic-territorial citizenship policy—
whether it is committed to respectively, cultural monism or cultural pluralism. We have al-
ready discussed the analytical ambiguities of these concepts in Chapter 2. Treating concrete 
naturalization criteria makes this distinction even more problematic. Take, for example, 
‘knowledge of the national or regional language’. For some, this is clearly a cultural require-
ment, which accepts only those belonging to an ethnic group who speak the native language 
of the group. However, one might also argue that it constitutes a criterion for structural inte-
gration in countries with a civic-territorial citizenship model, since the command of the na-
tional or regional language is crucial for participating in economic and social life. As for the 
‘welfare and social security dependence’, it is even less clear how the application of this crite-
rion tells us anything about whether a country defends an ethnic or rather a civic-territorial 
citizenship policy. In line with our theoretical arguments and akin to Howard (2006), we pre-
fer to argue for a difference of degree in regard to the effect of different criteria: The more 
criteria have to be fulfilled, the more restrictive is a naturalization policy and the more closed 
is the social closure mechanism of citizenship. Since we had no analytical framework at hand, 
we have simply chosen criteria, which often come up in debates about naturalization in Swit-
zerland to generate an indicator for the understanding of citizenship. Attitudes towards the 
following eleven criteria were collected:60 
1. Required degree of integration or assimilation; 
2. Required language knowledge; 
3. Required knowledge of Swiss history and the Swiss political system; 
4. The right for Muslim women to wear a headscarf in public; 
                                                
58 Examples for this indicator are, for example, regulations in Germany facilitating naturalizations of ethnic 
Germans from Eastern Europe and the Balkans whose ancestors have left Germany (Aussiedler). Another exam-
ple is Israel’s ‘law of return’, which gives Jews all over the world the right to Israeli citizenship. In some coun-
tries, residents of Overseas Territories and former colonies profit from facilitated naturalization.  
59 They also retained the actual naturalization rates as an indicator for nationality acquisition. As this indicator 
constitutes no naturalization criterion (but rather is close to our dependent variable), we did not consider it for 
our analyses. 
60 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 4 to 12). For an overview of naturalization crite-
ria in European and other countries, see Weil (2002). 
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5. Allowance of dual citizenship; 
6. Required membership in local associations; 
7. Unemployment as an obstacle to naturalization; 
8. Social security dependence as an obstacle to naturalization; 
9. Disability insurance as an obstacle to naturalization; 
10. Facilitated naturalization for the second generation; 
11. Facilitated naturalization for the third generation. 
The criterion of residency is not considered for our analysis as it is regulated at the national 
level and thus constitutes a constant for all our cases.61 The same is true for the allowance of 
dual and facilitated naturalization (the latter being regulated at the cantonal level). As these 
criteria are regularly and violently discussed at the local level, the attitudes towards these cri-
teria are nonetheless revealing for capturing the local understandings of citizenship. As Swit-
zerland has no provisions for the naturalization of co-ethnics (neither at the federal nor at the 
regional and local levels), this indicator is not being considered, either.  
Table 5.1 lists the aggregated values of each indicator for each municipality as well as a 
summary index for each municipality (UC) in the last column. All indicators and the sum-
mary index constitute the arithmetic means of the individual attitudes and the individual indi-
cators, respectively. Taking the arithmetic mean has the advantage that the composite measure 
has the same scale as the individual indicators and can therefore be interpreted in the same 
manner (see Roller 2005: 71-72). The cases are listed in ascending order of the prevailing 
understanding of citizenship (UC) in the last column, and the individual indicators in ascend-
ing order of their means. The eleven indicators have been standardized so that each one varies 
between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive). To make it clear from the outset, the range of 
variation between generous and restrictive understandings of citizenship help us compare the 
prevailing attitudes in our 14 municipalities. However, we will not be able to judge the vari-
ous positions in relation to any absolute standard. For example, when a municipality scores 
0.2 on the summary index, one can say that its citizenship policy is half as restrictive as the 
one of another municipality scoring 0.4. But we do not know whether the first municipality 
can be considered by some abstract theoretical or normative standard to be very generous in 
naturalization politics. 
                                                
61 However, some cantons and municipalities require that a part of the 12 years required at the national level 
have been spent on their territory.   
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When aggregating individual indicators into a composite measure, one has to decide whether 
they should be weighted equally or differently. In the latter case, the weighting needs to be 
justified either theoretically or empirically. As we simply chose the eleven indicators on 
grounds of naturalization criteria, which seem to be regularly applied, we propose no theoreti-
cal framework by which to judge which indicators should be considered more important than 
others. What about empirical weighting? This is typically done by factor analysis, which is a 
value-neutral technique. Choosing this alternative, we are however confronted with the ques-
tions of what these weights mean and whether the individual politicians ascribe them the same 
importance (Carley 1981: 80). A further problem is that the resulting factor loadings can only 
be interpreted if we make use of a social model or expert opinions. Although we gained the 
impression during the interviews that certain criteria are ascribed more importance than others 
by certain individuals, it is obvious that different criteria seem to be crucial for the various 
actors in the 14 municipalities. As we make use of no theoretical or analytical framework to 
regroup the individual criteria, they are equally weighted. 
Now let us have a brief look at the individual criteria. We will not only discuss the meaning 
of each indicator, but also show how strongly they vary from one municipality to the other 
(standard deviation and range), and in which municipalities they vary at a rather restrictive or 
generous level, taking the mean of the summary index of the understanding of citizenship 
(UC) as a dividing line (0.38; see Table 5.1). 
1. Integration/assimilation: As our interviews have revealed, even the most generous 
politicians require a minimal degree of integration. This is hardly surprising in the 
light of our earlier argument according to which people incessantly organize them-
selves in cultural groups. The question of course remains how integrated a foreigner 
has to be or whether one has even to assimilate him-or-herself to the culture of his or 
her new home-country. ‘Integration’ and ‘assimilation’ have become delicate concepts 
and are defined differently in the academic literature.62 We prefer to make a difference 
of degree rather than of principle. While ‘integration’ means that a person finds his or 
her way in the most important social domains of the new country without giving up 
his or her own culture, ‘assimilation’ stands for a complete absorption by the new cul-
tural environment.63 As Table 5.1 shows, for all but one municipality integration is for 
                                                
62 For a discussion of these concepts see Hoffmann-Nowotny (1973), Esser (2001), Gordon (1964), Brubaker 
(2001) and Matter (2005). 
63 This definition was given to all our interview-partners. See Annex (question 4). 
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the most part enough. The indicator varies not very strongly at a relatively low level, 
both its mean and its standard deviation being relatively low and small. This may be 
explained by a certain shift in the use of these two notions. In Switzerland today, 
hardly anybody speaks of ‘assimilation’ when it comes to naturalization. The same is 
true for the official use of these notions. In 1991, the national law on citizenship re-
placed the notion of ‘assimilation’ by ‘integration’. ‘Assimilation’ is seen even by a 
lot of right-wing politicians as too extreme. They argue that nobody can completely 
discard his or her former culture. Whether this change of usage of the two expressions 
also means a change in attitude is doubtful. Politicians from left-wing and right-wing 
political parties will hardly mean the same when they speak of ‘integration’. Nonethe-
less, it is still surprising that only 14 out of 180 local politicians in our sample prefer 
that candidates are assimilated. 
2. Language knowledge: Basic knowledge of the national language is a minimum re-
quirement for naturalization in every country. The same holds true for Switzerland: 
Almost all interviewees agreed that some minimal knowledge of at least one of the 
three national languages is necessary to manage the most important situations in eve-
ryday life. This also appears in Table 5.1: The indicator for language knowledge var-
ies at a very high level. For the large majority of municipalities in our sample, this in-
dicator scores the highest among all criteria. This confirms that even for persons with 
a rather generous understanding of citizenship, basic knowledge of language is impor-
tant. It is thus rather interesting to look at requirements that go beyond basic language 
knowledge: While some argue that it suffices that candidates speak one of the three 
national languages in Switzerland (since nobody would require from a Swiss citizen to 
learn another language when he or she moves to another language region), some poli-
ticians in the German part of Switzerland require that candidates speak Swiss German 
without which foreigners could not pretend to be really integrated.  
3. History and political system: While opinions on ‘integration’/’assimilation’ and lan-
guage vary either on a very low or a relatively high level, attitudes toward knowledge 
about Swiss history and the Swiss political system vary even more, ranging from a 
relatively low to a relatively high level, and thus appearing to be more controversial. 
In most municipalities, candidates have to pass a more or less formalized test on Swiss 
history and the Swiss political system. During the interviews, applicants are often 
asked questions about the most important events in Swiss history, the principles of a 
democracy, or the names of the seven ministers in the Swiss government. Sometimes 
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candidates have to prove their knowledge about history of the canton where they live 
or the political structure of their municipality. While for some this is a crucial crite-
rion, others argue that even Swiss citizens would often fail such tests. Critics often 
hold the position that such tests make the Swiss naturalization procedures particularly 
difficult to pass. They forget, however, that similar tests exist even in countries with a 
more generous understanding of citizenship.64 Applicants, in the U.S., for example, 
have to know the postal address of the White House in Washington, the names of the 
13 original states of the U.S., or the names of the senators of their state.65 In Great 
Britain, candidates have to know what the Magna Carta is, or where the myth of Fa-
ther Christmas comes from.66 Interestingly, in Switzerland knowledge about the politi-
cal system is considered as much more important than knowledge about history. For 
many left-wing and right-wing politicians, it is for example crucial that future citizens 
understand the democratic principles in this country. To a certain extent, this reflects 
the often-expressed idea that for Swiss, their national identity is mainly a political one 
(Kriesi 1998a: 5-23). 
4. Muslim headscarf: The increase of immigration from the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia and Turkey throughout the 1980s and 1990s have led to violent debates 
about the integration of people from Muslim countries. Discussions often focus on 
elderly Muslim women who are in general less integrated than their husbands or their 
children due to a certain lack of contacts with Swiss citizens. Moreover, they are much 
more quickly stigmatized than other Muslims, as they often wear the Islamic headscarf 
in public and thus clearly demonstrate their religious affiliation. The headscarf is not 
such an important issue in Switzerland as it is in France and Germany (see, however, 
Ossipow 1998; Gianni 2005: 357-363). Nonetheless, some politicians are bothered by 
the public ostentation of religious symbols. If they emphasize the importance of the 
liberty of religion, at the same time they defend the position that in public foreigners 
have to adopt Swiss ways. Once, a local right-wing politician told us that he actually 
would like to ask each candidate from a Muslim country if he or she would commit 
him-or-herself to the Bible or the Koran in a ‘case of doubt’. He then could not tell us 
                                                
64 Of course, tests vary a lot from one country to the other. While questions about the political system and the 
national history are part of every naturalization test, recent reforms in Germany, the Netherlands, and Great 
Britain have also included questions about society, the role of women or the discrimination against homosexuals. 
See next two notes.  
65 Sample questions of the US citizenship tests can be found here: 
http://www.uscis.gov%20/files/article/%20Flashcard_%20questions.pdf (January 2007) 
66 Information on the British citizenship tests can be found here: http://www.lifeintheuktest.gov.uk/ (January 
2007) 
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what he understood by a ‘case of doubt’. However, he added that of course he could 
not ask such a question since religious freedom was an important individual right in 
Switzerland. Attitudes towards the ‘Islamic headscarf’ indicate whether persons prac-
ticing another religion can become member of one’s own community. As Table 5.1 
reveals, attitudes vary a lot between municipalities with a generous and those with a 
restrictive national self-understanding. Opinions regarding this matter are less restric-
tive than requirements with regard to knowledge about Swiss history and the Swiss 
political system. 
5. Dual citizenship: Right-wing politicians often argue that people who belong to a relig-
ious group other than Christian are not familiar enough with Swiss norms and culture 
and thus do not identify themselves enough with this country. If that is so, how about 
people who prefer to keep their old nationality when they become Swiss? Is it possible 
that individuals feel at home in two countries? Politicians with a restrictive under-
standing of citizenship cannot imagine having two nationalities since, according to 
them, every person can identify only with one nation-state. In Germany, for example, 
it is still (at least officially) impossible to have two passports.67 In Switzerland, dual 
citizenship has been allowed since 1992. Although local politicians have no right to 
reject applicants who want to keep their old passports, in some municipalities candi-
dates are regularly asked whether they would abandon their old nationality if they 
were naturalized, and if not, for what reason they preferred to have two passports. For 
some, such questions allow the authorities to verify whether candidates really identify 
with Switzerland. In municipalities where decisions are made during local assemblies 
by the entire population, it may happen that individual citizens ask the members of the 
naturalization commission whether certain candidates are ready to abandon their old 
nationality. In other municipalities, such information about the individual candidates is 
specified in booklets, which are sent to all households in the run-up to a municipal as-
sembly. In six of our case studies, the majority of local politicians would prefer that 
candidates give up their old nationality, the mean of this indicator being above 0.38. In 
the remaining municipalities dual citizenship seems to be widely accepted. 
6. Membership in local associations: As we have already seen, some politicians require a 
strong identification not only with the Swiss nation but also with the municipality 
where candidates live. Some of our interviewees see their municipalities as a commu-
nity where all citizens should participate in social life. Candidates are often asked dur-
                                                
67 For the diverging application of this principle see Hagedorn (2001: 109-110). 
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ing the interviews with the naturalization commission or representatives of the mu-
nicipal authorities whether they are members of a local association in which Swiss 
also participate. At the beginning of a naturalization procedure, it may sometimes 
happen that candidates are advised to join a local association in order to increase their 
chances of becoming Swiss citizens. While some see such a membership as an impor-
tant step towards integration, others argue that even many Swiss are not members of 
any local association. In our sample, the majority of politicians in five municipalities 
prefer that applicants join local associations. 
7. Unemployment, social security and disability insurance: For a lot of politicians it is 
not irrelevant whether applicants benefit from social security, from disability insur-
ance or are unemployed. During our interviews some actors sometimes referred to 
cantonal or municipal regulations requiring that candidates have to financially keep 
themselves or their families. If most politicians agree on this principle, the interpreta-
tions of what this really means diverge. For some, candidates benefiting from social 
security or from being unemployed are considered unable to financially support them-
selves and their families. Others argue that financial problems or the loss of a job can 
happen to anybody, and that such persons are very capable—with the help of the 
state—of supporting themselves. As a matter of fact, foreign residents who have 
worked in Switzerland have the same social rights as Swiss citizens whether they are 
naturalized or not (see, however, Howard 2006: 445). Nonetheless, some right-wing 
politicians argue that ‘real’ Swiss can do without the help of the state and that those 
people only immigrated to Switzerland to profit from the social security system. Ac-
cording to these politicians, such freeloaders should not be rewarded by granting them 
Swiss citizenship. A comparison between these three criteria—social security, disabil-
ity insurance, and unemployment—shows that different importance is attributed to 
them. In twelve municipalities of our sample, being unemployed and/or benefiting 
from social security is considered a problem for naturalization. In regard to disability 
insurance, we get a different picture. In ten municipalities, the majority of politicians 
are rather generous with such people. In the course of our case studies, we received 
the impression that many local politicians think that losing a job or not having the 
money to support his or her family is self-inflicted. On the other hand, we were often 
told that to be involved in an accident that limits one’s working abilities could happen 
to anybody. 
 100 
8. Facilitated naturalization for the second and third generations: The nine criteria we 
have presented so far can be applied each time a decision is made about an applica-
tion. It may be that considerations about certain criteria are not explicitly made. As we 
have seen, for example, candidates must not be refused for the simple reason that they 
prefer to keep their old nationality, as this right is guaranteed by the Swiss citizenship 
law. Nonetheless, this aspect is sometimes taken into consideration when decisions are 
made. As for the last two criteria, the situation is slightly different: Laws on simplified 
naturalization exist only at the cantonal level. Local decision makers are hardly ever 
confronted with the question of whether young applicants who have been born or have 
attended part of their school years in Switzerland should profit from a facilitated natu-
ralization procedure. Nonetheless, opinions on these questions allow us to verify 
whether or not local decision makers think that young adults who have lived and gone 
to school in Switzerland can be considered integrated enough for naturalization. Opin-
ions are very diverse on this subject. For some, applicants who have spent most of 
their life in this country can be considered Swiss citizens. It is often argued that these 
adolescents have almost no relation any more with the former home country of their 
parents. Some, in fact, find it discriminatory to assert that people strongly identifying 
themselves with their Swiss environment have no political rights. In some few Swiss 
municipalities, all applicants that have lived for at least twelve years in this country 
are automatically considered integrated enough: applicants no longer have to prove 
their degree of integration; rather, opponents to an individual naturalization have to 
show that candidates do not fulfill this criterion. For other politicians, having lived in 
Switzerland for a certain time does not tell them anything about how familiar these 
persons are with Swiss culture. They argue that even adolescents who have been born 
in Switzerland may be socialized mainly in the cultural environment of their families. 
The average positions towards these two questions score in most municipalities below 
our 0.38 benchmark, and the standard deviations are relatively low compared with the 
other indicators. It thus seems that the majority of politicians in all our case studies are 
in favor of facilitated naturalization. This is rather surprising, as during our project 
two national referenda on these two issues have been rejected by a majority of the 
Swiss population. 
 
The attitudes towards these eleven naturalization criteria enable us to generate an indicator for 
each actor on how generous or restrictive his or her understanding of citizenship is. This indi-
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cator will be used extensively in Chapters 6 and 7. In this chapter, we are more interested in 
the aggregated indicator of both local subgroups and the entire municipalities, i.e., the sum-
mary index in the last column in Table 5.1. Interestingly, this new indicator for measuring the 
overall understanding of citizenship of all local politicians correlates relatively highly with 
our first indicator, which has been generated for the large-N analysis on the basis of results of 
national referenda (r=0.69, p=0.006). The positions of the local politicians thus appear to be 
in line with the attitudes of the people they represent. Moreover, we can be sure now that the 
first measurement of the understanding of citizenship is a rather good operationalization even 
though it does not directly account for individual attitudes. 
As Table 5.1 displays, a whole range of understandings of citizenship can be observed. For 
the sake of illustration let us briefly look at the two extreme cases. In Bernlow, the municipal-
ity with the most generous understanding of citizenship, hardly anybody requires that candi-
dates be assimilated, give up their old nationalities, or become members of a local association. 
For the large majority, it does not pose a problem when women wearing the Muslim headscarf 
apply for Swiss citizenship or that young foreign citizens profit from facilitated naturalization. 
When a candidate is unemployed, benefits from disability insurance, or is not very familiar 
with the political system in Switzerland, only a minority opposes his or her application. On 
the other hand, when someone does not speak the regional language very well or benefits 
from social security, it becomes difficult for him or her to become a Swiss citizen. At the 
other end of the scale of our 14 municipalities, the situation looks much different: While the 
majority of the decision makers in Aargauhigh finds that integration is enough for naturaliza-
tion and sees no problems in facilitating the procedure for young candidates who have been 
born or went to school in Switzerland, all other criteria feature relatively high values. 
 
Structure and Influence 
Needless to say, various attitudes on naturalization politics can be found in each municipality. 
How do we know then which ones prevail when it comes to making decisions on naturaliza-
tion applications? Could it be that the average values in Table 5.1 are distorted by extreme 
attitudes of politicians who are not very influential? How can we be sure, for example, 
whether the aforementioned example of the justification for refusing applications, given by a 
local SVP politician, is representative of the prevailing attitudes in his municipality? The fact 
that most candidates from Muslim countries have been rejected in this particular municipality 
points to a restrictive understanding of citizenship and suggests that other actors defend simi-
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lar attitudes. To get a clearer picture of the prevailing attitudes, we have to find out who the 
actors are who influence the decision-making processes. In other words, the importance of a 
specific discourse can only be detected if we know who uttered it, in which situation, and 
which position the bearer of an opinion has within an influence network. According to Hajer 
(2005), there are two steps to measure the influence of a discourse: First, we have to look at 
whether it is used by a given social unit to conceptualize the social world. Second, we have to 
verify whether a specific discourse solidifies into institutions and organizational practices. 
Since we deal with municipalities where few practices are institutionalized, it will be almost 
impossible to detect dominant discourses simply by looking at the formal procedures and 
regulations; nor is it very promising to take into consideration only the functions of the com-
municators of certain discourses. Instruments borrowed from social network analysis and 
community power studies constitute better and more useful means to reveal the influential 
actors and therefore the dominant understandings of citizenship.  
In the study of power relations and social influence in local settings, two main theoretical tra-
ditions can be distinguished: community power studies and social network analysis (Helbling, 
Egli and Matter 2005). In the community power studies that have emerged in the 1950s and 
1960s in the U.S., three classic approaches for data collection and analysis have been devel-
oped that are still applied in contemporary studies. The positional approach states that power 
is attributed through hierarchies and formal positions held by individuals in a political, bu-
reaucratic, or economic system (Mills 1956). According to the decision-making approach, 
one might identify the elite by detecting the actors intervening in particular decision-making 
processes (Dahl 1961). Influential actors either are able to implement their own problem-
solving strategies or they may successfully block the propositions of others. The reputational 
approach enables researchers to determine the local elite based on an assessment of the politi-
cal, economic, and social actors by local insiders (Hunter 1953). The subjective perceptions of 
these insiders constitute the main source of information. A strength of this approach is the 
consideration that power bases can translate into direct interpersonal influence only if they are 
perceived as influential. The disadvantage of this approach is, however, that the evaluation 
relies on subjective assessments. Real influence is not measured and there are no criteria for 
the selection and the number of ‘insiders’ to be interviewed.  
More recent studies began to combine these three approaches (Laumann and Knoke 1987; 
Knoke et al. 1996). By means of the positional and decision-making approaches, the impor-
tant actors are identified. The reputational approach, on the other hand, enables researchers to 
further reveal who the more informally powerful actors are, as well as to elicit who the most 
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influential among the involved actors are. Once all the involved actors are identified, every-
one is asked whom he or she considers as the most influential actor. The most-often-
mentioned persons are then regarded as the most powerful ones. In a similar vein, we first 
identified the involved actors by the positional and decision-making approaches and then lo-
cated the degree of influence of each local politician by means of the reputational approach; 
this approach comes closest to our definition of powerful actors in terms of Bourdieu’s con-
cept of political capital. Accordingly, those individuals are influential who succeed in con-
vincing others of their interpretation of the world and who are perceived by others as the le-
gitimate holders of power. The construction of the indicator of political capital is based on 
data collected in our face-to-face interviews. We asked all interviewees to indicate all actors 
from the list they thought to have some influence in the naturalization politics of the respec-
tive municipalities.68 Then they were asked to indicate the three most important actors and out 
of these three the one they considered to be the most influential. For the index, we summed up 
the number of times an actor was mentioned as being influential. Persons among the three 
most influential actors received an additional point, and those who were mentioned as the 
most important actors, two additional points. This indicator was then standardized so that the 
most important actor in the respective municipalities received the value ‘100’. 
Interesting as it is to look at the actors individually, it is even more interesting—and more 
revealing—to look at the entire structure of a municipality, by defining the actors’ relative 
positions in the contact network and by revealing groups of actors with similar positions. In 
social network analysis, the perspective that power is mainly a relational construct has gained 
in importance in the last decades (see Knoke 1990). In order to discern the important actors, 
the conviction prevails that it has to be observed how the actors bring each other into account, 
and it is argued that the influence of an actor depends on his or her contacts with others and 
his or her position in the network (social capital). By accounting for all ties between actors, 
we can go beyond their party affiliations and formal functions in political bodies and get a 
clearer picture of the entire political field. In this way, we will be in a better position to situate 
the various discourses and controversies.  
As a complement to classic community power studies, several research projects in the 1970s 
began to study local power structures in Germany and the U.S. by means of instruments bor-
rowed from social network analyses (Laumann, Marsden and Galaskiewicz 1977; Laumann 
and Pappi 1973). Other studies analyzed the influential actors within a specific national or 
                                                
68 See Annex (questions 20 to 23). 
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local policy domain (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Knoke, Broadbent and Tsujinaka 1996).69 In 
such issue networks (Heclo 1978) or policy networks (Van Warden 1992), different actors 
collaborate in a thematically delimited field. The network approach allows for widening the 
mere state-centered perspective of politics by including actors and organizations that are not 
formally involved or institutionalized. In a similar vein, the organizational state approach 
(Laumann and Knoke 1987; Knoke et al. 1996) assumes that modern states cannot be consid-
ered any more as autonomously negotiating actors but rather as conglomerate of interacting 
public and private actors, (e.g., Sciarini 1996; Serdült 2002). Such a perspective is helpful 
especially for studies in local settings, since it can be assumed that there are a lot of informal 
contacts and that a large range of different actors may exert influence (e.g., Ladner 1991: 236-
258).  
Social network analysis not only allows us to account for relationships between actors, it also 
provides different instruments for regrouping individual actors and for defining their relative 
position in a group. A useful instrument that will be applied for the analysis of our case stud-
ies is block-modeling (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 394-424). A block is a group within an 
adjacency matrix that displays structurally equivalent actors. Recall that by structural equiva-
lence we mean that actors are substitutable. In our case, such actors have the same patterns of 
relationships with third persons. This does not mean, however, that structurally equivalent 
actors have any direct ties to one another. In this sense, block-modeling has to be distin-
guished from the analysis of cliques, by which we can identify groups whose actors are all 
connected. The disadvantage of analyzing cliques is that it is based only on first-order rela-
tions and does not allow us to find out where those groups or their constituent parts are situ-
ated in the structure of the network. A clique may consist of both rather isolated and very 
well-connected actors.70 On the other hand, by identifying structurally equivalent actors, all 
the contacts of all the actors and hence their relative positions in the network are accounted 
for. Given the fact that these actors are connected to exactly the same nodes, they are identical 
with respect to all structural variables and indicators of centrality (Borgatti and Everett 1992: 
7). This implies a certain cohesion or proximity between structurally equivalent actors, as 
they are in the same part of the network (Borgatti and Everett 1992: 9). Moreover, structurally 
equivalent persons tend to have similar attitudes because they interact with the same kind of 
persons (Burt 1978: 199). Whether the obtained blocks really can be considered as issue net-
                                                
69 For studies analyzing national policy structures in Switzerland, see Kriesi (1980), Jegen (2003) and Kriesi and 
Jegen (2001). For analyses of local policy structures in Swiss municipalities, see Kissling-Näf (1997), Kübler et 
al. (2003) and Serdült (2000). 
70 For further problems connected with analyzing cliques, see Erickson (1988: 107-108). 
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works, i.e., groups of actors that pursue a similar policy, can be decided by looking at the 
characteristics of the constituent actors. As a matter of fact, we observed that the various 
blocks of our municipalities are relatively similar in their understanding of citizenship. Party 
members with differing attitudes are regrouped in different blocks. We can therefore conclude 
that, on the one hand, our structurally equivalent blocks are groups of actors who discuss mat-
ters of local naturalization politics with the same people and thus dispose of similar informa-
tion and are exposed to the same attitudes of third persons. Information on ties between actors 
has been collected in our face-to-face interviews. Each interviewee had to indicate with whom 
he or she had been in regular contact to discuss matters of local naturalization politics.71 
Table 5.2 lists the blocks of all 14 municipalities of our sample and thus enables us to get a 
clearer picture of the municipal power structures. By means of the CONCOR method, we 
have divided the actors of each municipality into four blocks.72 In three cases less than four 
blocks result from the calculations because groups of actors that are structurally completely 
equivalent, for obvious reasons, cannot be divided. In St. Gallenhigh (case 8 in Table 5.2), for 
example, all actors are connected to each other; no subgroups can therefore be found. For 
each block, we have listed the party affiliation of their members and calculated the indicators 
for the degree of influence and the understanding of citizenship by averaging the values of the 
individual actors of the respective blocks. The municipalities are listed in descending order of 
their rejection rates (indicated in brackets), and the blocks within each municipality in de-
scending order of their degree of influence. 
                                                
71 See Annex (questions 16 to 19). 
72 The CONCOR approach (CONvergence of iterated CORrelation) was applied for the analysis of the local 
networks and the structural equivalence of the individual actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 376-381). Similar 
to hierarchical cluster analysis, this analytical instrument permits us to regroup actors with similar characteristics 
and to analyze the structure of the naturalization field. CONCOR begins by correlating each pair of actors. Each 
row of this actor-by-actor correlation matrix is then extracted and correlated with each other row. Through re-
peated correlations, groups of actors are divided into two subgroups consisting of actors that are as similar as 
possible. This operation can be repeated, whereby the regrouped actors are again divided into two groups. We 
have divided each municipality into four blocks for practical reasons. Regrouping all actors into two groups only 
would not have allowed us a very differentiated analysis. Running the regrouping three times, we would have 
ended up with eight blocks, most of them consisting of one or two actors only. For the analysis of the network 
data, we used the program Ucinet 6.59 (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 1999). 
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Table 5.2: Blockmodels 
Blocks N Political parties  Influence UC 
 
1. Schwyzhigh (47%) 
1 2 SP, SVP 57 0.36 
2 4 SVP, CVP, FDP, Admin. 40 0.59 
3 2 SP, Grüne 37 0.36 
4 2 SVP, CVP 37 0.50 
Std. Dev.   10 0.11 
 
2. Bernhightwo (29%) 
1 3 SP, SVP, Admin. 60 0.43 
2 2 SP, SVP 32 0.54 
Std. Dev.   20 0.08 
 
3. Schwyzlow (26%) 
1 1 SP 55 0.09 
2 4 3 CVP, SP 39 0.50 
3 4 2 CVP, FDP, SP 30 0.52 
4 3 3 SVP 21 0.39 
Std. Dev.   15 0.20 
 
4. Luzernhigh (24%) 
1 5 3 SVP, Grüne, FDP 44 0.49 
2 3 2 FDP, CVP 22 0.36 
3 6 2 FDP, 2SP, SVP, CVP 12 0.31 
4 3 SVP, SD, FDP 7 0.60 
Std. Dev.   16 0.13 
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Table 5.2: Blockmodels (continued) 
 
5. Bernhigh (22%) 
1 8 3 FDP, 2 SVP, SP, 2 Admin. 51 0.40 
2 4 3 SP, Grüne 13 0.34 
3 2 2 FDP 9 0.42 
4 2 EVP, SVP 2 0.18 
Std. Dev.   22 0.11 
 
6. Neuchâtelhigh (15%) 
1 2 SP, PL 86 0.27 
2 2 2 SP 57 0.09 
3 5 SP, SVP, PL, FDP, Grüne 9 0.23 
Std. Dev.   39 0.09 
 
7. Aargauhigh (13%) 
1 5 FDP, SVP, EVP, SP, Admin. 38 0.57 
2 3 2 SVP, PA 29 0.67 
3 1 SP 21 0.18 
4 2 SP, Grüne 11 0.30 
Std. Dev.   12 0.23 
 
8. St. Gallenhigh (11%) 
1 8 3 FDP, 2 CVP, SP, 2 Admin. - 0.39 
Std. Dev.   - - 
 
9. Zurichhigh (11%) 
1 7 2 SVP, FDP, SP, CVP, 2 Admin. 57 0.47 
2 6 2 SVP, 2 FDP, EVP, Grüne 33 0.32 
3 2 SP, Grüne 33 0.27 
4 2 2 SVP 19 0.48 
Std. Dev.   16 0.11 
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Table 5.2: Blockmodels (continued) 
 
10. Neuchâtellow (5%) 
1 3 POP, SP, PL 50 0.12 
2 3 POP, SP, Grüne 25 0.27 
3 1 SP 25 0.18 
4 5 SP, Grüne, SVP, PL, FDP 18 0.27 
Std. Dev.   14 0.07 
 
11. Zurichlow (2%) 
1 5 SVP, EVP, CVP, SP, Admin. 27 0.42 
2 6 3 SVP, 2 FDP, SP 22 0.50 
3 7 3 SP, 2 CVP, FDP, SVP 13 0.28 
4 2 2 SVP 12 0.82 
Std. Dev.   7 0.23 
 
12. Aargaulow (1%)73 
1 9 3 SP, AF, CVP, SVP, FDP, Admin. 73 0.37 
2 2 CVP, SP 33 0.25 
3 2 Admin. 33 0.58 
4 1 SP 20 0.18 
Std. Dev.   23 0.18 
 
13. Aargaulowtwo (1%) 
1 6 SP, FDP, SVP, EVP, 2 Admin. 28 0.47 
2 4 2 FDP, SP, SVP  12 0.41 
3 4 2 SP, FDP, Grüne 11 0.27 
4 1 SVP 0 0.72 
Std. Dev.   12 0.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
73 One actor in groups 1 and 3 is not a member of a political party. 
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Table 5.2: Blockmodels (continued) 
 
14. Bernlow (0%) 
1 3 2 SP, Admin. 51 0.16 
2 5 4 FDP, Admin. 45 0.22 
3 3 EVP, SVP, FDP 7 0.32 
4 1 SVP 0 0.19 
Std. Dev.   26 0.07 
Abbreviations: Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP) and (PL), Christian Democrats (CVP), 
Social Democrats (SP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green Party (Grüne), Evangelical People’s Party (EVP), 
Politarena (PA) (local right-wing association close to the SVP), Agenda Femina (AF) (local left-wing associa-
tion), person in charge of naturalizations at the local administration (Admin.). 
Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ varies between ‘0’ (no influence) and ‘100’ (very influential). ‘Understanding 
of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive). 
 
As for the party composition of the individual blocks, it appears that in many cases the two 
most influential blocks are composed of politicians from both left and right wing parties. An 
exception is Bernlow (case 14 in Table 5.2), where the powerful blocks 1 and 2 are composed 
of either Social Democrats or Liberals. On the other hand, in no municipality are all politi-
cians of the same party part of the same block. These two observations confirm our earlier 
caveat according to which local power structures cannot be strictly traced along party lines 
(cf. Ladner 1991: 252-256). As it turns out, resorting to social network analysis and commu-
nity power studies is highly useful for finding influential actors, as we thereby do not start 
from any prior assumptions about the distribution of power. 
If our hypotheses are correct, the influential blocks in municipalities with a high rejection rate 
should feature high values for the understanding of citizenship. Inversely, municipalities in 
the lower half of Table 5.2 should be dominated by groups with a rather generous understand-
ing of what it means to become Swiss. Moreover, actors with opinions strongly diverging 
from the general naturalization policy should be part of third and fourth blocks, which nor-
mally have little influence. In this regard, block 4 in Zurichlow and Aargaulowtwo, as well as 
block 3 in Aargaulow are very good examples: They are composed of actors with little influ-
ence who have a very restrictive understanding of citizenship in municipalities that hardly 
reject any applicants. 
Skimming over Table 5.2 does not immediately confirm the assumption that the average atti-
tudes of the most influential blocks predict the rejection rates. There are even cases which 
seem to clearly contradict our hypothesis: In the first and third cases in Table 5.2—in 
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Schwyzhigh and Schwyzlow—the first blocks feature very low values, which are caused by 
two Social Democrats, who have a very generous understanding of citizenship and who have 
been declared as the most influential actors by the other politicians of their municipalities. 
This is rather surprising, as these two municipalities clearly pursue a very restrictive naturali-
zation policy. One might of course argue that the rejection rate would be even higher if these 
Social Democrats did not intervene in local naturalization policies. As a matter of fact, these 
two politicians are politically very active—however, rather from the outside and through their 
political functions at the cantonal level, since they are not formally involved in local politics. 
It appeared that they are not very well connected to other local politicians and that they do not 
directly participate in local naturalization politics. It is thus doubtful whether they exert any 
real influence. It seems that these two persons were chosen as very influential by their col-
leagues because of their regular public appearance, rather than due to any real influence they 
have on the outcome of local decision-making processes. This reveals a problem we some-
times encountered while doing our face-to-face interviews: For some interviewees, very ac-
tive colleagues were considered as dominant actors, even though they have never substan-
tially influenced the local naturalization policy (cf. Windisch 1976: ch.2). 
Having briefly presented and discussed for our 14 case studies the two central indicators for 
the analysis of local citizenship politics—the understanding of citizenship and the power 
structure—we are now in a position to systematically study their impact on the outcome of 
decision-making processes in the context of naturalizations. Recall that in the large-N analysis 
in the previous chapter, we operationalized these two concepts by the understanding of citi-
zenship of the entire population and the degree of influence of political parties in local poli-
tics. For our 14 municipalities, we have data at hand for a more pertinent operationalization, 
enabling us to distinguish ‘power-ideas’ (Bourdieu): For each decision maker who is involved 
in local citizenship politics we know how he or she thinks about citizenship and how influen-
tial he or she is in this policy domain (political capital). 
There are two strategies to test whether the distribution of power-ideas has an impact on the 
outcome of policy processes: We account either for the degree of polarization or simply for 
the most influential actors (cf. Van Waarden 1992: 36; Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 198-199; 
Kriesi et al. 2006). Let us start with the first strategy. In the theoretical part, we argued that 
the struggles over applications for naturalization lead to cultural compromises, i.e., a consen-
sus on which criteria have to be fulfilled. This consensus might of course be more or less 
strong. If it is very strong, one might expect a naturalization policy that is very restrictive, 
very generous, or somewhere between these two extremes, depending on the prevailing atti-
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tudes. When the consensus is low, we additionally have to account for whether the political 
structure is very polarized or not (whether there is equal distribution of power between adver-
sary groups or not). When one group monopolizes the power, we can expect that the rejection 
rate will be in line with the convictions of the most influential group. When we have two or 
more powerful groups with opposing understandings of citizenship, we should expect rejec-
tion rates at the medium level, as the groups have to compromise. To measure the degree of 
consensus (related to understanding of citizenship) and the degree of polarization (related to 
influence) we resorted to the standard deviations listed in Table 5.2. While we cannot expect 
any specific rejection rates in municipalities in which either a high consensus or no polariza-
tion exists, we expect modest values in highly polarized municipalities. As Table 5.3 reveals, 
however, we cannot confirm this hypothesis. In every group—and especially in group 2—
rejection rates vary from very low to very high. 
 
Table 5.3: Polarization and concentration of power structures 
Std. Dev. 
UC 
Std. Dev. 
Influence 
Expected Rejec-
tion Rate 
Groups Municipalities (Rejection rates) 
Very low  - 1 Neuchâtelow (5%), Bernlow (0%), Bern-
hightwo (29%) 
 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Medium  
 
2 
Zurichlow (2%), Aargauhigh (13%), Aar-
gaulowtwo (1%), Schwyzlow (26%), 
Schwyzhigh (47%), Luzernhigh (24%), 
Zürichhigh (11%) 
 High - 3 Aargaulow (1%), Bernhigh (22%), Neuchâ-
telhigh (15%) 
Notes: St. Gallenhigh is not listed, as we found only one block of actors in this municipality. The mean of the 
standard deviations of the understanding of citizenship is 0.13. Cases with a standard deviation below 0.09 are 
considered being highly consensual (group 1). As for the distribution of power (std. dev. influence) cases are 
divided at its mean value of 17. 
 
Following our second strategy for analyzing the impact of the power structures, we simply 
account for the attitudes of the elite. We hypothesize that the average understanding of citi-
zenship of the very influential actors helps us predict the rejection rates better than the aver-
age attitudes of all actors involved in the decision-making processes. By means of regression 
analyses, we compare the impacts of the average values of the most powerful groups (see 
most influential blocks in Table 5.2) and the average attitudes of all actors (see Table 5.1).74  
                                                
74 Since the first blocks in Schwyzhigh and Schwyzlow are outliers, we retained the second most influential 
blocks for these two cases. 
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Running regression analyses with 14 cases only leads to big standard errors and is not unprob-
lematic, however, as individual cases can easily distort the results. Since effects of the inde-
pendent variables are highly uncertain when we have only a limited number of cases, a large 
standard error makes sure that we do not jump to conclusions, as we need much more data to 
get significant results (see Goldberger 1991: 248-250). Conversely, if the number of observa-
tions is small and we still get statistically significant results (even if they are significant at a 
low level), we can be sure that we confirmed our hypotheses. The impact of individual cases 
is a more serious problem. We are, however, in the position to test our theoretical model with 
data from both our 14 case studies and our large-N analysis. As we will see, the results from 
the 14 case studies confirm to a large extent the findings we have got in the previous chapter. 
Thus, we can be sure that the results presented below are not distorted by individual cases. 
In Table 5.4, the impacts of the unweighted (all actors) and weighted local understandings of 
citizenship (very influential actors only) can be compared (see Models 1 and 2). One immedi-
ately sees that accounting for the powerful actors predicts much better the outcomes of citi-
zenship policies: Whereas the coefficient of the second indicator is highly significant, the first 
one is significant only at a relatively low level. Moreover, the weighted UC explains the vari-
ance of rejection rates much better. When in Models 4 and 5 we control for the perception of 
the employment rate, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality and the ratio of applicants 
from Muslim countries—operationalized as in Chapter 4—the influence of the unweighted 
understanding of citizenship decreases and is no longer significant. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of the weighted indicator remains stable and is still significant, only, however, at 
the 0.1 level. Comparing Models 4 and 5 reveals again that more variance is explained when 
information about the influence structure is included. These findings demonstrate that ac-
counting for the power structures gives a much clearer picture of which criteria are relevant 
and which citizenship policy is pursued. We further observe that the unemployment rate and 
the number of Muslim candidates have no significant impact on the rejection rates. As for the 
ratio of foreign residents living in a municipality, the results are ambiguous. Contrary to the 
results we have got from our large-N analysis, the negative sign seems to indicate that fewer 
candidates are rejected in municipalities with a large foreign population. In Model 6, the coef-
ficient is significant at the 0.1 level. 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, the formal decision-making structure also has an enormous 
impact on the rejection rate. Our large-N analyses in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 have shown that mu-
nicipalities in which the entire population makes decisions in naturalization matters by ballot 
reject many more applications than others. Taking into account only the 14 case studies, a 
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bivariate analysis revealed that not only decisions that are made by popular votes but also 
those made by closed ballot during municipal assemblies lead to much higher rejection rates 
(see Table 4.2). The impact of this modified variable (accounting for both popular votes and 
decisions by closed ballot during municipal assemblies) is also tested in Model 3 of Table 5.4: 
In municipalities in which decisions are made anonymously, almost 20 percent more appli-
cants are rejected. The impact of this indicator is highly significant and explains much more 
than the weighted understanding of citizenship (Model 2). However, when we control in 
Model 6 for other variables, it is no longer significant; its coefficient strongly decreases, and 
the degree of explained variance becomes smaller than when we include the indicator for the 
weighted understanding of citizenship (Model 5). Unfortunately, the two variables ‘weighted 
understanding of citizenship’ and ‘decisions by closed ballot’ cannot be included in the same 
model as they are highly correlated (r=0.67, p=0.009).75 This is probably due to the fact that 
the variable ‘decisions by closed ballot’ not only informs us about the formal structures but 
also contains information about the attitudes of local politicians. As we have already seen in 
Table 4.2, local politicians in municipalities in which decisions are made anonymously disap-
proved the verdicts of the Swiss Federal Court, declaring such procedures to violate the Swiss 
constitution. In such municipalities, the opinion prevails that their population constitutes a 
homogeneous group, which should have the competence to decide who becomes member of 
their community. Accordingly, both indicators in Models 2 and 3 include information on the 
attitudes of local politicians. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
75 In a Klein-test we got the following results: R2 (adj.) = 0.69, VIF = 3.18. 
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Table 5.4: Rejection rates of all applicants in 14 municipalities: Non-standardized regression coeffi-
cients, standard error in brackets. 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Unweighted understanding 
of citizenship 
 
0.71° 
(0.35) 
  0.51 
(0.42) 
  
Weighted understanding of 
citizenship 
 
 0.61** 
(0.26) 
  0.60° 
(0.29) 
 
Decisions by closed ballot 
 
 
  19.81** 
(6.02) 
  13.51 
(8.51) 
Unemployment rate 
 
 
  
 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
Ratio of foreign residents 
 
 
  
 
-0.84 
(0.52) 
-1.06° 
(0.48) 
-0.41 
(0.52) 
Ratio Muslim candidates 
 
 
  
 
0.23 
(0.20) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
Constant 
 
 
-11.17 
(13.69) 
-8.65 
(10.82) 
7.03° 
(3.94) 
5.40 
(19.86) 
4.57 
(14.70) 
11.85 
(14.47) 
R2 (adj.) 0.19 0.26 0.43 0.29 0.44 0.35 
N 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Notes : Level of significance : ° p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
In the previous chapter, we have demonstrated that our explanatory model explains the rejec-
tion rate of candidates from Muslim countries much better than the general ratio. We have got 
similar findings for the comparison of the 14 case studies in Table 5.5. When we replace the 
dependent variable, all coefficients of the explanatory variables strongly increase. As for the 
‘understanding of citizenship’ we observe the same patterns as in Table 5.4: The coefficient 
for the unweighted understanding of citizenship decreases and is no longer significant when 
we include control variables. On the other hand, the coefficient of the weighted understanding 
of citizenship does not change and remains significant at the 0.1 level (Model 5). In line with 
the results from the large-N analysis, the impact of the formal decision-making structure is 
much higher when explaining the number of rejected applications of candidates from Muslim 
countries than when predicting the general rejection rates. 
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Table 5.5: Rejection rates of candidates from Muslim countries in 14 municipalities: Non-standardized 
regression coefficients, standard error in brackets. 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Unweighted understanding 
of citizenship 
 
1.16° 
(0.58) 
  0.79 
(0.72) 
  
Weighted understanding of 
citizenship 
 
 1.06** 
(0.41) 
  1.03° 
(0.48) 
 
Decisions by closed ballot 
 
 
  35.35** 
(9.02) 
  28.92° 
(13.11) 
Unemployment rate 
 
 
  
 
0.10 
(0.21) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
Ratio of foreign residents 
 
 
  
 
-1.13 
(0.90) 
-1.52° 
(0.81) 
-0.29 
(0.81) 
Ratio Muslim candidates 
 
 
  
 
0.38 
(0.34) 
0.34 
(0.29) 
0.27 
(0.29) 
Constant 
 
 
-22.16 
(22.50) 
-20.66 
(17.21) 
6.32 
(5.91) 
1.27 
(34.01) 
-3.15 
(24.64) 
4.57 
(22.31) 
R2 (adj.) 0.19 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.42 0.43 
N 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Notes : Level of significance : ° p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
 
External influences II 
This chapter set out to generate pertinent indicators for the understanding of citizenship and 
the degree of influence of each local actor and to test whether it makes a difference or not to 
account for power structures when we measure the influence of the understanding of citizen-
ship on the ratio of rejected applications. As our findings have shown, it makes a difference 
whether or not we account for the local power structures in predicting the outcomes of natu-
ralization policies. Similar to the findings of the previous chapter, we further demonstrated 
that our model and especially the indicator for the formal decision-making structures work 
particularly well in predicting the number of rejected applications of candidates from Muslim 
countries. More generally, we have also revealed that in Swiss municipalities the implementa-
tion of citizenship politics and the application of naturalization criteria diverge a great deal. 
This confirms our earlier observation that Swiss municipalities can be considered to a certain 
 116 
extent as independent political units when it comes to naturalizing foreigners. The question 
remains, however, whether the attitudes of local politicians are solely the result of local strug-
gles (which we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 7), or whether their opinions are also 
influenced by external factors. We have already seen in the previous chapter that there are no 
regional clusters of citizenship politics (see Table 4.4). In our interviews we learned that some 
actors knew and observed how other municipalities in their region dealt with naturalization 
applications. It may even happen that somebody proposes to introduce a procedure that was 
successful elsewhere. However, such occurrences seem to be very rare. It appeared that hardly 
anybody regularly discusses matters concerning naturalizations with colleagues from other 
municipalities. We can therefore conclude that there are no significant influences from one 
municipality to another within a certain region that lead to clusters of local settings with simi-
lar naturalization policies. As we will see in the next chapter, one can observe very different 
approaches in citizenship politics even among neighboring municipalities.  
Might there be influences coming from the national level? As we already know, there are very 
few regulations at the national and cantonal levels and hardly any direct exchanges between 
actors at the different levels. When it comes to the discourses of the individual actors, we no-
ticed in our interviews with local politicians that they sometimes adopted arguments from 
representatives of their parties at the national level. However, whether such influences exist or 
not is irrelevant, since they constitute a constant factor for all municipalities. What is more 
interesting is the fact that such discourses are adopted in varying degrees. We observed, for 
example, that some local representatives of the Swiss People’s Party, defending a very restric-
tive naturalization policy, used similar arguments as their colleagues at the national level. In 
municipalities with a generous understanding of citizenship and a less active SVP, however, 
such arguments were absent. This points again to the salience of the local context.  
Although we highlighted, time and again, the importance of the local political and social con-
text and could hardly trace any external influences, we should not treat our case studies as 
completely isolated fields. After all, they are part of the same nation-state and it might be as-
sumed that they share some cultural and political characteristics. Leach’s (1965 [1954]) study 
illustrates that the variation of political systems on the local level in highland Burma appears 
to be limited when compared to other societies where political systems existed that were not 
conceivable in highland Burma (see Chapter 3). In a similar vein, studies comparing local 
integration politics in different countries have emphasized the influence of national citizen-
ship models that limit the range of conceivable politics at the local level within a nation-state 
(Rogers and Tillie 2001; Koopmans 2004; Penninx et al. 2004a). Unfortunately, there is no 
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comparable data about local understandings of citizenship in other European countries. Such 
information would allow us to evaluate whether, on average, conceptions of citizenship are 
more restrictive or generous in other nation-states.  
Instead of comparing local citizenship models in different countries, another strategy is to 
look for commonalities of Swiss municipalities and to evaluate whether local politicians in 
different places share some cultural and political values despite diverging citizenship politics. 
This can be done by studying how local decision makers think about Switzerland and what 
they feel proud about in this country. In each of our municipalities, at least 56 percent of our 
interviewees, and on average 77 percent, are very or rather proud of Switzerland.76 This might 
not be so surprising given the fact that we talked to local politicians. It gets much more inter-
esting when we look at what these people are proud of. As is shown in Table 5.6, in each mu-
nicipality by far the most-often-mentioned characteristics were the direct democratic system 
and the high degree of liberty prevailing in this country. Both aspects were conceived as exis-
tent together, since by ‘liberty’ most people understood rights and opportunities to express 
one’s opinion and to participate in the political processes. Of all 18 characteristics that came 
up in this open-ended question, these two traits of the country were mentioned by 59 percent 
of all interviewees. Indeed, in the individual communities, how many politicians are proud of 
direct democratic institutions varies a great deal. In virtually all cases, however, it is by far the 
most-often-mentioned characteristic of Switzerland. Even in the municipality in which ‘direct 
democracy’ and ‘liberty’ have been indicated as points of pride the fewest times, 40 percent 
of the local actors still have mentioned it. Only in three municipalities have other characteris-
tics been mentioned more often than 40 percent. The second most-often-mentioned character-
istic, ‘cultural diversity’, scores (on average) only 23 percent, and the remaining ones, 19 per-
cent or less. By ‘cultural diversity’, most understand the four national linguistic groups. A few 
left-wing politicians also included the cultural diversity of immigrants in this category. In 
some individual municipalities, people are also proud of the peaceful cohabitation of different 
(indigenous) cultures, the social wealth of this country, its politics of neutrality, and the pre-
vailing law and order.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
76 For the wording of these questions, see Annex (questions 25 to 27). 
 118 
Table 5.6: Pride of Swiss local politicians 
Characteristics Municipalities 
  Over-
all % 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
 
1 
 
Direct Dem./Liberty 
 
59 
 
 
50 
 
71 
 
50 
 
64 
 
56 
 
67 
 
64 
 
44 
 
60 
 
40 
 
43 
 
88 
 
60 
 
63 
2 Cultural Diversity 
 
23 
 
20 18 42 9 19 50 18 22 0 7 43 35 20 25 
3 Social Wealth 
 
19 
 
25 6 8 36 19 0 9 33 20 27 7 29 0 50 
4 Peaceful Cohabitat. 
 
18 
 
30 12 33 27 25 33 27 11 0 13 7 6 10 13 
5 Law and Order 
 
15 
 
15 18 8 9 6 0 36 0 20 27 14 12 0 38 
6 Neutrality           
       
13 
 
10 24 25 9 13 0 18 0 20 7 14 12 20 13 
7 Nature         
         
11 
 
20 6 17 0 3 8 18 11 0 13 21 18 20 0 
8 Constitutional State 
 
10 
 
20 12 8 0 31 8 9 0 0 20 14 6 0 13 
9 Welfare State 
 
7 
 
5 0 0 0 6 0 9 0 20 13 14 18 0 13 
10 Tolerance/Generosity 
 
7 
 
5 6 17 9 6 8 0 11 0 13 14 0 0 13 
11 Level of Education 
 
6 
 
5 6 0 0 6 0 0 22 20 0 14 6 10 0 
12 Assiduity 
 
5 
 
15 0 0 0 0 17 9 0 0 13 14 0 0 0 
Note: Only those characteristics are listed that were mentioned by at least 5 percent of all interviewees. In total, 
18 characteristics came up in the interviews. Characteristics mentioned by less than 5 percent are ‘self-
assuredness’, ‘federalism’, ‘consociationalism’. ‘Christian values,’ and ‘Switzerland as a financial center’. Some 
were also proud of the fact that most politicians at the national level are not professionals (militia-system).  
 
Similar patterns can be observed when we compare how proud the representatives of different 
local political parties are. With the exception of the members of the Green Party, of which 
only 25 percent are very or rather proud of Switzerland, in all other groups only a minority is 
not proud of Switzerland. Needless to say, differences can be observed between the Social-
Democrats (SP) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), of which 64 percent and 97 percent, 
respectively, are proud of this country. As for ‘direct democracy’ and the ‘high degree of lib-
erty’, those are again by far the most crucial characteristics of Switzerland for a majority of 
the representatives of all political parties. 
More detailed analyses have shown that there is no correlation between the most-often-
mentioned characteristics and the rejection rates. This shows that local politicians in Swiss 
municipalities have some common ideas about the Swiss nation-state, even though they pur-
sue different naturalization policies and have different ideas about who can become a member 
 119 
of this nation-state. The fact that a large majority is proud of this country’s direct democratic 
institutions confirms the commonly held view that political institutions constitute a crucial 
part of Swiss citizens’ national identity (Kriesi 1998: 5-12; Chollet 2006: 86-124). Of the 
three fundamental political institutions in Switzerland—neutrality, federalism, and direct de-
mocracy—the last one is considered as the most important one since it heavily determines 
political life in this country (Kriesi 1998: 90). Some even speak of Switzerland as the oldest 
democracy, referring to the union of the first three cantons in the 13th century. Given the cul-
tural heterogeneity of this country, it is possible to contend that political institutions constitute 
a crucial denominator for all groups. Accordingly, Switzerland is often considered as a nation 
by action of the will rather than a nation based on cultural homogeneity (Kohn 1967 [1944]; 
Deutsch 1976; Theiler 2004).  
It can be concluded from this short excursus on what Swiss local politicians are proud of 
Switzerland that they share some common ideas about this country despite diverging under-
standings of citizenship. While we discussed in this chapter our hypotheses by comparing 
aggregated data of 14 case studies, in the next chapter we will illustrate in more detail the 
decision-making processes and the various understandings of citizenship by looking more 
closely at the politics of citizenship in four municipalities. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Four Naturalization Fields 
 
 
Introduction 
Having compared the prevailing ideas of citizenship and the local influence structures among 
our 14 case studies, we are now taking a closer look at two pairs of municipalities by investi-
gating in detail their decision-making structures and the attitudes of their politicians. This 
chapter mainly serves to confirm our hypotheses with more qualitative data and to illustrate in 
more detail the conclusions of the previous two chapters. Besides the meaningful generali-
zations we seek in our study, we will highlight that each municipality has interesting and im-
portant stories to tell us. For the sake of feasibility and not to bore the reader with endless 
accounts of local naturalization politics, only four cases will be discussed in more detail. Two 
ideas guided the selection of the four cases: first, we wanted to guarantee a certain variety 
among the cases covering the range of citizenship politics, which we encountered in the pre-
vious chapter. Second, we made sure that the two cases of each pair are as similar as possible 
in order to control for a range of intervening variables. Out of the 14 case studies we first se-
lected the two municipalities with the most generous and the most restrictive understandings 
of citizenship (see Table 5.1). As we selected most of the 14 municipalities in pairs (see Table 
3.1), we then simply retained the two cases that belonged to the first two cases; these two are 
situated somewhere in the middle between the two extreme ends of the scale of understand-
ings of citizenship. One case of each pair has a high and the other one a low rejection rate. 
Looking at Table 6.1, where some key features of the four cases are listed, we notice that the 
number of inhabitants, the ratio of foreigners living in these municipalities, and the local un-
employment rate are relatively similar for each pair and that there seems to be hardly any rela-
tion between these variables and the rejection rate. Although there are very few regulations at 
the cantonal level that could interfere with local naturalization policy, we selected municipali-
ties of the same canton. This allows us to show that even within the same region naturaliza-
tion politics and understandings of citizenship can vary a lot. Moreover, the selected pairs of 
municipalities have the same formal decision-making procedure. In Bernhigh and Bernlow, 
the final decisions regarding naturalization applications are taken by the local parliament, 
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whereas in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow the population decides during municipal assemblies 
whether the applicants can acquire the Swiss citizenship. Although similar with regard to a 
range of characteristics, the averaged rejection rates between 1990 and 2002 do display dif-
ferences upon critical inspection. While Bernhigh and Aargauhigh refused 22 percent and 13 
percent of the applications respectively, Bernlow and Aargaulow accepted almost all candi-
dates.  
 
Table 6.1: Key features of the four case studies 
  Bernhigh Bernlow   Aargauhigh Aargaulow 
Rejection rate  22% 0%  13% 1% 
Understanding of citizenship  0.42 0.20  0.51 0.37 
Formal decision-making 
procedure 
 Parliament Parliament  Assembly Assembly 
Kind of municipality  Small indus-
trial town 
Small indus-
trial town 
 Rural com-
muter mu-
nicipality 
Small town 
Canton  Bern Bern  Aargau Aargau 
Residents in 2002  14’284 10’803  8’421 10’776 
Foreign nationals in 2002  21% 17%  18% 26% 
Unemployment rate in 2002  2.5% 1.8%  1.8% 2.7% 
Notes: The understanding of citizenship (UC) varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive) and has been 
generated according to the procedure discussed in Chapter 5. The information for ‘kind of municipality’ has 
been extracted from Andreas Ladner’s dataset that is based on three surveys in all Swiss municipalities (cf. Lad-
ner 1991). 
 
As we will see in the course of this chapter, the idea of citizenship is problematized in a com-
pletely different manner in the municipalities with restrictive naturalization policies and those 
with generous naturalization policies. The detailed description of these four case studies—
first of Bernhigh and Bernlow, then of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow—therefore mainly con-
centrates on the attitudes of the local decision-makers in order to show that it is to a certain 
extent their conceptions that help us understand whether a candidate is naturalized or not. In 
contrast to the previous chapter, we will not content ourselves with quantitative indicators; we 
will present in more detail the discourses of local politicians. By doing so, we will not lose 
track of the power-and-influence structures within each municipality that facilitate or con-
strain certain ideas.  
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On the basis of documents and expert interviews with representatives of the local administra-
tion, we will for each case first present the respective formal naturalization procedure and 
concentrate especially on the question which actors are involved in which function and at 
what moment of the process. This will allow us to find out whether certain individuals or 
groups of persons through their formal positions have an influence on the decision-making 
processes. More generally, the brief presentation will show in detail how municipal naturali-
zations proceed, that even in relatively small political units many different actors are involved 
in the decision-making processes and that the evaluation of the candidates’ dossiers happens 
at various stages. This once more reveals the contentious nature of local naturalization proc-
esses and that both recommendations and final decisions depend a lot on the attitudes of indi-
vidual actors. Finally, looking at how the dossiers are treated, in which way information about 
candidates are gathered, how recommendations are made and how the broader population is 
informed, already tells us a lot about how restrictive the local naturalization policy is. 
The power structures within the local political fields of naturalization will be sketched by re-
sorting to the indicators that we generated in the previous chapter. Again, we will be able to 
show the positions of individual persons within each municipality. These preliminary analy-
ses mainly serve to better situate the importance of the discourses of individual actors and 
political parties. Thus, we will be able to distinguish dominant and minority discourses, con-
flict situations and the degree of heterogeneity of ideas within each municipality.  
The discourses of local politicians will then be presented and compared in relation to three 
relevant questions which we have already dealt with in the previous two chapters:77 (1) first 
and foremost, we will present attitudes towards naturalization criteria for which we have so 
far used an aggregated indicator. In contrast to the previous discussion on the eleven naturali-
zation criteria, only the attitudes towards aspects that are judged by the local actors as being 
crucial have been retained for the following analysis. (2) We repeatedly noticed that our ex-
planatory model works particularly well to predict the number of rejected applications from 
Muslim countries. We will therefore present in more detail the attitudes towards this group of 
candidates. It will be revealing as to whether people from Muslim countries are seen as very 
different from Swiss citizens or not with regard to their culture and more specifically their 
attitude towards the state. More generally, we will demonstrate how those people are catego-
rized and whether or not and to what extent stereotypical thinking is present in the heads of 
local politicians. Interestingly, it will appear that problems of integrating oneself into a new 
social and cultural environment are explained very differently: for those with a rather restric-
                                                
77 See Annex (open questions 2, 3 and 13 and closed questions 4 to 12). 
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tive understanding of citizenship it is the different cultural background of the applicants that is 
crucial, whereas those with a rather generous understanding of citizenship emphasize individ-
ual characteristics such as education or social class as relevant for a successful integration. 
Moreover, politicians requiring a lot of criteria to be fulfilled also use a more xenophobic vo-
cabulary than those with a more generous understanding of citizenship. Using terms like 
‘tribes’, ‘niggers’, ‘potential criminals’ and ‘profiteers’ when talking about naturalization 
candidates, not only shows how high the barriers are set by such actors, but also what image 
they have of certain foreign residents. (3) Finally, we are also interested in views of the ver-
dicts of the Swiss Federal Court that were taken one year before we started our case studies. 
Attitudes towards these decisions will be an indicator of whether the interviewees see natu-
ralizations as political rather than administrative procedures. As our interviews have revealed, 
those people regard naturalizations as political procedures who think the local population 
should have the last word to say in naturalization matters. They have a restrictive under-
standing of citizenship and most often hold the opinion that a naturalized citizen becomes 
primarily a member of a local community and not of the Swiss nation-state. 
 
 
Bernhigh and Bernlow 
Formal procedures and power structures 
In both municipalities, Bernhigh and Bernlow, the formal naturalization procedures and the 
kind of actors involved are more or less the same. However, some minor aspects already point 
to a more restrictive naturalization policy in Bernhigh. In Bernhigh, after candidates have 
submitted their applications at the local administration, the sufficiency of the documents and 
the formal requirements (mainly the years of residence) are verified. In contrast to procedures 
in many other municipalities, applicants are then invited for more or less formal interviews 
with representatives of the local administration (in most municipalities candidates only meet 
the naturalization commission). These interviews mainly serve to let the authorities to get to 
know the candidates—to find out their reasons for naturalization and to verify their knowl-
edge of language and degree of integration. In some cases, possible criminal records or out-
standing tax debts in the past are addressed. In Bernhigh, it regularly happens that information 
is gathered from employers, schoolteachers and housekeepers. In Bernlow, it appears to be 
rather exceptional for schoolteachers and employers to be contacted. In contrast to Bernhigh, 
in Bernlow representatives of the executive body (local government) are always present dur-
ing these interviews. On the basis of the interviews and recommendations from third persons, 
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the local administrations of both towns make an application for acceptance or rejection. The 
dossiers are then handed over to the naturalization commission consisting of representatives 
of the local parliament. Each candidate’s application is discussed by the members of the 
commission who often adopt the recommendations of the administration. In Bernlow, it rarely 
happens that the commission invites candidates for a second interview. In Bernhigh, this may 
occur in some borderline cases when candidates seem to have violated a traffic rule. Since the 
commission does not dispose of any written documents in such a case, candidates are invited 
to clarify the incident. After having discussed each dossier, the commission also makes an 
application for acceptance or rejection. If a candidate is not recommended for naturalization, 
he or she is given the opportunity to withdraw his or her application. In Bernhigh, about 25 
percent of the applications are withdrawn each year and submitted again one or two years 
later. In Bernlow, very few dossiers are recommended for rejection. This means that the dif-
ference in the rejection rates between both municipalities would be even higher if all submit-
ted dossiers in Bernhigh were passed through the process to the final decision in the local par-
liament. The members of the commission are in direct contact with the parliamentary groups 
and inform them about the individual dossiers. As a consequence, the attitudes of the deputies 
are taken into account by the commission, and its recommendations are often followed after 
the dossiers have been handed over to the legislative body. In both municipalities, the execu-
tive body also discusses the dossiers but virtually never challenges a recommendation of the 
administration or the commission. Since representatives of the executive body in Bernlow 
interview the candidates together with the person in charge at the local administration, the 
opinions of its members already flow into the very first recommendation. Interestingly, in 
Bernhigh freshly naturalized candidates are invited for a more or less formal ceremony during 
which the documents are handed over. In Bernlow, however, such ceremonies were abolished 
some years ago since hardly anybody attended to them.  
Looking at the formal procedures, we can see that in Bernhigh the candidates appear to be 
screened more systematically, more information is gathered from third persons, and it is rec-
ommended to more persons that they withdraw their applications. It seems that more criteria 
are verified and a higher level of integration is required. All this constitutes an initial expla-
nation for the different rejection rates and points to local politicians with more restrictive at-
titudes towards naturalization candidates in Bernhigh. The existence or non-existence of a 
naturalization ceremony might also be considered an indicator for the importance that is at-
tributed to the citizenship acquisition. To elaborate on these impressions, we now have to 
specify who the actors are who decisively influence the decision-making processes. In both 
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communities, the local administration seems to be an important actor, since their representa-
tives are among the few persons that encounter the candidates. Actually, only in Bernlow do 
some other actors—members of the executive body—regularly meet the applicants. The rec-
ommendations of the administration are therefore crucial for the decisions of both the natu-
ralization commission and the local parliament. In Bernhigh, the naturalization commission 
itself is certainly another important actor. Its members verify the dossiers a second time and 
work out recommendations for the parliament. During the decision-making processes, they 
are constantly in contact with other members of the local parliament and inform them about 
their decisions. In Bernlow, the executive body can be considered the second most important 
collective actor, since it is involved already at the very beginning of the naturalization proce-
dure. These impressions are confirmed in Table 6.2 which lists the relative influence of each 
interviewee in comparison to the most powerful actor in the political field of naturalizations 
of each municipality.78 The two persons in charge of naturalizations at the local administra-
tion and the members of the commission are among the most influential individual actors in 
Bernhigh. The executive body in Bernhigh has no influence except for one person who is also 
a member of the naturalization commission. In Bernlow, in addition to the two persons in 
charge of naturalizations at the local administration, three members of the executive body and 
one representative of the local parliament constitute the most important persons. The naturali-
zation commission seems to be fairly unimportant. Table 6.2 also lists the individual under-
standings of citizenship (UC). A brief look at the table reveals that, except for one representa-
tive of the local administration, the important actors in Bernhigh have a more restrictive atti-
tude than their counterparts in Bernlow. Interestingly, the party affiliation of the influential 
members seems not to be a very good predictor of the individual understandings of citizen-
ship. In both municipalities, members from the Liberal Party (FDP) and the Social Democrats 
(SP) constitute the most influential actors, and representatives of the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP) are rather unimportant. Nonetheless, the naturalization policy in Bernhigh is much 
more restrictive than that in Bernlow. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
78 The construction of this indicator is based on data collected in our face-to-face interviews. Each interviewee 
had to indicate which actors exert a certain influence on the respective local naturalization procedures (reputa-
tional approach). For a theoretical elaboration of this indicator see Chapter 5. For the exact wording of the ques-
tions see Annex (questions 20 to 23). 
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Table 6.2: Relative influence and understanding of citizenship of local actors 
Bernhigh  Bernlow 
Actor Party Function Infl. UC  Actor Party Function Infl. UC 
1 - Administration 100 .10  1 - Administration 100 .23 
2 FDP Executive 96 .23  2 SP Executive 89 .13 
3 - Administration 61 .63  3 FDP Executive 63 .28 
4 FDP Nat. Commission 26 .55  4 FDP Mayor 53 .10 
5 SP Nat. Commission 22 .20  5 SP Parliament 47 0 
6 SP Nat. Commission 22 .25  6 - Administration 16 .30 
7 SP Nat. Commission 13 .13  7 EVP Nat. Commission 11 .43 
8 SVP Nat. Commission 13 .43  8 FDP Nat. Commission 11 .18 
9 SVP Nat. Commission 9 .48  9 FDP Executive 5 .20 
10 FDP Nat. Commission 9 .35  10 FDP Executive 5 .10 
11 FDP Parliament 9 .38  11 SVP Nat. Commission 0 .40 
12 Grüne Parliament 9 .28  12 SVP Parliament 0 .18 
13 FDP Executive 9 .38       
14 SVP Parliament 4 .20       
15 SP Parliament 0 .50       
16 EVP Parliament 0 .13       
Abbreviations: Influence (Infl.), Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP), Social Democrats (SP), 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green Party (Grüne), Evangelical People’s Party (EVP). 
Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ indicates the relative influence of actors in comparison to the most powerful 
actor (100). ‘Understanding of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive). 
 
 
Attitudes towards naturalization criteria 
Now that we have a clearer picture of the structures of the local naturalization fields and know 
who the dominant actors are, we would like to explore and compare in more detail the various 
discourses on citizenship and particularly the criteria that have to be fulfilled for naturaliza-
tion (for a summary of this analysis see Table 6.3 below). Without knowing who the influen-
tial actors are, we would not be able to distinguish influential attitudes from less relevant 
opinions. In the following discussion we will therefore always precise whether certain posi-
tions are taken by powerful politicians or not. 
As we have seen in Table 5.1 above, knowledge of the regional language is an important cri-
terion in most of our case studies.79 The obvious difficulty for examiners is how to evaluate 
                                                
79 All municipalities discussed in this chapter are located in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. 
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whether the language ability of a candidate is good enough for naturalization. In most mu-
nicipalities, local politicians verify the language abilities of examinees during an interview in 
an informal way. For candidates who are judged to have an insufficient command of the re-
quired language, it is often recommended that they attend a language course before continuing 
the naturalization procedure. Quite exceptionally, Bernhigh in 2003 introduced a standardized 
language test that should enable the local decision makers to evaluate the individual candi-
dates according to a standardized European language folio.80 Different actors in Bernhigh 
argued that it was now easier to prepare for these language tests because the expected level 
was better specified. While such language tests avoid discriminatory decisions, they may lead 
to other problems. The most influential actor in Bernlow, the person mainly responsible for 
naturalizations at the local administration, opposed such language tests because they discrimi-
nated against illiterates, candidates from regions with other alphabets, persons with a low 
education and elderly people. According to her, it sufficed to evaluate their language knowl-
edge during the regular interviews. Anyway, she continued, the interviewers in Bernlow did 
not consider the command of German very important. It was only when they had the impres-
sion that candidates really did not understand anything at all that they would suggest to them 
that they attend a language course before the application process was carried further. Com-
pared to Bernhigh, the different attitudes towards the criterion of language knowledge became 
most apparent when she told us that even if candidates did not improve their German during 
such a language course, they were naturalized simply because they showed some willingness 
to integrate themselves.  
When asked about the most important criteria a naturalization candidate had to fulfill, most 
actors in Bernlow either did not mention language knowledge at all or attributed to it less im-
portance than their colleagues in other municipalities. An influential member of the SP argued 
that she expected that young candidates would have a minimal command of German, but 
those persons who immigrated to Switzerland as adults would not be expected to speak Ger-
man. Another actor of the same party held the attitude that it was important that applicants 
were able to communicate in school or at their workplace. It had to be taken into considera-
tion, however, whether these persons had any opportunity at all to learn German. A represen-
tative of the administration observed that nobody felt bothered when a French-speaking Swiss 
moved to Bernlow and did not speak German even after 20 years; if an Italian did not speak 
                                                
80 The rather exceptional introduction of such a language test in Bernhigh may be due to the fact that the respon-
sible person at the local administration who proposed to introduce this test is a linguist. In recent years, formal 
language tests have also been introduced in other municipalities. Each time, violent debates could be observed in 
Switzerland on whether such tests are an appropriate instrument to evaluate if the language knowledge of candi-
dates is good enough for naturalization. 
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German after having lived in Switzerland for many years, why should it pose a problem, he 
rhetorically asked. On the other hand, most actors of the slightly less important right-wing 
group required either broken German or another national language. Two politicians even 
brought up the question of whether English should be acceptable. Language knowledge was 
an important criterion for only one influential right-wing politician. According to him, candi-
dates had to be able to speak and read but not write German. However, under certain circum-
stances and because of Bernlow’s proximity to the French-speaking part of Switzerland, he 
could also accept somebody who only spoke French.  
In Bernhigh, most actors seemed to agree that the command of a language was a very impor-
tant criterion to prove a certain degree of integration. Surprisingly, for some influential actors 
it seemed to suffice to speak a national language, although they all supported the new lan-
guage test by which only knowledge of German is verified. A left-wing member of the execu-
tive body told us that if a person spoke one national language, this already showed that he or 
she wanted Swiss citizenship for other than purely self-serving reasons. Not all representa-
tives of the left-wing parties, though, seemed to have the same opinion concerning this matter. 
Indeed, the two members of the naturalization commission believed that it was only by learn-
ing the regional language, and thus through linguistic integration, that one could become a 
Swiss citizen. One of them told us that otherwise contact with Swiss citizens and the accom-
plishment of everyday tasks would be impossible. She gave us the example of her foreign 
cleaning lady who damaged her furniture because she did not understand her instructions and 
used the wrong cleaning agent. The much-less-influential representatives of the left-wing par-
ties defended other positions. One of them argued that an insufficient command of German 
did, indeed, complicate a successful integration, but that this was no reason to prevent some-
one from becoming a Swiss citizen. The representative of the Green Party presented an argu-
ment similar to that of some actors in Bernlow, namely, that it sufficed if candidates tried to 
learn the language; this effort already proved that they were willing to integrate themselves. 
Notice two observations: (1) Despite of the fact that in Bernlow the criterion of ‘knowledge of 
language’ is attributed much less importance than in other municipalities, it is still much more 
relevant than other criteria in this municipality (cf. Table 5.1). (2) In Bernhigh, this criterion 
is much more relevant than in Bernlow. However, nobody required it for cultural integration. 
Rather, it was argued that speaking the regional language facilitates everyday life in a new 
home country. As we have already argued in Chapter 5, it appears that the application of this 
criterion does not necessarily tell us whether naturalization policy is led by an ethnic concep-
tion of citizenship or a civic-territorial one. On the one hand, it constitutes an important crite-
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rion even in municipalities with a rather generous understanding of citizenship. On the other 
hand, in municipalities where it is rather difficult to get the Swiss passport, language knowl-
edge might be required for a structural rather than a cultural integration. 
 
In some municipalities, controversies are ignited when candidates for naturalization benefit 
from social security or disability insurance or are unemployed (cf. Table 5.1). Some right-
wing politicians are opposed to the idea that the Swiss state has to financially support such 
persons. Others are rather concerned about naturalizing persons that, in their opinion, unjusti-
fiably profit from the Swiss security system. They want to be sure that candidates have seri-
ous reasons for benefiting from social security and disability insurance. Such debates are all 
the more interesting in light of the fact that foreigners eligible for naturalization already have 
the same social rights as Swiss citizens. Therefore, granting the Swiss citizenship never im-
plies any additional costs for the municipalities or the Swiss state. As will become clearer in 
the next few paragraphs, opposing the naturalization of such candidates does not reflect any 
economic interests, but rather expresses the attitude that ‘good’ Swiss citizens do not depend 
on the state. 
The very influential person in charge of naturalization at the local administration in Bernhigh 
first explained to us that, in principle, there was no obstacle for naturalization of such persons. 
However, with regard to unemployment he then made a distinction between persons that were 
unemployed although they had made an effort to find a job, and those that were just too lazy 
to work. According to him, in Bernhigh it often happened that applications of young persons 
were reset because the naturalization commission had the impression that the young people 
were not motivated enough to find a job. He concluded that such persons lacked a certain am-
bition and did not share the Swiss mentality in terms of diligence. After all, negative decisions 
were even some kind of “development aid” for such persons because they forced them to find 
a job. Interestingly, in Bernhigh representatives from both left-wing and right-wing parties 
preferred to verify why applicants were unemployed. An influential member of the Social 
Democrats told us that it posed a problem for her if a person had no job only because he or 
she was too lazy to find one. Another person in charge at the local administration required 
that concrete and clear reasons had to be presented before such a person could be naturalized. 
It also seems, as just asserted by the representative of the administration, that cases of candi-
dates benefiting from social security and disability insurance are more controversial. For a 
right-wing politician and influential member of the naturalization commission, it did not suf-
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fice if candidates benefiting from disability insurance could provide medical attestations since 
some doctors handed them out even to persons that had no disability or illness at all. Surpris-
ingly, a representative of the Swiss People’s Party, who is politically rather isolated in Bern-
high, confided to us that he is no longer against naturalizations of persons who have debts, are 
sick or disabled, for it was incredible how many applicants benefited from social security or 
disability insurance nowadays, and it was simply impossible to reject them all. After all, he 
told us, they also got the money without naturalization. How important it is for some politi-
cians in Bernhigh that candidates do not financially depend on the state provides a final ex-
ample: a representative of the Swiss People’s Party explained to us that a command of Ger-
man was one of the most important criterion for naturalization. However, his party allowed 
some exceptions. Recently, the SVP had been in favor of a naturalization of an elderly couple 
that had been living in Bernhigh for 20 years but only spoke German badly. But, according to 
the representatives of the SVP, they had worked their whole lives and had never made any 
financial demands on the state, which in large measure justified accepting them for naturaliza-
tion. 
In Bernlow, the person in charge of naturalizations at the local administration told us that the 
social status of a candidate was no obstacle for the acquisition of the Swiss citizenship. For 
most influential actors, ‘social security’, ‘disability insurance’, or ‘unemployment’ were not 
issues that should influence decisions on naturalization. An important representative of the SP 
argued that these persons had every right to benefit from these services since they had paid 
taxes in Switzerland for many years. Only for one person was it important to verify such cases 
because, according to her, it sometimes happened that asylum seekers refused to work and 
thus unjustly benefited from social security. For her, it posed a problem if such persons ap-
plied for citizenship later on. Some right-wing politicians, indeed, preferred to verify in detail 
the dossiers of persons with financial difficulties. However, they were not opposed to appli-
cants who benefit in one way or another from the state. They saw it rather as a problem if 
candidates had debts or did not pay their taxes. 
While national criteria are vague regarding most aspects of naturalization, they are quite clear 
on the requirement that alien citizens have to respect the legal order and must not compromise 
the interior and exterior safety of the country if they want to acquire Swiss citizenship. Crimi-
nal records are verified by cantonal and national authorities and can make naturalization im-
possible. Therefore, it is even more surprising that local politicians in Bernhigh worried about 
possible criminal records of candidates. In contrast to actors in Bernlow, some in Bernhigh 
when asked about the most important naturalization criteria, explicitly required that applicants 
 132 
have no criminal records. Agreeing with the attitudes in other rather restrictive municipalities, 
some actors in Bernhigh argued that breaking traffic rules was not always registered, or was 
deleted, after several years.81 Merely looking at criminal records therefore did not suffice to 
verify if a candidate had violated any law in the past. As we have already seen, when the natu-
ralization commission is suspicious of a candidate, he or she is invited for an additional inter-
view. For a right-wing politician of the naturalization commission, even “youth sins” have to 
date back quite a few years before the person could be naturalized. For a left-wing representa-
tive of the commission, candidates should not have committed any “gross” crimes. A col-
league of his told us that applicants should not be criminals, although small acts of thievery 
and youthful escapades should not be an obstacle. Only one member of little influence in the 
Social Democrat Party defended the position that even criminals should have the right to ac-
quire the Swiss citizenship. In Bernlow, the matter of ‘criminal records’ was only mentioned 
by some uninfluential right-wing politicians. 
 
Attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries 
Besides the attitudes on criteria that have to be fulfilled for naturalization, perceptions of can-
didates, especially with regard to their nationality and their ability to integrate themselves in 
Switzerland, constitute another helpful indicator for the identification of different conceptions 
of citizenship.82 In Bernhigh, we were told by two representatives of the local administration 
that for the local decision makers, the country of origin and especially the religious affiliation 
played an important role when it came to judging the different applications. A lot of actors, 
they continued, were quite critical towards Muslims and persons from the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia, since such people were often associated with crimes reported by the me-
dia. After all, the statistics showed that in most violent crimes people from countries of the 
former Yugoslavia were involved, and personal experiences and incidents such as brawls dur-
ing the weekly evening sales in Bernhigh simply confirmed this. They held the opinion that 
the Muslim headscarf was often interpreted as a sign of extremism and that a lot of inhabitants 
                                                
81 These arguments also have to be seen in connection with national statistics that were published at the time of 
our data collection and showed that young men from the countries of the former Yugoslavia were more often 
involved in car accidents than young Swiss. A fierce debate started after a car insurance company announced its 
intention to increase the policy for such persons. 
82 We first asked all our interviewees in open questions whether it was more challenging for some foreigners to 
integrate themselves than for others, and if yes, for whom and for what reasons it was more difficult. We then 
more specifically wanted to know whether it posed a problem when a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf in 
public applied for Swiss citizenship. 
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were scared by international events such as the terrorist attacks in New York, the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia or the conflict in Palestine.  
These remarks are confirmed to a large extent by the opinions of the local decision makers. 
Almost all right-wing politicians agreed that persons from Muslim countries, in contrast to 
people from Western Europe, experienced many difficulties integrating themselves in Swit-
zerland because of their very different cultural and religious background. Some mentioned 
also Africans as a group of persons having such difficulties. On the other hand, Tamils and 
Vietnamese were considered as adaptive and friendly persons. Often we heard that Muslims 
had another image of the role of women. A lot of local actors felt uneasy with the headscarf 
because they see it as a sign of oppression of women. Some stated that persons from Muslim 
countries placed religion over the state and democratic institutions. A person in charge of 
naturalizations at the local administration distilled these opinions with the assertion that Mus-
lims had a “special” relationship with the state. A very influential Social Democrat and mem-
ber of the naturalization commission told us that certain “tribes” such as the Roma or the 
Kosovars had another way of thinking and followed different laws. She gave us the example 
of a Roma who had killed another Roma and then had paid his victim’s family money as an 
act of reconciliation. This man had not understood, according to her, why he was put in prison 
by the Swiss state and therefore in his eyes punished twice. Some related the allegedly violent 
attitudes of people from the former Yugoslavia toward the wars of the last decade in their 
region. A right-wing politician and member of the naturalization commission told us that 
these violent attitudes might be explained by the violent and criminal past of these regions. 
According to her, it would take many years before these people were no longer violent. And 
then she added that, after all, persons from the former Yugoslavia also had a brutal physiog-
nomy. A colleague of hers explained the Muslims’ lack of integration mainly by the fact 
that—unlike Italians and Spaniards—what he called “pride people” always stuck together and 
avoided the contact with the Swiss. Sometimes a link between immigration from Muslim 
countries and the Swiss welfare system was established. A member of the influential naturali-
zation commission asserted that certain persons came to Switzerland with excessive expecta-
tions (he referred to the image of Cockaigne). According to him, when they realized that they 
did not get what they wanted, they just took it. The representatives of much lesser importance 
in the left-wing parties in Bernhigh also held the opinion that persons from Muslim back-
grounds had more difficulty adapting to West European culture. They underscored, however, 
that the capacity for integration mainly depended on the individual persons and their educa-
tion and less on their cultural background. 
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Different perceptions could be observed in Bernlow. The person in charge of naturalizations 
in Bernlow told us that in her municipality, in the last years Muslim women wearing a head-
scarf were naturalized without any problems. She assumed that most politicians did not even 
notice that women with a headscarf had acquired Swiss citizenship and that in contrast to 
other municipalities female applicants were not asked to take off their headscarves during the 
interviews with local decision makers. The dominant left-wing politicians in Bernlow agreed 
that there were no differences at all between candidates from different countries concerning 
their ability for integration. For one of them it depended a lot on how the different cultural 
groups collided with Swiss society. Tamils, for example, were better accepted because they 
were much quieter and remained within their own groups. Swiss people therefore hardly no-
ticed them. Albanians, on the other hand, were much more communicative and attracted more 
attention. She concluded therefore that it was mainly a matter of how the Swiss perceived the 
different groups that facilitated or complicated the integration of foreign residents. Contrary 
to the opinions of many local politicians in Bernhigh, a colleague of hers was convinced that 
persons from countries of the former Yugoslavia were very much liked at their working 
places because they were assiduous and learnt German quickly. She stated that the high crime 
rate among immigrants could be explained by the fact that the Swiss society did not want to 
integrate such persons. Therefore, it hardly surprised her that they behaved differently. She 
concluded that integration depended on each individual and on his or her character. The rep-
resentative of the local administration who is in regular contact with left-wing politicians, 
held a slightly different position. He asserted that people from the former Yugoslavia had 
more difficulties integrating themselves and were more violent than persons from West Euro-
pean countries. He argued that this had nothing to do with their particular culture but could 
rather be explained by the fact that these people often were refugees who had undergone very 
hard experiences. 
Even most right-wing politicians in Bernlow argued that the ability for integration of candi-
dates of the former Yugoslavia could be explained mainly by the particular situation in their 
home countries. Often they linked difficulties in integrating to individual characteristics or the 
willingness to undertake the necessary efforts. One representative of the Liberal Party de-
plored the fact that Swiss society did not communicate clearly enough what is expected from 
foreign residents. As for the Muslim headscarf, he saw no problem for naturalization, as long 
as it was not worn at school. He defended the French position that the wearing of headscarves 
in schools should be forbidden in public, asserting that such a manifestation of religious af-
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filiation might provoke unnecessary aggression. Moreover, Swiss pupils would then demand 
to wear caps in school with the argument that this was their religion.  
 
Attitudes towards the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court 
 The narratives presented so far give a clear picture of the various attitudes of the influential 
local decision-makers. We get some important impressions of how naturalization candidates 
are perceived and how citizenship is conceptualized. In Bernhigh, more criteria have to be 
fulfilled, a higher integration or assimilation is required and candidates from Muslim coun-
tries are perceived much more mistrustfully. In Bernlow, the attitudes towards the acquisition 
of the citizenship are quite different. They could be summarized by a statement of the very 
influential person in charge of naturalizations at the local administration that their municipal-
ity does not consider naturalizations an act of state. Whereas in Bernhigh the influential right-
wing politicians especially wanted to make sure that applicants identified with the Swiss na-
tion, in Bernlow the attitude prevails that Swiss citizenship should be granted even if foreign-
ers apply for it for purely practical reasons; for example, because it makes traveling much 
easier. This difference of attitude leads us to the more general issue of whether naturalizations 
should be considered administrative or political procedures. This issue is not only a matter of 
competence but more generally concerns the question of whether municipalities can be con-
sidered communities that should have the right to decide according to which procedure and 
criteria foreigners become a member of their society, or whether naturalizations constitute 
clearly regulated procedures similar to those for issuing a driving license. Concerning this 
matter, attitudes towards the verdicts of the Swiss Federal Court from July 2003 are good in-
dicators. It may be argued that this indicator is less relevant for understanding the current 
naturalization politics since it does not directly concern the question of who might become a 
Swiss citizen. However, those attitudes give us a more general picture of how citizenship is 
perceived and might indicate whether subjective discriminatory decisions are in general ac-
cepted or not. 
In Bernlow, virtually all actors welcomed the decisions of the Federal Court. They all agreed 
that decisions taken by the whole population at ballot were nonsense, since such a system 
favored discriminatory decisions. Most actors agreed that candidates must not be rejected 
solely because they are coming from a certain country. Some saw it as an advantage for better 
integration that, henceforth, negative decisions had to be justified. In such cases, candidates 
knew exactly what they had to improve before they applied a second time. Only one isolated 
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representative of the SVP was completely against the decisions. In Bernhigh, many of the 
important politicians were also in favor of the ban on popular votes and of the right of candi-
dates to appeal negative decisions. Some of the important right-wing politicians, however, 
expressed their ambivalence with parts of the decisions. Others were against the right of ap-
peal because they thought that this amounted to a right for naturalization and therefore dimin-
ished the position of the municipality. All but one of the SVP politicians were against popular 
votes. Two persons of the naturalization commission were against the obligation to justify 
decisions. They argued that some foreigners simply did not fit into their community and that 
it happened sometimes that they just did not like an applicant, and that in such cases decisions 
simply could not be justified.  
In contrast to the attitudes towards the other issues presented above, the positions of the influ-
ential politicians in Bernhigh and Bernhigh with regard to the decisions of the Swiss Federal 
Court are less disparate. This can be explained mainly by the fact that the crucial part of the 
verdicts—the ban of popular decisions at ballot—did not concern the current practices in 
Bernhigh and Bernlow. In most municipalities where decisions had been taken until recently 
by the population through a closed ballot, a large majority of local politicians completely dis-
approved of the verdicts (see Table 4.2). Table 6.3 summarizes the qualitative analysis of the 
various attitudes of the local decision-makers that decisively influence the respective naturali-
zation processes. The findings show that the politicians in Bernhigh not only defend a restric-
tive naturalization policy with a high level of requirements, but are also quite hostile towards 
candidates from Muslim countries. In Bernlow, on the other hand, discriminatory attitudes 
hardly exist and there are only few criteria that are required for naturalization.  
 
Table 6.3: Summary of qualitative analysis of conceptions of citizenship  
Attitudes towards… Bernhigh Bernlow 
Naturalization Criteria Restrictive Generous 
Candidates from Muslim Countries Hostile Open 
Decisions of the Swiss Federal Court Rather in favor In favor 
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Aargauhigh and Aargaulow 
Aargauhigh and Aargaulow are not directly affected by the ban on popular votes by ballot 
because decisions are taken in these two neighboring municipalities during the municipal as-
semblies. They are, however, confronted with the problem of justifying negative decisions. 
For it is almost impossible to know why a majority of citizens who are in attendance are not 
in favor of a particular naturalization application. Given the fact that their naturalization pro-
cedure also relies on popular decisions, it may be assumed that local politicians are opposed 
to the verdicts because they fear an interference with municipal political autonomy and local 
democracy. However, and in line with our hypothesis, only the influential local politicians in 
Aargauhigh criticized the verdicts, whereas the decision-makers in Aargaulow were mostly in 
favor of them. These findings are commensurate with the different attitudes towards candi-
dates from Muslim countries and correspond, though less clearly, to the different levels of 
requirements in both municipalities (see Table 6.5 below).  
Given the fact that in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow the population has the final word in natu-
ralization matters, it might be objected that we did not talk to the people who actually take the 
decisions. It could easily be argued that the attitudes of the politicians involved in the natu-
ralization processes in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow do not help us predict how many appli-
cants are refused Swiss citizenship, since the population takes the final decisions during the 
municipal assemblies. There are, however, two reasons why our data very readily constitute 
valid indicators of the respective prevailing conceptions of citizenship. First, the interviewed 
politicians are also citizens of these municipalities. They can be considered as a representative 
group of the respective populations insofar as most of them are elected politicians. Given the 
small size of the municipalities and the low degree of institutionalized politics, the distance 
between the population and the political elite is very narrow, in contrast to the situation at the 
national level. Second, the actors directly involved in the naturalization processes know the 
candidates and their dossiers, on the basis of which they issue recommendations for the citi-
zens attending the local assemblies. It can be assumed that these recommendations have an 
effect on the decisions of the individual citizens. Finally, we have already shown above that 
attitudes of the populations in our 14 case studies strongly correlate with the positions of their 
local representatives (r=0.69, p=0.006). It thus seems that our data on local politicians’ atti-
tudes is quite pertinent to predict the rejection rates. Let us now turn to the formal procedures 
and power structures of these two municipalities to get a clearer picture of what is going on in 
Aargauhigh and Aargaulow. 
 138 
Formal procedures and power structures 
In both municipalities of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow, foreign citizens who seek to acquire the 
Swiss citizenship submit the required documents at the local administration. The persons in 
charge at the municipal administration verify the formal requirements and contact the canto-
nal police, the employers and the teachers of the candidates. In Aargauhigh, candidates are 
given booklets that inform them about the municipality and the political rights in Switzerland. 
They receive another booklet about the political structure of Switzerland after they have filled 
in the forms. When the person responsible for naturalizations in Aargauhigh has the impres-
sion that prospective candidates have an insufficient command of German, he advises them to 
refrain from applying right away when they ask him for the forms. If such persons still apply, 
he discusses the matter with the mayor. For a short time, the local administration has offered 
the possibility of inviting applicants for a language test. During the test, candidates are re-
quired to copy a text and to write a short curriculum vitae. If someone fails the language test, 
he or she has to attend a language course before his or her command of German is verified 
again and the procedure is carried on. After the person has passed the exam, the dossiers are 
handed over to the naturalization commission which consists of the mayor, the secretary of 
the municipal administration and four representatives of the local parties. The commission has 
existed since 2000 and was constituted after the startling rejection of two young Muslim 
women,83 with the aim of reinforcing recommendations among the population. Before, only 
the mayor and a person in charge of naturalizations at the local administration interviewed the 
applicants. The commission invites the candidates for a second interview and for a test about 
the Swiss political system. Each member of the commission separately interrogates individual 
applicants or couples and discusses with them the results of the test. After the individual in-
terviews, the commission meets without the candidates for a discussion of all dossiers. Rec-
ommendations for acceptance or rejection are handed over to the executive body which al-
most always follows the decisions of the commission. Finally, the population of Aargauhigh 
votes on the individual applications during a municipal assembly. In the run-up to the munici-
pal assembly, all citizens receive a booklet with information about the candidates. Each appli-
cant is presented with a photo and specifications such as their nationality, profession, em-
ployer, etc. Before the local assemblies, the president of the executive body informs the presi-
dents of the local parties about the dossiers. For ten years votes have been taken by closed 
ballot. Such a procedure has been chosen because the impression emerged that some people 
                                                
83 This incident will be discussed in more detail further down.  
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otherwise do not dare to express their real opinion. After the assembly, candidates are in-
formed in written form about the decisions.  
In Aargaulow, the administration does not interview the candidates, and the completed dossi-
ers are directly handed over to the naturalization commission which is composed of six mem-
bers: the president of the executive body, the secretary of the administration, and four inhabi-
tants of Aargaulow. In contrast to Aargauhigh, the members of the commission are not neces-
sarily representatives of the local parties but often persons who work in organizations that 
deal with foreigners. In the past, the commission tested the knowledge of the Swiss political 
system of each candidate. After they had noticed that applicants learned the answers by heart, 
the commission abandoned the tests and, henceforth, has verified the integration of the appli-
cants during the interviews in a more informal manner. The applicants are asked if they know 
some Swiss citizens personally, if they are members of an association, how well they know 
the municipality of Aargaulow and how they pass their spare time. Families are also interro-
gated about the education of their children. Then a recommendation for acceptance or rejec-
tion is made by the commission that is handed over to the executive body which normally 
follows up on these decisions. Negative decisions are discussed with the applicants, and it is 
recommended that they withdraw their application. In a pattern similar to that in Aargauhigh, 
around 10 to 15 percent of all applications are withdrawn, mostly because candidates do not 
speak German well enough. The population of Aargaulow is informed about the applications 
in the run-up to a local assembly. So far, no pictures of the candidates have appeared in the 
information leaflets; however, some members of the commission suggested following the 
example of their neighbor municipality of Aargauhigh. The executive body refused this idea, 
arguing that such pictures would favor subjective judgments. Decisions at the local assembly 
are taken by open ballot. In both municipalities no celebration is held for the freshly natural-
ized candidates. 
In contrast to Bernhigh and Bernlow, one notices that in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow the in-
volvement of the local citizens in the decision-making processes alters the formal decision-
making processes. Not only does the municipal population take the final decisions, they are 
also informed by the local administration and the naturalization commission. The informa-
tion-booklets that are sent to each household and especially their contents have let, time and 
again, to violent debates in Switzerland. It is debated whether such leaflets are derogatory for 
candidates or whether they violate their privacy. While many prefer to abandon such ‘infor-
mation-campaigns’ or to limit the information appearing in these booklets, others wonder 
whether it is possible at all for local citizen to get an idea of the applicants on the basis of 
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such leaflets, which for the large majority constitutes the only information about them. Many 
hold the opinion that it is particularly questionable whether pictures of candidates contain any 
relevant information that should be taken into account for the final decisions. To augment the 
chances to get the Swiss passports, applicants often have their pictures taken by professional 
photographers. In this respect, it is particularly noteworthy that no pictures of the candidates 
appear in the information leaflets in Aargaulow. While many politicians in Aargauhigh hold 
the opinion that such pictures show their citizens how friendly an alien resident might be, in 
Aargauhigh a majority of the local actors argue that such pictures contain no relevant infor-
mation about the candidates. 
Despite of the direct democratic decision-making procedure in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow, 
the local administration and the municipal politicians are still strongly involved in the natu-
ralization processes. As in most of our case studies, the persons in charge of naturalizations at 
the local administrations play a crucial role during the naturalization procedures. In Aargau-
high, the responsible person at the local administration seems to be a particularly influential 
actor, since together with the mayor he verifies the German knowledge of all candidates and 
receives them for a first interview, before the naturalization commission talks to them. In 
Aargaulow, representatives of the administration do not meet the candidates and make no 
recommendations. Moreover, the composition of the naturalization commission further dis-
tinguishes the two procedures: in Aargaulow only few politicians are members of the com-
mission. This might point to the fact that in this municipality naturalizations are considered an 
administrative rather than a political issue. 
Table 6.4 confirms that, compared to other actors in their municipalities, the representative of 
the local administration in Aargauhigh is much more important than his colleague in Aargau-
low. Very influential actors are the mayors of both municipalities, since they are involved at 
different points during the naturalization processes. The party affiliation seems to be a better 
predictor in these two municipalities than in Bernhigh and Bernlow: in Aargauhigh the presi-
dent of the SVP and another person who has a lot of affinities with the Politarena—a political 
right-wing association—are judged more important than the members of the naturalization 
commission. In Aargaulow, with one exception, the influential actors are members of the cen-
ter or left-wing parties. Beside the respective mayors, the other members of the executive 
bodies are seen as rather unimportant. 
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Table 6.4: Relative influence and understanding of citizenship of local actors 
Aargauhigh  Aargaulow 
Actor Party Function Infl. UC  Actor Party Function Infl. UC 
1 FDP Mayor 100 .45  1 CVP Nat. Commission 100 .35 
2 PA Party President 46 .85  2 FDP Mayor 100 .63 
3 SVP Party President 33 .73  3 AF Nat. Commission 100 .15 
4 - Administration 29 .50  4 SVP Nat. Commission 100 .68 
5 SVP Nat. Commission 25 .53  5 - Nat. Commission 67 .35 
6 SP Nat. Commission 21 .18  6 Grüne Nat. Commission 67 .20 
7 SP Nat. Commission 21 .53  7 SP Nat. Commission 60 .20 
8 EVP Nat. Commission 17 .55  8 SP Executive 47 .10 
9 SP Party President 17 .10  9 - Administration 47 .43 
10 SVP Executive 8 .33  10 - Administration 40 .50 
11 Grüne Party member 4 .50  11 - Executive 27 .65 
      12 CVP Executive 20 .40 
      13 SP Party President 20 .20 
      14 SP Nat. Commission 13 .10 
Abbreviations: Influence (Infl.), Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP), Christian Democrats 
(CVP), Social Democrats (SP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green Party (Grüne), Evangelical People’s Party 
(EVP), Politarena (PA) (local right-wing association close to the SVP), Agenda Femina (AF) (local left-wing 
association). 
Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ indicates the relative influence of actors in comparison to the most powerful 
actor (100). ‘Understanding of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive). 
 
 
Attitudes towards naturalization criteria 
With regard to the command of the German language, knowledge of the Swiss political sys-
tem and candidates benefiting from social security or disability insurances, the dominant ac-
tors in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow defend different positions. However, the differences are 
not as much pronounced as between Bernhigh and Bernlow. Strongly diverging attitudes be-
tween the two municipalities of the canton of Aargau can however be observed, when it 
comes to deciding whether or not naturalized Swiss should be allowed to keep their old na-
tionality. By virtue of a motion that has been accepted by the municipal assembly in Aargau-
high some years ago, all applicants have to indicate whether they would give up their old citi-
zenship in the case of naturalization. Different actors in Aargauhigh confided to us that, al-
though dual citizenship had been permitted in Switzerland since 1992, they wanted to have 
this information in order to know whether candidates were really serious about their applica-
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tion. During the municipal assemblies, it regularly happens that individual citizens ask the 
naturalization commission whether the candidates preferred to keep their old nationality or 
not. The person in charge of naturalization at the local administration told us that alien citi-
zens who declared that they would give up their old nationality had a much better chance of 
being accepted. This very influential actor seemed to be very attracted to the idea that candi-
dates should sign a notice of abandonment to make sure that they turned in their old passport 
after a successful naturalization. He recognized, however, that such a procedure was legally 
impossible. An influential member of the naturalization commission and representative of the 
SVP argued that naturalized citizens should abandon their first citizenship because otherwise 
they could easily escape Switzerland when they had committed a crime. In Aargaulow, on the 
other hand, dual citizenship seems not to be of an issue at all. A lot of important actors argued 
that freshly naturalized Swiss should keep their culture and therefore also their old citizen-
ship. Only one representative of very little influence in the local administration held the opin-
ion that candidates from Western Europe could keep their old nationality, whereas naturalized 
Swiss from the countries of the former Yugoslavia must not have two passports. 
 
Attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries 
Quite a large gap between Aargauhigh and Aargaulow can also be observed concerning the 
different attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries. The three most influential ac-
tors in Aargauhigh took the view that persons from Muslim countries had quite a lot of diffi-
culty integrating themselves into Switzerland. The mayor, as one of them, argued that they 
had, for example, diverging perspectives on marriage. It was often problematic when Muslim 
men married non-Muslim women. In such situations, he argued, kidnapping of children by 
one of the parents had already occurred. He then went on to tell us that people from the for-
mer Yugoslavia had more difficulty to live in Western European countries because they had 
had to survive for many centuries under Tito’s dictatorship and were therefore not used to 
living in a democratic country. The second most important actor in Aargauhigh who has a lot 
of affinities with the right-wing association Politarena expressed the opinion that not only 
people from the Balkans and Turkey but also Blacks (he used the term ‘nigger’) were persons 
who integrated themselves with more difficulty. Such people had another culture, often dealt 
with drugs, and knew quite well how to sell themselves. He was also convinced that they 
lived in clans and were always ready to kill other people to protect themselves. He concluded 
that such people did not like to work, just took the money where they could and pitilessly 
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drew on the Swiss social security system. Everybody in Aargauhigh does not share such ex-
treme positions. However, most right-wing politicians agreed with the basic arguments that 
have just been presented. Even the left-wing actors who had little influence did not seem to 
completely disagree with such stances. The SP representative in the executive body supported 
the opinion that people from the Balkans were not used to living in a democratic system and 
the president of the SP in Aargauhigh argued that the behavior of foreigners in their daily life 
and their readiness to integrate themselves depended a lot on their ‘race’. 
The perceptions of citizens coming from Muslim countries were different in Aargaulow. Only 
the very influential mayor’s attitude resembled those of the restrictive positions in Aargau-
high. For example, it posed a problem for him when Muslim women wore a headscarf. He 
argued that they did this only to affront the social environment of their host country and held 
the opinion that people from the Balkans interacted with each other in a very ruthless manner 
and had misguided attitudes toward governmental institutions. They simply thought that the 
state was responsible for everything outside their domiciles. Some other influential actors in 
Aargaulow agreed that foreigners from Muslim countries had more difficulty integrating 
themselves in Switzerland than people from Western European countries. However, they did 
not seem to be that much preoccupied with this question or had no real explanation for this 
phenomenon. One influential member of the naturalization commission argued that people 
from African or Asian countries had such difficulties simply because of the cold temperatures 
in Switzerland. The president of the Social Democrats, who had relatively little influence, 
explained the difficulties persons from Muslim countries had by the fact that Islam was 700 
years younger than Christianity. For him, such countries were in another ‘historical phase’ 
than, for example, Switzerland. She then added that the social class of a candidate explained a 
lot more than other factors about one’s ability to adapt to another culture. In general, a lot of 
actors in Aargaulow agreed that the individual characteristics of a person were much more 
decisive for a successful integration than their cultural background. 
 
Attitudes towards the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court 
Since both municipalities of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow were affected by the decisions of the 
Federal Court, it is even more surprising that the reactions were so different. One of the most 
important politicians in Aargauhigh told us that it was an unbounded cheek that the Federal 
Court tried to take the responsibility for naturalizations away from the people. For him, deci-
sions by ballot should still be possible and they should not have to be justified. The influential 
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mayor had a rather ambivalent attitude towards the verdicts. On the one hand, he was against 
an arbitrary naturalization policy. On the other hand, he preferred that the decisions be taken 
by the population; and since the citizens decided at closed ballot in Aargauhigh, he concluded 
that it was impossible to know why they refused a particular candidate. Anyway, he did not 
see the reason why Swiss citizens should justify their decisions about naturalization, for no-
body asked them—so his comparison ran—to justify why they voted, for example, for a par-
ticular candidate during an election. Altogether, he preferred decisions by closed ballot, be-
cause in this case people did not have to expose their personal attitudes. Moreover, there were 
legitimate reasons to fear reprisals from foreign citizens if everybody could see how they 
voted. This seems to be an issue that concerns politicians in Aargauhigh here and there. A 
member of the naturalization commission confided to us that in the commission they had al-
ready discussed several times whether its members exposed themselves to any danger when 
they rejected applications.  
In contrast to Aargauhigh, the opinions in Aargaulow were very much in favor of the verdicts. 
Only two actors were opposed to parts of the decisions. The mayor and a member of the natu-
ralization commission held the opinion that the verdicts had mainly caused confusion and 
uncertainty. Both agreed that the Federal Court decided about a political matter it had not 
been competent to decide on. They, however, disagreed about whether popular votes by ballot 
should be possible and whether decisions should be justified. The other members of the natu-
ralization commission agreed that decisions have to be justified and that candidates should be 
given the opportunity to appeal naturalization decisions. After all, so their arguments ran, the 
right to appeal had to be part of every democratic decision. One actor expressed a certain 
doubt as to whether applicants would really make use of this right. Another person argued that 
justifying a negative decision also would help the candidates to better prepare for a second 
application.  
Table 6.5 summarizes the various attitudes in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow. The influential 
decision-makers in Aargauhigh require a lot of criteria to be fulfilled by applicants, are very 
hostile towards candidates from Muslim countries, and, in contrast to Bernhigh, completely 
oppose the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court. In Aargaulow the local politicians support 
the decisions of the Federal Court and have no discriminatory attitudes towards candidates 
from Muslim countries. As for the positions towards naturalization criteria: they point to a 
less restrictive naturalization policy, which however seems to be not as generous as in Bern-
low. 
 145 
 
Table 6.5: Summary of qualitative analysis of conceptions of citizenship  
Attitudes towards… Aargauhigh Aargaulow 
Naturalization Criteria Restrictive Rather generous 
Candidates from Muslim Countries Hostile Open 
Decisions of the Swiss Federal Court Opposed In favor 
 
 
Controversies and occurrences 
This chapter allowed us to illustrate the results of the foregoing chapters with more qualitative 
data and to discuss the various discourses of local politicians in more detail. The comparison 
of two pairs of case studies enabled us to make appear different citizenship politics in munici-
palities with similar socio-economic characteristics, situated in the same regions of Switzer-
land. While in this study we mainly concentrate on the number of criteria that have to be ful-
filled for naturalization, a more detailed discussion of attitudes towards candidates from Mus-
lim countries and the recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Court opened additional ways to 
analytically grasp the local understandings of citizenship. At the same time we have got a 
clearer picture of the formal decision-making processes and to what extent they reflect the 
prevailing understandings of citizenship. The involvement of different actors at various stages 
of the decision-making processes clearly shows that naturalizations are not administrative 
procedures in which only representatives of the local authorities take a share. Rather, both 
political and administrative actors struggle over the question of who might become a Swiss 
citizen. 
However, naturalization politics is not always controversial and has not the same political 
salience in all municipalities. Interestingly, when comparing cases with high and low rejection 
rates, we noticed that naturalization politics is rather more controversial in municipalities 
where a lot of candidates are rejected. The four case studies discussed in this chapter are par-
ticularly good examples in this regard. In Bernlow and Aargaulow 87 percent and 100 percent 
of all actors respectively had no objections to the current naturalization policy. On the other 
hand, in the two municipalities of Bernhigh and Aargauhigh 31 percent and 41 percent of the 
involved actors from various parties told us that they were opposed to several aspects of the 
citizenship politics of their municipalities. It regularly happens in both municipalities that 
actors with a restrictive understanding of citizenship demand a tightening up of the naturaliza-
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tion procedures. Moreover, we have observed fiercer debates, highlighted by particular inci-
dents in recent years, which indicate how controversial naturalization politics in these mu-
nicipalities is. 
As we have already alluded to above, in 1995 and 1996 the municipal assembly in Aargau-
high twice rejected two young Muslim women who were said to have refused to shake hands 
with the mayor when they met for an interview. These rejections were widely echoed in the 
regional newspapers and discussed among the population and local politicians. The two 
women told the mayor that their religion would not allow them to touch a man who is not a 
member of their family. For many local politicians such an attitude was a clear indication of 
lack of integration. The mayor, who was in charge of all applications at this time, recom-
mended that the municipal assembly not accept these two candidates for naturalization.  
Quite exceptionally, in Bernhigh some years ago the different parties involved did not come 
to an agreement as to whether to recommend a particular candidate for naturalization. The 
administration was somewhat, but reluctantly, in favor of the candidate because he more or 
less fulfilled all the criteria. However, the commission preferred not to recommend that can-
didate. They justified their decision simply by the assertion that he was not a friendly person. 
After the executive body had backed the decision of the commission, the candidate in ques-
tion appealed the recommendation. The cantonal authority in charge of naturalizations re-
jected the decision and remanded the dossier to Bernhigh. During our interviews, most actors 
in Bernhigh referred to this incident to criticize either the decisions of the naturalization 
commission and the local naturalization policy in general or the interference of cantonal and 
judicial authorities in local politics.  
Such incidents might be exceptional even in municipalities with a restrictive naturalization 
policy, and we do not claim that they are always a result of their respective politics or that 
they tell us everything about the attitudes of local politicians. But they indicate that naturali-
zations constitute a controversial issue in these municipalities and mobilize political actors. 
On the other hand, the absence of such incidents and the high degree of satisfaction with the 
local procedures, as we have observed in Aargaulow and Bernlow, point to the fact that local 
actors are not that much preoccupied by the question of who should become a Swiss citizen. 
It is of course quite difficult to quantify such local occurrences and to judge whether they 
have clouded local discussions on naturalizations for a longer period or only at the time of our 
data collection. Nonetheless, we have tried to find out for each of our municipalities whether 
incidents such as the ones described in the foregoing paragraphs have occurred. We have only 
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retained incidents that were mentioned by various local actors and/or were discussed in re-
gional newspapers. Table 6.6 clearly reveals that they can indeed be observed mainly in mu-
nicipalities with high rejection rates (r=0.79, p=0.001). Table 6.10 also lists the degree of dis-
satisfaction with local naturalization policy expressed by local actors. The relation between 
this indicator and the pursued naturalization policy (rejection rate), is however rather ambigu-
ous (r=0.44, p=0.12). As the example of Bernhightwo shows, even in municipalities with a 
high rejection rate can a large majority of local politicians be happy with the current naturali-
zation policy (when there are no left-wing politicians questioning the way alien residents are 
naturalized). On the other hand, it might very well be that a rather generous citizenship policy 
is criticized by right-wing politicians as the example of Zurichlow demonstrates. 
 
Table 6.6: Controversial occurrences and degree of dissatisfaction 
Municipality Rejection Rate Controversial 
occurrences 
Degree of dissatisfaction with local 
naturalization policy 
Schwyzhigh 47 Yes 50 
Bernhightwo 29 Yes 20 
Schwylow 26 Yes 71 
Luzernhigh 24 Yes 71 
Bernhigh 22 Yes 31 
Neuchâtelhigh 15 No 19 
Aargauhigh 13 Yes 41 
St. Gallenhigh 11 No  25 
Zürichhigh 11 No  85 
Neuchâtellow 5 No  21 
Zurichlow 2 No 40 
Aargaulow 1 No 0 
Aargaulowtwo 1 No 17 
Bernlow 0 No 13 
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Chapter 7 
 
Local Social Influence Networks 
 
 
Introduction 
This last empirical chapter seeks to analyze naturalization processes from a further perspec-
tive that so far has been treated only at the margins. After a large-N analysis, a comparison of 
local citizenship models, and a detailed discussion of four naturalization fields, we now con-
centrate our attention on the individual decision makers and on the factors influencing their 
individual understandings of citizenship.  
In the introduction to Chapter 4, we have presented a newspaper report in which a representa-
tive of a local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) justified the rejection of several candidates from 
Muslim countries. He thereby exposed the fact that he personally requires from candidates a 
high degree of integration into the local community. Why does he have such a restrictive un-
derstanding of citizenship? Might it be due to bad experiences he had with foreign residents 
from Muslim countries? Is he looking for a job and fears that naturalized foreigners might be 
preferred to him? Does he fear that Switzerland loses its cultural characteristics by allowing 
too many alien residents to become Swiss? Or did his parents teach him to be wary of for-
eigners? All these aspects might have an impact on his attitude towards naturalization candi-
dates. According to our theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, there is a further explana-
tory variable that we will discuss in more detail in this chapter: the influence of the local so-
cial environment.   
So far, we have mainly demonstrated how local politicians struggle over the definition of their 
nation, and thereby how they contribute to the production and reproduction of social reality. 
As we argued above, such groups of local politicians are not rational associations of self-
interested actors. Rather, their attitudes towards naturalization candidates and their perception 
of citizenship are shaped by, among other factors, interactions in the context of decision-
making processes. By emphasizing such socialization processes, we argue that struggles about 
cultural boundaries are more about conviction than suppression of minority positions: Those 
arguments prevail or become accepted that appear to be more legitimate than others; or as 
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Wimmer (2002) would put it: Such struggles can be considered as negotiation processes lead-
ing to cultural compromises or agreements inhabiting a common arena about basic principles, 
meanings, moral and social categories that structure, for example, naturalization politics. 
While cultural compromises are the results of established and internalized modes of meaning-
making, they in turn influence the direction in which further struggles develop by limiting the 
horizon of possibilities within which individual actors interpret and experience social reality 
(Wimmer 2002: 35). In other words, local interactions can be considered as secondary so-
cialization processes (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 129-146), which decisively influence the 
actor’s habitus, constraining his or her attitudes towards foreign residents applying for Swiss 
citizenship.  
As we have repeatedly seen above, in the context of naturalizations interactions happen exclu-
sively within municipalities, external influences being virtually inexistent. Cultural compro-
mises thus emerge in relatively isolated local policy fields. It thus can be assumed that the 
prevailing naturalization policy and the attitudes of the dominant actors influence the opinions 
of other politicians and that the range of attitudes is limited in each municipality. To test these 
hypotheses and to explain more systematically how interactions with other local politicians 
shape one’s attitudes towards candidates for naturalization, we propose an analytical frame-
work that draws on theories in social psychology and social influence networks. 
 
How to explain individual understandings of citizenship: classic approaches 
To be clear from the outset, by investigating the influence of the local social environment on 
the understanding of citizenship of municipal politicians, we do not claim that contacts with 
other politicians during decision-making processes are the unique explanatory factor for indi-
vidual attitudes. Each human being has been socialized in various contexts during his or her 
life. Attitudes towards foreigners and the way people think about their nation are influenced 
to various degrees by their education, personal relationships to alien residents, experiences at 
work, etc. We merely seek to demonstrate here that the local social environment constitutes a 
further important variable that should not be neglected. 
Before we present our main theoretical framework, let us briefly discuss some alternative ex-
planations by resorting to theories on xenophobia. Xenophobia—commonly defined as the 
fear of the ‘other’ or the ‘stranger’—is closely linked to nationalism and our concept of un-
derstanding of citizenship. The attitude toward foreigners and their desire to become members 
of one’s community depend largely on one’s national identity, its definition, and especially its 
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openness toward citizens living outside one’s community: “Racism84 and nationalism are both 
ideologies. They are bodies of knowledge (a word that denotes in this context neither validity 
nor reliability), which make claims about the way the social world is and, crucially, about the 
way it ought to be. This knowledge is mobilized in the definition of criteria of group member-
ship and principles of exclusion.” (Jenkins 1997: 84; see also Hall 2000: 7-8)  
Whenever people have organized themselves in groups throughout human history, they have 
excluded others. As Taifel (1981; 1982) has shown in his experiments, such processes occur 
not only among individuals that possess similar convictions or feature cultural characteristics. 
Even arbitrarily arranged groups begin to form their own group identities and to mark them-
selves off from other groups through categorization and over-accentuation of common charac-
teristics within a group and differences in relation to other groups. In the age of nationalism, 
this disposition to exclude others from a nation can be called xenophobia (Wimmer 2002: 5; 
Schöneberg 1987: 44). In other words, understanding of citizenship and xenophobia/racism 
are the two sides of the same coin: The way we perceive ourselves heavily influences the way 
we exclude others; a person with a very restrictive understanding of citizenship can also be 
considered as very xenophobic.85 Accordingly, theories explaining xenophobic behavior can 
also be resorted to in order to explain the degree of understanding of citizenship of individual 
citizens. 
Arguing that in modern nation-states xenophobia constitutes a potential disposition to exclude 
others is far from a socio-biological approach elaborated by such researchers as Van den Ber-
ghe (1978; 1981). By claiming that somebody always is excluded and that xenophobia and 
racial differentiation are specific dimensions of nationalism, we make no statement about the 
content of xenophobia or about who is excluded. Just as there are many different contents of 
nationalism, so there are also various forms and degrees of racism and xenophobia. Thus, the 
crucial question is not whether or not somebody is excluded but who and how many are de-
nied Swiss citizenship.  
Contrary to our theoretical model claiming that specific contents of nationalism, ethnicity or 
                                                
84 Jenkins uses the term ‘racism’ in the same way we use the term ‘xenophobia’. 
85 How closely related the concepts of xenophobia and understanding of citizenship are can also be demonstrated 
empirically by comparing attitudes towards naturalization criteria with a more classic operationalization of 
xenophobia. Our indicator for xenophobia includes questions on whether foreign residents constitute a cultural 
enrichment, whether the ratio of foreigners should be reduced, whether one-day immigrants from Turkey living 
in Switzerland will be completely integrated, and whether due to the rising ratio of foreigners Swiss no longer 
feel at home. Unsurprisingly, both variables correlate relatively highly (r=63, p<0.000) compared with Heit-
meyer’s comparison of xenophobia and racism correlating at 0.69 (Heitmeyer 2002: 31-32n4). For the exact 
wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 28a, b, c and d).  
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xenophobia are the outcome of political struggles, Van den Berghe (1978; 1981) argues that 
ethnicity tends to be ascriptive, defined by common descent, generally hereditary, and often 
endogamous. For him, ethnic groups and nations are extensions of primordial kinship net-
works. That is why for him such powerful sentiments as nationalism or xenophobia can easily 
be mobilized even in modern societies. He acknowledges that common ancestry is always 
partially fictive as a result of migration and conquest and partially instrumentalized. However, 
he is convinced that ethnicity is primordial and that myths “will only be believed if members 
of an ethnic group [or a nation] are sufficiently alike in physical appearance and culture, and 
have lived together and intermarried for a sufficient period (at a minimum three or four gen-
erations) […]” (Van den Berghe 1995: 360). According to this view, fear and aggression to-
ward others that look or behave differently are natural and very old protective mechanisms 
(see Jäger 1995: 28-29). For exponents of the socio-biological approach, xenophobia is the 
consequence of incompatible cultures: A country’s population rejects immigrants because of 
their inability to integrate into the structure and culture of the new home country.  
Although Van den Berghe relativizes his socio-biological explanation by considering social 
and cultural aspects, his emphases on physical aspects and ethnic durability cannot account 
for the considerable variability, wide range, and frequent absorptions and dissolutions of in-
stances of ethnic affiliation and exclusion. Smith (1998: 149) criticizes Van den Berghe for 
forgetting that, for example, the Romans and English emphasized in their myths of common 
ancestry their varied origins, and that the contents of these myths changed considerably over 
time. Against the argument of cultural homogeneity, one could also put forward the example 
of Switzerland, where the idea of cultural heterogeneity and its four linguistic groups is often 
successfully mobilized to construct a national identity (Chollet 2006). As Smith (1998: 150) 
rightly comments, socio-biological approaches fail to discriminate between various forms of 
exclusion over time and space and do not account for how exclusion is socially and politically 
organized. As for the rejection of immigrants, Wimmer (2002: 205-208) offers an explication 
that asserts that so-called ‘objective cultural distances’ and ‘racial distinctiveness’ are mainly 
the results of framing processes. In most countries, it can be observed how the perception of a 
certain group of foreigners can change from a view of complete distinctiveness to wide accep-
tance. A case in point are Italians who immigrated to Switzerland in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Their culture was first widely regarded as incompatible with Swiss culture. Today, they con-
stitute one of the best-integrated foreign groups in Switzerland, whereas recently arrived mi-
grants from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey are often seen as too different 
from Swiss citizens (Stolz 2001: 60; Niederberger 2004). 
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Besides the socio-biological approach, nowadays completely out-dated, there are various 
other theories seeking to explain xenophobic attitudes. Approaches can be divided into two 
groups, one emphasizing the dimensions of structural elements, the other, the dimensions of 
individual characteristics (Jäger 1995: 27-50; Heitmeyer 2002: 28). Approaches explaining 
tensions between ethnic and national groups with socio-economic and socio-structural factors 
have already been discussed in Chapter 4. We thus concentrate the following brief discussion 
on the second dimension. Following Heitmeyer (2002: 27-30), we will first distinguish four 
explanatory variables on the micro-sociological level: social class of individuals, contacts 
with foreigners, authoritarianism (including unbounded flexibility), and social disintegration 
(including relative deprivation).86 We will also discuss whether education has an influence on 
xenophobic attitudes. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly present the different theo-
ries and how we operationalized the respective indicators.87 The hypotheses will then be 
tested below in Table 7.1. 
 
1. Social Class: Related to theories emphasizing structural changes are those approaches 
explaining xenophobic attitudes by social class. It is argued that globalization and the 
opening of national markets mainly pose problems for people from lower social 
classes (Bornschier and Helbling 2005: 32-36). It has been shown that such people 
more readily vote for radical-right and populist parties (Mughan et al. 2003; Kitschelt 
and McGann 1995). These so-called losers in the globalization processes might per-
ceive immigrants as competitors on the job market. More generally, their precarious 
situation might lead to feelings of anomie and relative deprivation. We operationalized 
social class with the job of the interviewees.88 Accounting for the rise of the new mid-
dle class in Western European countries, Kriesi (1998b) has developed a useful class 
structure with eight categories that goes beyond the traditional class divide of the 
working class and the old middle class and that discriminates between more and less 
privileged groups. People of the middle class are divided in three groups: those who 
fulfill administrative or commercial tasks (office workers, managers, etc.), technical 
specialists (engineers and those working in a natural-science domain), and socio-
                                                
86 Heimeyer (2002: 29) also lists anomie as a further independent variable explaining xenophobia with processes 
of disorientation and alienation in a faster-growing social world (see also Kühnel and Schmidt 2002). This con-
cept has not been retained for our analysis due to a lack of data for its operationalization and because it comes 
close to the concept of social disintegration. 
87 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 28 to 32). 
88 In the rare cases in which the respondents were not the main wage earners, we retained the job of the respon-
dent’s partner. 
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cultural specialists (teachers, nurses, etc.). A further distinction is made between quali-
fied and unqualified workers. The last three categories consist of farmers and self-
employed persons exercising traditional jobs (craftsmen, salesmen, etc.) and other 
self-employed persons. There were no unskilled workers, socio-cultural specialists, or 
other self-employed persons among our interviewees. As there are only four farmers 
in the dataset, this category has been put together with those exercising traditional 
jobs. In Table 7.1, the four remaining categories are retained as dummy-variables, the 
category of office workers and managers serving as a reference category. 
2. Education: Various studies have empirically demonstrated that a rising level of educa-
tion reduces negative attitudes toward foreigners (Wagner and Zick 1995; Vogt 1997; 
Hagendoorn and Nekuee 1999; Heyder 2003). It is often argued that education influ-
ences our cognitive faculties, social competences, value orientation and social status 
(Heyer 2002: 78). Education has thus not only an impact on our attitudes towards for-
eigners but is also closely related to the social class of a person and influences one’s 
social integration (cf. Heyder and Schmidt 2000). It is disputed why and how educa-
tion reduces xenophobia. Some argue that individuals with a low level of education 
have limited cognitive capacities for differentiated perceptions and information proc-
essing and are therefore inclined to stereotypical thinking and much more susceptible 
to interpersonal influence (Case et al. 1989; Hyman et al. 1990; Maykovich 1975; 
Stouffer 1955). As the reference to ‘susceptibility’ makes clear, people with limited 
education are not automatically xenophobic; a social environment is still needed to 
trigger negative attitudes towards foreign residents. Political mobilization processes 
conditioning the presence of perceptions of threat and conceptualizing social causa-
tions are still a necessary condition to produce a restrictive understanding of citizen-
ship. Others argue that educated people are better integrated and thus consider immi-
grants not as competitors. Still others hold the opinion that better-educated people mix 
in a social environment where xenophobic attitudes are considered as socially not de-
sirable (see Kühnel and Schmidt 2002: 85). To measure the impact of education, we 
use a dichotomized indicator differentiating whether or not a respondent has a general 
qualification for university entrance (A-level). 
3. The contact hypothesis: It is often observed that persons who are particularly xenopho-
bic have very few contacts with foreigners. For example, it has been demonstrated that 
among different ethnic groups in Germany, Sinti and Roma are especially disliked al-
though very few Germans have any contacts with members of these groups (Wagner 
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et al. 2002: 98). A common argument, which has been empirically proved, therefore 
asserts that personal contacts with foreigners in the neighborhood or at the workplace 
reduce negative attitudes towards those people (Wagner et al. 2002: 99-101). It has 
been argued that knowing people from other ethnic groups helps relativize one’s own 
cultural and ethno-centrist standards (Pettigrew 1997; Thomas 1996). Such relation-
ships help people to learn and accept that different cultural backgrounds might lead to 
different behaviors. Of course, it also has to be taken into account whether contacts to 
foreigners are positive or negative. Unsurprisingly, Wagner et al. (2002: 100-101) 
have shown that people are less xenophobic when in the recent past they had been 
helped by foreigners or when they have had the opportunity to conduct an interesting 
conversation with such persons. The problem of causality concerning xenophobia is, 
however, not yet completely solved. Against the contact hypothesis it might be argued 
that people with negative attitudes try to avoid contacts with foreigners. In assessing 
our local politicians we were in a particular situation, as most of them were in contact 
with foreign residents in the context of naturalization processes. However, we still 
wanted to know how often they met foreign residents privately or at their working 
places and whether these contacts were positive or negative. Astonishingly, no less 
than 96 percent told us that their relationships to foreigners were rather or very posi-
tive. Even among those people with a very restrictive understanding of citizenship, 
who had no reason to give socially desirable answers, only a very few of them re-
ported negative experiences. Eighty-six percent were regularly or very often in contact 
with foreigners. Only two persons indicated that they hardly knew any alien residents 
or immigrants. Given the very small variance in the frequency of contacts, it is unclear 
whether this variable has any impact at all. 
4. Authoritarianism: A large range of studies concentrate on individual psychological 
characteristics to explain xenophobia. The work of Adorno et al. (1950) on the 
authoritarian personality, seeking to predict one’s potential for fascist and antidemo-
cratic behavior, stands at the beginning of this research tradition (see Altemeyer 1996; 
Heitmeyer and Heyder 2002; Heyder and Schmidt 2000). It is argued that an authori-
tarian character is developed during childhood and the result of a specific socializa-
tion. An authoritarian character needs to maintain control and prove superiority over 
his or her social environment and is rooted in a worldview populated by enemies and 
empty of equality and empathy. Such persons are therefore particularly xenophobic. 
Authoritarianism is often related to the following characteristics: group dependency, 
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ethnocentric orientation, coercion to conformity, and hierarchical and dogmatic think-
ing (Jäger 1995: 31). Those characteristics result in mental and social rigidity and im-
maturity (Roghmann 1966: 76). Therefore, authoritarianism comes close to the con-
cepts of anomie and social disintegration. For the operationalization of an authoritar-
ian character, we asked our interviewees whether they think that we need leaders who 
tell us what to do, whether they agree that children should follow their parent’s con-
victions, whether school should mainly teach discipline and performance, and whether 
criminality should be combated more aggressively. For each question, respondents had 
to indicate on a scale from 1 to 6 to what extent they agree with those statements. A 
summary indicator (Authoritarianism) has been generated by averaging the attitudes 
towards those statements. 
5. Social disintegration and relative deprivation: According to the social disintegration 
hypothesis, those people are xenophobic who have little or no access to parts of their 
society (e.g., labor market), who do not have the resources to participate in public life, 
who have a feeling of political powerlessness or, more generally, who are not socially 
integrated (Endrikat et al. 2002). According to Heitmeyer (2002: 29), closely related 
to this hypothesis is the concept of relative deprivation emphasizing the subjectively 
felt degree of disadvantage in comparison with people of the same group (individual 
relative deprivation) or compared with other groups (collective relative deprivation) 
(Runciman 1967). As Endrikat et al. (2002: 37-39) argue, modern societies indeed of-
fer differentiated structures, pluralistic values, individual lifestyles, and thus many op-
portunities for self-realization. On the other hand, however, increasing structural ine-
qualities, rapid social changes, experiences of senselessness, and dissolving of social 
relations present precarious situations for individuals. People, especially when they 
have the feeling that what they are doing is not appreciated, or when they do not suc-
ceed in life, develop negative attitudes towards foreigners (Kronauer 2002; Honneth 
1992). In the light of the social-disintegration hypothesis, local politicians constitute a 
particular group, as they are presumably rather well-integrated socially through their 
public functions. This does of course not foreclose the possibility that they may feel 
excluded in other domains. To measure relative deprivation and social disintegration, 
we rely on two indicators that inform us about whether people think that the increasing 
ratio of foreigners aggravates the labor market (Economic threat), and whether they no 
longer feel at home where they live due to an increasing number of alien residents (Al-
ienation). For each question, respondents had to indicate on a scale from 1 to 6 to what 
 157 
extent they agree with those statements. The above-presented variable for social class 
might partially also be considered for the operationalization of relative deprivation, as 
people with a low social status may perceive foreigners as an economic threat.  
 
Social influence and norm formation  
Some of the approaches to xenophobia, presented in the foregoing paragraphs, emphasize 
socialization and interaction processes as explanatory factors for negative attitudes towards 
foreigners. It is widely agreed that the social environment constitutes a crucial element for 
forming attitudes and norms. For our local politicians, the environment of local citizenship 
politics provides a sub-world different from all other contexts in which they have been social-
ized, as it is common to all actors of a specific municipality. While municipal politicians 
might have grown up in different regions, educated by different parents and teachers, and 
work at different places, they all have experienced citizenship politics in the same municipal-
ity. None of our interviewees has ever been active in local politics of another municipality. 
On average, all interviewed politicians have been involved in local naturalization politics for 
ten years and only 16 percent for less than four years—four years being one term of office for 
those who are elected. As for the time of residence, on average they have lived for 29 years in 
the municipality where they are currently politically active—28 percent less than 20 years, 
and only 11 percent less than 10 years. Their municipality and its political system thus be-
come an important environment, in which their attitudes towards naturalization have been 
shaped. This becomes all the more relevant when we look at how strongly those politicians 
identify with their municipality: Not very surprisingly for local politicians, 96 percent of them 
identify rather or very strongly with the town or village where they live. We can therefore 
conclude that for the large majority of the interviewed persons their municipalities constitute 
an important political environment for forming ideas about citizenship. They present their 
opinions about naturalization along with those of other local politicians, confronting those 
other opinions, trying to impose their own or modifying them when convinced and influenced 
by other arguments. To understand how such influence mechanisms work, we resort to theo-
ries in social psychology.  
In social psychology, the concept of ‘social influence’ refers to ways in which the attitudes of 
individuals have an impact on each other and conformity or norms are created. If it is hard to 
imagine attitudes that are not in some way exposed to those of others, social influence varies 
along a continuum according to the degree of pressure exerted on the individual. Homans 
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(1961) argues that idiosyncratic norms may indeed exist when a person perceives that a feel-
ing, thought or action is appropriate and correct for one or more persons in particular circum-
stances. However, it is difficult to maintain one’s perception in the presence of disagreement 
among significant others. Therefore, for Homans, most norms are shared norms by virtue of 
the process that links the development of normative content to the recognition that it is a 
shared norm. If a person adapts his or her opinion to the attitudes of his or her social envi-
ronment, a distinction has to be made whether such an adaptation happens because the respec-
tive individual has been convinced by new arguments (informative social influence) or be-
cause he or she changes his or her personal point of view for reasons of social desirability 
(normative social influence) (von Avermaet 1996). As for politicians, the second mechanism 
might often apply. Since politicians are also strategists, it is certainly possible that they 
change their openly declared opinions in order to represent the attitude of a majority or to 
avoid antagonizing their electorate. In our interviews, however, all actors were explicitly 
asked in face-to-face interviews to tell us their personal opinions and not that of a particular 
party or organization of which they are a member. Indeed, they often told us that their per-
sonal opinion did not correspond to the official position of their party, or they confided to us 
thoughts they would not express in public. We are thus convinced that the responses we have 
gotten from our interviews reflect the personal opinions of these actors and are the result of 
informative social influence processes.  
Sherif’s (1935) seminal study on norm formation still belongs among the classical works in 
this research field. He demonstrated that people’s judgments about the characteristics of an 
ambiguous phenomenon tend to converge when their disagreements are made visible, and that 
such emergent agreements shape people’s judgments about the same phenomenon when they 
experience it at a later point in time. Sherif’s experiments showed how the judgments of dif-
ferent actors converged when the addressed question could be answered objectively. Hardy 
(1957) conducted analyses to see if similar results could be obtained when persons were asked 
to comment on rather normative questions. His experiments with small groups debating issues 
such as divorce led to the insight that the majority influences the judgments of both the public 
and private attitudes of individuals of the minority group.   
The question remains why local politicians adapt their personal judgments, for we are dealing 
with actors who are involved in a political decision-making process and are supposed to de-
fend their personal convictions. In this regard, the insights of Asch’s (1960) experiments are 
highly relevant. He discovered that changes of judgments occurred even when the test persons 
were clearly convinced of their judgments at the beginning of the experiment. Festinger 
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(1954) and more generally social comparison theory (Erickson 1988: 101-102) explain that 
such adaptations occur because human beings tend to evaluate their opinions and skills by 
comparing them with other persons through interpersonal communication. People feel uncom-
fortable when they are not sure whether their attitudes are correct. Especially in situations in 
which normative considerations influence the decision-making and when no objective stan-
dards are at hand, advantages and disadvantages of alternative arguments are deliberated and 
measured. According to Festinger (1954), such a comparison is sought in circumstances when 
important decisions have to be made and personal opinions or skills become highly relevant. 
Attitudes tend to be unstable in the absence of interpersonal agreements, since actors are not 
confident that their attitudes are correct when there are no influential others who agree with 
them. Decisions in the context of naturalizations and the evaluation of naturalization applica-
tions clearly demand normative judgments. The judgment whether a foreigner may become a 
new citizen depends on the understanding of citizenship, which constitutes a highly subjective 
question.  
Arguing that local actors are influenced by the opinions of the actors surrounding them in 
their individual opinion-making processes, we have to tackle the problem of causal relation, 
since similar attitudes among interacting individuals at a specific point in time could result 
either from selection or socialization (Kandel 1978: 427-429; Baron and Tindall 1993: 269-
270). It could easily be argued that actors mainly maintain relationships with those persons 
who share the same opinions or that they deal with people of the same political party (Erick-
son 1988: 101). This problem mainly applies in situations in which individuals are free to 
choose their contact persons. The opinion-making before general elections or referendums, 
when voters compare their opinions or preferences with those persons surrounding them could 
be such an example: Are people influenced by the opinions of their friends and colleagues at 
work or did they choose people as friends defending similar values? It seems quite plausible 
that someone will compare and come to agree with close colleagues or friends rather than 
with political enemies (Erickson 1988: 102). However, there are many situations in which the 
choice of others is not free and where relationships are constrained by impersonally deter-
mined opportunities to interact (Feld 1981). Many policy fields, including our own, constitute 
such examples. Eighty-two percent of our actors are formally involved in the decision-making 
process.89 They are members of a naturalization commission, the local parliament, the execu-
tive body, or the municipal administration. They were delegated by their party and/or elected 
                                                
89 The remaining 18 percent are informally involved in the decision-making processes mostly through their 
membership in a local political party. 
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by the local population and thus confronted with other politicians they did not choose to deal 
with.  
Even if we are sure that each local actor talks to different colleagues during decision-making 
processes, however, we cannot attribute the same relevance to all relationships. Although 
most politicians incessantly try to convince others of their opinions, not all are equally suc-
cessful. Those who enjoy a great reputation or those who are in contact with many others 
have particular success in imposing their convictions. The more frequently people interact, the 
more opportunities they have to interpret each other’s attitudes accurately. We thus not only 
have to look at the relationships between actors but, again, also at the degree of influence of 
individual actors and at the frequency of contacts between actors (e.g., Baron and Tindall 
1993; Erickson 1988: 102-105). 
 
Explanatory model and results 
Our explanatory model is heavily influenced by social influence network theory (Friedkin 
1998; 1999; 2001; Friedkin and Johnsen 1999). According to Friedkin (2001: 171), social 
influence network theory includes French’s (1956) formal theory of social power and De-
Groot’s (1974) consensus formation model, and “describes an influence process in a group of 
N persons in which the members’ attitudes and opinions on an issue change as they revise 
their positions by taking weighted averages of the influential positions [of] other members.” 
(Friedkin’s emphasis). In line with our theoretical arguments and Bourdieu’s ‘field-theory’, 
social influence network theory accounts for both symbolic (attitudes) and material (structure 
and power) aspects of influence processes. Arguing that individuals form their opinions in a 
complex interpersonal environment in which powerful opinions are in disagreement and liable 
to change, Friedkin (1999) has probably developed the most elaborate account of how social 
influence networks affects attitudes and opinions. His theoretical model takes into account 
how actors modify their opinions by taking into consideration their own circumstances and 
the influences of others, and how the configuration and strength of interpersonal influences in 
particular populations depends on the social structure.  
All the aforementioned studies have compared attitudes before and after the experiments to 
reveal influence mechanisms. Since we were not in an experimental setting and resources as 
well as practical considerations did not allow it, data for our analyses were collected for one 
period only. As we argued above, initial opinions can be assumed to change at the moment 
they are actively voiced in local naturalization politics, since it is a situation in which political 
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actors with a priori different attitudes, none of whom chose to deal with each other, confront 
each other. For the index measuring the individual understanding of citizenship, we resort to 
the indicator we have generated in Chapter 5. The social environment of an actor has been 
operationalized by averaging the attitudes of all persons with whom an actor is in contact dur-
ing the decision-making processes. 
How can we measure the degree of influence of particular actors? In Friedkin’s (1999) ex-
periments the participants were asked to record their opinions at the beginning and at the end 
of the experiment. To solicit information on relative interpersonal influences, the participants 
had to estimate the extent to which each group member influenced their final opinion. As 
Friedkin (1999: 17) admits himself, there are obvious difficulties with such a measurement: 
actors may over-or-underestimate the importance of others or their own susceptibility to be 
influenced by others. Especially in a political field, actors may present themselves as resistant 
to other opinions. In our study, we have measured two constructs in order to weight the opin-
ions surrounding an individual actor: The first weight concerns the intensity of contact. Each 
respondent was given the possibility of indicating a maximum of three persons with whom he 
or she was more often in contact than with the other indicated actors. Each interviewee then 
also indicated which one of these three was the most intensive contact.90 Values of colleagues 
with whom a politician had intensive or very intensive contacts have been doubled and tripled 
respectively.  
The second weight is the relative power of each actor, as presented in Chapter 5. While the 
interviewees indicated with whom they discussed naturalization politics most often, they were 
not asked who influenced their personal opinion but which actors were influential during the 
decision-making processes in general. The strength of such a measurement is that we do not 
rely on subjective judgments for measuring particular interpersonal influences. At the same 
time, it is an advantage that we measure the subjective judgments of the general influence of 
other actors, for power bases can only translate into direct influence if they are perceived as 
such. 
As we have already argued above, our politicians are in contact with colleagues from different 
parties with whom they did not choose to deal. However, they are free to decide with whom 
they discuss matters in naturalization politics more often. It might be that intensive contacts 
exist mainly between persons defending similar ideas. It can thus be assumed that the aver-
aged attitudes of the social environment weighted with the intensity of contacts correlates 
                                                
90 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 16 to 19). 
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relatively highly with the individual attitudes. On the other hand, the relative influence of ac-
tors does not depend on individual decisions and is therefore the more ‘objective’ weight.   
Rather surprisingly, our analyses revealed that only 41 percent of those contacts indicated by 
our interviewees as intensive relationships are contacts between actors with similar attitudes. 
If we consider only the most intensive contacts of our interviewees, 48 percent of them hap-
pen between politicians with similar attitudes.91 It appears that local politicians discuss natu-
ralization matters not exclusively with colleagues defending the same positions. On the con-
trary, a lot of intensive exchange happens between politicians with different understandings of 
citizenship. In other words, due to structural constraints and their formal involvement in vari-
ous political bodies, local politicians are regularly confronted with opposing ideas in naturali-
zation politics. Nonetheless, we expect a higher impact of our indicator of social environment 
when we weight it with the intensity of contacts than when we weight it with the actor’s rela-
tive influence. After all, almost half of the weighted interactions happen between actors with 
similar attitudes. 
The construction of our main independent variable and our explanatory model can be summa-
rized as follows: 
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91 For each relationship that was indicated by an actor as one of his or her intensive (or most intensive) contacts, 
we verified whether the attitudes of the indicated actors were within a range of 10 points of the respondent’s 
attitude. For example, if a particular actor had an understanding of citizenship of 0.38, a contact with another 
politician with an understanding of citizenship of 0.28 or 0.48 would be considered as a relationship between 
actors with similar attitudes. 
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Equations 1 and 2 describe how we constructed our main independent variable, the social 
environment (SE) of each local politician. The actors with whom an individual 
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ual values have been summed up and divided by the number of contact persons. By doing so, 
we got an indicator for the social environment measuring the averaged and weighted attitudes 
of the political environment that influences the opinions of the individual actors. Equations 3 
and 4 display the model we test in Table 7.1 below. Besides our differently weighted main 
variable (SE1 and SE2), the two equations include indicators generated on the basis of more 
classic approaches to xenophobia we discussed above: the social class of the respondents, the 
degree of their education, the degree of their contacts with foreigners, whether or not they 
have an authoritarian character, whether or not they perceive foreigners as an economic 
threat, and whether or not they feel alienated due to an increasing number of alien residents. 
In Table 7.1 we first compare the two differently weighted indicators for the social environ-
ment (SE1 and SE2) without controlling for other factors. As predicted, the indicator in 
Model 1 has a higher impact than the second indicator in Model 2, as a large part of the inten-
sive (41 percent) and most intensive contacts (48 percent) occur between actors with similar 
attitudes. However, the impact of the second indicator also remains statistically highly signifi-
cant for predicting one’s attitude towards naturalization candidates: Local politicians have a 
more restrictive understanding of citizenship when they are in contact with powerful actors 
who require a limitation of naturalizations. However, this indicator explains only 5 percent of 
the variance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
92 W1 takes the values ‚1’ for non-intensive, ‚2’ for intensive and ‚3’ for the most intensive contacts. W2 varies 
between ‚0’ and ‚1’. 
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Table 7.1: Individual understandings of citizenship: Non-standardized regression coefficients, standard 
error in brackets  
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Social environment 1 (SE1) 0.43*** 
(0.08) 
 0.30*** 
(0.07) 
 
Social environment 2 (SE2)  0.36** 
(0.11) 
 0.23* 
(0.10) 
Social class: self-employed   0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Social class: technocrats 
 
 0.07 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
Social class: skilled workers 
 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Education 
 
 -0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.00) 
Contacts 
 
 -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Authoritarianism 
 
 0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
Economic threat 
 
 0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
Alienation 
 
 0.03** 
(0.00) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.19*** 
(0.04) 
0.29*** 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.08) 
R2 (adj.) 0.13 0.05 0.40 0.36 
N 175 175 170 170 
Notes: Level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The ‘Social environment 1’ is weighted by the 
frequency of contacts and ‘Social environment 2’ by the actors’ relative power.   
 
As Models 3 and 4 reveal, the coefficients of the two indicators decrease but remain signifi-
cant when we control for alternative hypotheses. Of course, other elements also influence 
one’s attitudes since every person has been socialized in different social environments. While 
the social class seems to have no impact—at least for those groups for which we have respon-
dents—the perception of foreigners as an economic threat, a feeling of alienation and an 
authoritarian character leads to a more restrictive understanding of citizenship. Given the fact 
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that both politicians with restrictive and those with a generous understanding of citizenship 
are often in contact with foreigners, the contact variable does not vary a lot and thus has al-
most no impact. Nonetheless, the negative sign seems to indicate that people who are regu-
larly in contact with foreigners are less xenophobic. It is further demonstrated that better edu-
cated actors are less susceptible to the influence of xenophobic ideas.  
 
Conclusion 
As we have argued in Chapter 3, to understand the dynamic nature of nations, the contentious 
nature of citizenship politics and more generally the ongoing processes of cultural boundary 
drawing, we have to conceive of individuals as both improvising and socialized human be-
ings. Naturalization politics can be considered as political fields in which different under-
standings of citizenship are pitted against each other. At the same time, those controversies 
can be seen as social negotiation processes, in which individuals adapt their attitudes when 
they are confronted with more convincing arguments. While we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6 
to what extent powerful actors within a naturalization field influence the outcomes of natu-
ralization processes, in this chapter we discussed how the local social environment shapes 
individual attitudes towards candidates for naturalization. We have revealed that the attitudes 
of those colleagues with whom an individual politician is in contact influence his or her un-
derstanding of citizenship. This is all the more astonishing when we recall that many intensive 
contacts occur between individuals who do not share the same convictions in citizenship poli-
tics. Although the indicators for the individual social environments remain significant when 
we include other influence factors in our models, our main variables explain relatively little of 
the variance in the understanding of citizenship (see Models 1 and 2 in Table 7.1). Nonethe-
less, we are able to demonstrate that the negotiating processes in the context of citizenship 
politics have an impact on personal convictions. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Contingent Citizenship Politics 
 
 
Local struggles 
Having arrived at the end of our study, we hope to have achieved two aims: On the one hand, 
our intention was to shed some light on what is going on when alien residents are naturalized 
in Switzerland, and to better understand why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive 
citizenship policy than others. On the other hand, we sought to make a more general contribu-
tion to the study of citizenship and nationalism and more specifically to the debate about the 
social construction of nations. Today, most researchers in this field agree that nations and 
ethnic groups are not fixed and bounded entities, but rather contingent and fluent. Despite this 
wide consent, the scholarly debate is far from resolved. Do constructivists believe that there 
are no such things as national and ethnic groups? Are cultural group characteristics and identi-
ties completely open to free choice? Our theoretical arguments and empirical results should 
have made it clear that the answer to the second question is clearly ‘no’. As for the first ques-
tion, we have argued that nations and ethnic groups are neither a matter of essential common-
ality nor a matter of free-flowing constructions. What are nations and ethnic groups then? In 
this concluding chapter we will summarize our main results and discuss to what extent our 
project on local citizenship politics in Switzerland has helped us find an answer to this ques-
tion.  
When it comes to naturalizations, Swiss municipalities are accorded many rights that nor-
mally belong to the competencies of nation-states. Within the framework of vaguely defined 
criteria at the national level, municipal politicians or the entire local population decide accord-
ing to which formal procedure candidates are naturalized and which are the criteria applicants 
have to fulfill to get a Swiss passport. The political systems and the social structures of Swiss 
municipalities make the study of municipal citizenship politics highly relevant: Not only do 
they enjoy much more autonomy in various policy fields than municipalities in other coun-
tries, even small municipalities dispose of a distinct party system and have a relatively high 
ratio of foreigners. As a consequence, we have observed a large variety of citizenship politics 
 168 
and distinctive ways of regulating the access to the Swiss nationality. The differences in citi-
zenship policy might not be as big as those between nation states. As we have seen, our local 
political units clearly have some cultural traits in common. When it comes to the question of 
what local politicians are proud of about Switzerland, a majority in all our case studies agreed 
that the direct democratic system and the political liberty people enjoy in this country are cru-
cial characteristics of Switzerland. This confirms the commonly held view that political 
institutions constitute a crucial part of Swiss citizens’ national identity. But the key question 
still remains to be answered: Why do some municipalities pursue a more restrictive 
naturalization policy than others?  
Data from a large-N analysis allowed us to pave the way for a more thorough investigation 
(see Chapter 4). We were able to demonstrate that socio-economic and socio-structural factors 
have no influence on which naturalization policy is pursued in a municipality. A high unem-
ployment rate, a large ratio of foreigners or a growing number of applicants from Muslim 
countries seem not to preoccupy the people who decide how many and which alien residents 
become Swiss citizens. Rather, cultural and political factors are decisive: The rejection rates 
increase when the local population has a restrictive understanding of citizenship, when the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP), a populist right-wing party, is influential in local politics and/or 
when decisions are taken at open ballot. It thus clearly appears that it is how people think 
about citizenship, in which way political actors influence the naturalization procedures, and 
how decisions are taken, which tells us which policy is pursued. This points to the contentious 
and political nature of citizenship and is a first confirmation of our main hypothesis according 
to which the outcome of a specific naturalization policy is the result of ongoing political 
struggles over the questions of who we are and who belongs to us.  
Citizenship politics were then analyzed in more detail in 14 case studies (see Chapter 5). By 
generating an indicator for the individual understanding of citizenship of local actors, we were 
able to distinguish diverging ideas on how cultural boundaries are drawn and how foreign 
residents who apply for Swiss citizenship are perceived. As we made clear from the outset, 
solely accounting for the way local politicians think about their nation leaves us in a some-
what unsatisfied situation. How do we know which attitudes are relevant when it comes to the 
final decision? To distinguish majority and minority positions and to explain why a specific 
construction prevails, we proposed to include the local power structures in our study. In order 
to trace the ways in which influence is exerted, we resorted to community power studies and 
social network analysis. As it turned out, accounting for both the symbolic and material as-
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pects of naturalization politics enabled us to explain rejection rates and to distinguish various 
local citizenship models.  
While Chapter 5 provided a quantitative comparison of 14 citizenship models, Chapter 6 illus-
trated our hypotheses by means of qualitative data collected in four municipalities. A detailed 
discussion of the naturalization procedures, the attitudes of the municipal politicians involved 
in the decision-making processes and the local influence structures once more revealed the 
highly political nature of naturalizations: At different stages various actors confront each 
other with their convictions of who should become a member of their community. Each mu-
nicipality has an interesting story to tell us about how foreigners become citizens of Switzer-
land. This becomes most clear when diverging attitudes are presented toward topics that have 
been molding naturalization politics in Switzerland in recent years. In municipalities pursuing 
a restrictive naturalization policy, not only do local political actors screen the candidates more 
systematically and gather more information about them, but as we have already seen in Chap-
ter 5, in such municipalities more criteria have to be fulfilled to get a Swiss passport: It is of-
ten requested that the candidates speak the local dialects, that they know a lot about the politi-
cal systems of Switzerland, their canton and their municipality, that they are members of local 
associations, are willing to give up their old nationality and/or that they have a job and do not 
benefit from social security or disability insurance. Local debates on the decisions that have 
recently been taken by the Swiss Federal Court have revealed whether citizenship politics 
constitutes a political or rather an administrative issue for municipal politicians. Some hold 
the opinion that naturalized citizens become first and foremost citizens of a local community, 
and therefore local politicians or the entire population should be accorded the right to decide 
on each application individually. Opponents of the existing system criticize the arbitrariness 
of this system and demand that procedures be standardized. We were also interested in the 
opinions on candidates from Muslim countries. In recent years, the increasing immigration of 
people from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey have led to violent de-
bates on the question of how they can be integrated in Switzerland. It is thus all the more in-
teresting to observe that opinions on whether they can and should be naturalized diverge a lot. 
While some defend the position that the cultural background of those immigrants is incom-
patible with Swiss traditions, others relate difficulties of integration to individual characteris-
tics such as class or education. 
Emphasizing that naturalization policies are the outcome of political struggles and that not 
only the ideas of local actors but also the local power structures are relevant to understand 
them reveals that understandings of citizenship are constructed in socially and culturally 
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shaped fields which, in turn, influence the attitudes of individual politicians. This aspect has 
been investigated more thoroughly in Chapter 7. By drawing on theories in social psychology 
and social influence networks, we have demonstrated how the individual habitus of local poli-
ticians are influenced by their contacts to other politicians in the course of decision-making 
procedures. We were thus able to demonstrate that local politicians involved in naturalization 
processes are both actors and agents or improvising and socialized human beings. Not only do 
they contribute to the production and reproduction of citizenship politics, their opinions are 
structured during the decision-making processes. 
 
One might easily criticize that inference from the Swiss case of nationalization procedures is 
not possible as the heterogeneity of citizenship politics is simply due to its highly decentral-
ized system. Of course, we can observe so many different naturalization policies because mu-
nicipalities take the decisions autonomously. But when we look at other countries, we observe 
that variations in regional practice of naturalizations are strong in both federal and unitary 
states. Moreover, studies analyzing integration politics in European cities also revealed di-
verging citizenship paradigms as a major explanatory factor for policy outcomes. It thus ap-
pears that the Swiss case is not as exceptional as one might first think. Rather, it constitutes a 
unique opportunity to approach citizenship politics from new directions and forces us to 
reflect on existing analytical instruments. Our object of study not only enabled us to demon-
strate that citizenship can take different forms and meanings within a nation-state. It also al-
lowed us to go beyond formal citizenship regulations and to look closely at the moments 
when naturalization laws are applied and interpreted. By talking to local politicians and ob-
serving how they come to an agreement on which criteria are relevant to become a Swiss citi-
zen, we were in the comfortable position to study the ways ordinary citizens conceptualize 
citizenship and how a specific naturalization policy emerges in a local setting. 
 
Towards a sociology of citizenship and nationalism 
Our results clearly refute the arguments of essentialists who would expect a much more ho-
mogeneous naturalization politics both among and within our municipalities and much less 
variation of the individual understandings of citizenship. The close look we have taken at lo-
cal naturalization politics has revealed that it becomes highly problematic to speak of the 
Swiss citizenship policy or of a clearly defined Swiss national identity. Our analysis also dis-
proves Van Evera’s (2001) arguments who is one of the very few scholars still openly defend-
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ing a primordialist position. Van Evera (2001: 20) recognizes that ethnic identities are not 
stamped on our genes at birth, but holds the opinion that they can become fixed after having 
been adopted through socialization. According to him, identities especially harden when mass 
literacy is achieved (because literacy allows to store identity and to purvey it to a mass audi-
ence), in situations of violent conflicts with others (due to an emotional impact of recorded 
national memories that is enhanced) and among non-immigrant ethnic groups (because they 
did not have to assimilate to another culture). In our study we focused on a highly educated 
society where ethnic conflicts are absent and on local politicians who have spent most of their 
life in Switzerland—and even in the same village or town. Nonetheless, cultural boundaries 
are drawn differently from one municipality to the other. 
Our findings are also opposed to the arguments of instrumentalists and adherents of rational 
choice theories who see groups as artifacts of cultural engineers and/or as being mobilized on 
the basis of economic interests. We have demonstrated that socio-economic and socio-
structural factors have no direct impact on the outcome of naturalization policies. This is in 
line with one of our main arguments according to which citizenship is about the symbolic 
aspects of national membership. Noteworthy in this regard are the attitudes of local politicians 
towards candidates who are unemployed and/or depend on social security or disability insur-
ance. Our qualitative analysis has shown that when politicians refuse to naturalize such candi-
dates, they do this, not because they are not willing to financially support them but because 
according to them, ‘good’ Swiss citizens do not depend on the state. Against extreme instru-
mentalists—hardly represented in the theoretically more sophisticated debates—we argue that 
culture is not infinitely malleable: Elites are not free to choose aspects of culture, and the 
masses do not always follow the elite. The role of elites—be it politicians or intellectuals—
and their attempts to mobilize the masses are certainly crucial to understand the formation of 
nations and national identities, but these processes do not happen in a cultural vacuum. Elites 
must select from a range of symbols that are traditionally embedded in a group, and mobiliza-
tions must take place on the wavelength to which the public is ready to tune in. As we have 
seen, elites are also a product of their social environment and they have to negotiate on citi-
zenship politics with other actors defending opposing positions. 
In our study we have put forward an approach that helps us bridge the rigid divide between 
these two research traditions. Following many others, we have first pleaded for a cognitive 
approach. We fully agree with Brubaker (2004) that we have to conceive ethnicity and na-
tionhood in terms of practical categories, cognitive schemes and discursive frames. However, 
solely taking into account how people perceive their social environment does not allow us to 
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grasp the dynamics of nationalism and citizenship politics. As Calhoun (2003) rightly fears, 
claiming that ethnicity, race and nationhood are not things in the world, but perspectives on 
the world might easily lead one to underestimate the importance of the social. Pure cognitiv-
ism also bears the danger of being a-historical as it neglects broader social structures and 
events. Brubaker (2004: 86) rightly reminds us that “there is nothing intrinsically individualis-
tic about the study of cognition” and that schemes of perception is always “socially shared 
knowledge of social objects.” Our aim was to elaborate on this aspect in order to better under-
stand why specific perceptions on the world appear and disappear. 
To avoid an individualistic approach and methodological idealism, we have to be aware that 
no human being lives outside of particularistic solidarities. People have always organized 
themselves in cultural groups. In the age of nationalism they do this in nation-states which 
give human beings a sense of belonging, offer rescue from alienation, solitude and anonymity 
and assure individuals that they enjoy equal status (cf. Tamir 1995: 433-435; Greenfeld 1992: 
487-488; Calhoun 2003: 546-550). How individuals depend on their social environment be-
came most obvious in our discussion on social influence and norm formation (see Chapter 7). 
We came to the conclusion that the way we conceive a social phenomenon is partially shaped 
by the attitudes of individuals whom we are in contact with. Especially when we have to take 
normative judgments and no objective standards are at hand, and when in processes of inter-
personal communication convincing arguments are brought up, alternative arguments are de-
liberated and measured. 
Emphasizing that nations, and more generally groups, are both a social reality and social ne-
cessity does not mean that they are in any way bounded and clearly defined. When human 
beings begin to (re-)organize themselves in cultural groups, neither we as researchers nor the 
members of the emerging groups do know which culture will be blessed by success. A con-
trasting argument would imply that forms of culture exist prior to the formation of groups or 
that any cultural traits automatically lead to group-consciousness. Culture might indeed be the 
basis of political action, but it is also the result of political efforts. Any form of social clo-
sure—and in the light of our study especially national citizenship—is intrinsically political. 
Consequently, we argued that a specific naturalization policy is the outcome of struggles, and 
it is in the course of such processes that nations are constructed. Accordingly, claiming that 
nations are socially constructed does not simply mean that people imagine their nation, but 
rather that they confront different ideas about how to draw the cultural boundaries and come 
to a temporarily stable agreement. Those processes make nations real without ascribing them 
any fixed cultural boundaries. 
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To analytically grasp such struggles, we proposed to study citizenship politics by means of 
Bourdieu’s analytical instruments. Bourdieu has never specifically written on nations and 
nationalism, but he studied neighboring themes such as regionalism and identity (Bourdieu 
1980) and the genesis of groups (Bourdieu 1984). The political sociology that he has elabo-
rated in these works and elsewhere provides challenging analytical tools to bridge the rigid 
division between essentialists/culturalists/objectivists and instrumentalists/ cosmopolitanists/ 
subjectivists, namely by accounting for how in ongoing processes dominant interpretations 
emerge out of different representations of the social world. 
Resorting to his analytical instruments enabled us to conceive of nations as ‘political fields’ in 
which, according to Bourdieu, actors struggle over the legitimate manipulation of the com-
prehensive view of the social world. In those fields ‘power-ideas’ between those defending a 
prevailing perception of the world and those challenging it can be observed. It is the political 
capital of the involved actors that helps us trace the power structures and predict which ideas 
have more chances to become dominant. According to Bourdieu, ‘political capital’ includes 
the prestige and legitimacy a person enjoys and his or her relationships to others. 
Correspondingly, powerful are those people who succeed in convincing others of their inter-
pretation of the social world. To understand these dynamic processes, Bourdieu’s concept of 
‘habitus’ was of great importance. ‘Habitus’ can be considered as a general perception or ac-
tion-scheme that structures an individual’s reactions to new situations. It helps us understand 
that people’s identity is shaped by their social environment, but that they also exercise choice 
and thus may claim or reject common cultural values.  
With Calhoun (2003: 549) we can conclude that groupness and its related aspects of identity 
and social closure are “neither simply a matter of inheritance and essential commonality nor a 
matter of free-flowing ubiquitous and undetermined construction. [They are] socially pro-
duced, shaped by material factors, culturally organized and yet also open to human action.” 
Such social production processes cannot only be observed in Swiss municipalities. They are 
the engine of every nation-state and help us explain why nationalism and citizenship politics 
change their forms over time and space. We therefore think that the theoretical framework 
discussed in this study might lay the basis for a more coherent theory of nationalism and citi-
zenship politics. 
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Unpredictable naturalization politics—arbitrary decisions 
Having come to a conclusion why certain municipalities pursue a more restrictive citizenship 
policy and reject more applicants for naturalization than others, we are already confronted 
with the next question: Why does in some municipalities a more restrictive understanding of 
citizenship emerge than in others? We have demonstrated that there are no regional clusters of 
citizenship policies. The language region, the number of inhabitants and the degree of urban-
ization have no impact. This finding underlines that explanatory factors have to be found at 
the local level and lends force to our argument according to which the outcome of a specific 
naturalization policy is the result of ongoing political struggles. But how can we predict 
which direction such struggles take, and why are local politicians with more xenophobic atti-
tudes more successful in certain local settings than in others? To completely understand the 
ways people confront each other with their ideas about citizenship, we would have to observe 
such processes over a longer period of time. A longitudinal analysis would be necessary to 
fully apply our theoretical framework and to grasp the interaction processes between individ-
ual and systemic levels. For comprehensible reasons we have neither had the financial re-
sources nor the time to undertake such an ambitious project. As written documents about local 
politics hardly exist, such a research program would require observe local struggles over a 
period of at least ten years. We would then probably see how certain politicians get powerful, 
how they convince others of their ideas, how certain constellations of actors favor specific 
solutions and pave the way for further developments, etc. Thereby we would trace the actual 
sequence of the actor’s moves and reactions to the others’ moves and reconstruct the particu-
lar strategies and struggles. We would be able to demonstrate that particular ways of thinking 
and talking about nationhood are reinforced and activated at specific moments and in particu-
lar institutional settings and produce effects of path dependency. When convincing arguments 
were brought up against an established naturalization policy, we would then observe that a 
path is abandoned again and that changes become possible.  
It appears that interactions between actors, to which extent actors adapt themselves to negoti-
ated and established politics and how opponents try to challenge these politics constitute the 
crucial aspects we would have to investigate. Emphasizing these aspects of life in general and 
citizenship politics in particular brings us back to Bourdieu’s metaphor of sports games. To 
understand, a soccer game for example we have to know the rules and the abilities of the two 
teams. If we followed games in the past and know how the teams and the individual players 
have recently performed, we might dare to make a bet which team will win. But as the rules 
do not regulate every tiny aspect of the game and any training and coaching does not deter-
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mine the player’s performances, our knowledge at the beginning of the game does not help us 
foresee the reactions of the players of one team to the other team’s changing constellations 
they are faced with in the course of the game. Similarly, any social processes involve complex 
and open-ended series of interactions among numerous actors and groups. This makes it diffi-
cult to predict with certainty who will win respectively which political decisions will be 
taken. 
This does not mean that on the field where the soccer game takes place or in political fields of 
nations a complete chaos prevails. Nor does it mean that the reactions of the players to an 
attack of the other team or decisions of local politicians in the context of naturalization poli-
tics are unreasonable, only because they take unforeseeable turns. Both players and politicians 
pursue specific strategies, and both soccer games and decision-making procedures can always 
be retrospectively reconstructed to a certain degree. But even if you can explain why a foreign 
resident has been denied Swiss citizenship, the decision might appear arbitrary when we com-
pare decision-making processes and come to the conclusion that between municipalities or 
even for different applicants within a municipality different criteria were applied. How can it 
be that within a nation-state the chance to become a full member depends on the location 
where you (by accident) are living at the moment of application? Those defending the current 
system argue that you first and foremost have to please the people who live in the same vil-
lage or town because you have to deal with them in everyday life. Opponents require that cri-
teria be standardized and be the same for all municipalities and that the local administrations 
or the executive body take the final decisions as these organs are better capable or more will-
ing to apply clearly defined criteria. As it seems, this issue will continue to preoccupy Swit-
zerland in the years to come. Interestingly, these struggles not only turn around the questions 
of how to define the Swiss nation and how high to set the barriers to become a full member of 
it. They also include a debate on whether you are primarily a citizen of a municipality or of a 
nation-state. 
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Annex 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire for interviews with local politicians 
 
This questionnaire was used for the face-to-face interviews that we conducted with 180 local 
politicians in the framework of our 14 case studies. Only those questions are listed that were 
used for our empirical analyses. The entire and original questionnaires in German and French 
can be obtained from the author. The questionnaire is divided into four parts:  
 
(1) Personal Attitudes. These questions were used for measuring the understanding of citizen-
ship. 
 
(2) Influence and Contacts. These questions were used to trace the contact networks and 
power structures. 
 
(3) Swiss Identity and Foreigners. These questions were used for measuring the various indi-
cators for xenophobia and for getting to know what local politicians are proud of about 
Switzerland. 
 
(4) General Questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Personal Attitudes 
 
 
1. What is your opinion about the current naturalization policy in your municipality and its evo-
lution in recent years? Are you happy with the current naturalization policy or is there any-
thing that should be changed, and if yes, why? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2. In July 2003 the Swiss Federal Court decided that decisions on naturalizations taken at ballot 
are unconstitutional and that justifications for the decisions and possibilities for appeals 
against such decisions on this subject must be made available. What is your opinion about 
these verdicts? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3. In your opinion, which criteria have to be fulfilled by a candidate for naturalization to become 
naturalized. For this question we are interested in your personal opinion that may not be com-
mensurate with the current naturalization policy of your municipality. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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4. In the context of naturalizations one often distinguishes integration from assimilation. By as-
similation we understand that one disrobes one’s former culture and completely adapts to the 
new culture. On the other hand, integration means that one finds his or her way in the most 
important social domains of the new country without giving up one’s own culture. In your 
opinion, should candidates for naturalization rather be integrated or rather be assimilated, or 
does this not constitute a criterion for naturalization? 
 
  Rather be integrated 
  Rather be assimilated 
  No criterion 
  Don’t know 
 
5. Do you prefer that a naturalized Swiss abandons his or her old citizenship or should it be pos-
sible to have two nationalities?  
 
  Is possible 
  Is not possible 
  Don’t know 
 
6. Should a naturalization candidate absolutely, if possible or not necessarily be a member of a 
local association in which also Swiss participate; or does this not constitute a criterion for 
naturalization? 
 
  Absolutely 
  If possible 
  Not necessarily 
  No criterion 
  Don’t know 
 
7. A Muslim woman wearing a headscarf in public, does this constitute a problem for naturaliza-
tion or not? 
 
  Rather a problem 
  No problem 
  Don’t know 
 
8. A naturalization candidate should he or she have good or broken knowledge of the Ger-
man/French language? Does it suffice if he or she speaks a national language or if a member 
of the family speaks German/French? 
 
  Good knowledge of German/French 
  Broken German/French 
  A national language is sufficient 
  It suffices if a family member speaks German/French 
   Don’t know 
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9. It might happen that a candidate for naturalization benefits from disability insurance, social 
security or is unemployed. Could you please indicate for each possibility whether this consti-
tutes a big problem, rather a problem, rather not a problem or not a problem at all? 
 
9.a. Disability     Big problem 
  Rather a problem 
  Rather not a problem 
  Not a problem at all 
  Don’t know 
 
9.b. Social security    Big problem 
  Rather a problem 
  Rather not a problem 
  Not a problem at all 
  Don’t know 
 
9.c. Unemployment   Big problem 
  Rather a problem 
  Rather not a problem 
  Not a problem at all 
  Don’t know 
 
10. A naturalization candidate who attended his or her entire school years in Switzerland, should 
he or she benefit from a simplified naturalization? 
 
  Yes 
  No 
  Don’t know 
 
11. A naturalization candidate who was born in Switzerland, should he or she benefit from a sim-
plified naturalization?  
 
  Yes 
  No 
  Don’t know 
 
12. A naturalization candidate should he or she have a very good, good or minimal knowledge of 
Swiss history and the Swiss political system or does this not constitute a criterion for a natu-
ralization?  
 
  Very good knowledge is necessary 
  Good knowledge is necessary 
  Minimal knowledge is necessary 
  No criterion 
  Don’t know 
 
13. Candidates for naturalization have emigrated from different countries to Switzerland. Many 
people think that for some applicants it is more difficult to integrate or assimilate themselves 
in Switzerland. Do you agree that there are such differences? 
 
  Yes 
  No 
  Don’t know 
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13.a. [IF YES] In your opinion, which nationalities, religious or other groups have more diffi-
culties and which ones have less difficulty? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
13.b. Could you briefly give reasons for your answer?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
(2) Influence and Contacts 
 
 
14. Could you please indicate whether you are formally involved in the naturalization processes of 
your municipality? Are you… 
 
  a member of the local parliament and decide on or deliberate about applications? 
  a member of the executive body and decide on or deliberate about applications? 
  working at the local administration and responsible for naturalizations?  
  a member of a commission and decide on or deliberate about applications?  
  a member of another political body that is involved in the naturalization procedures: 
___________________________________  
 
15. Since when have you been involved in local naturalization politics? ______________ 
 
16. We have compiled a list of actors who are somehow or other involved in naturalization poli-
tics of your municipality. Could you please indicate which are the actors with whom you dis-
cuss naturalization matters once in a while. Could you please also indicate whether or not you 
share similar attitudes about naturalization politics with those persons. 
 
 Actors Con-
tact 
Similar 
attitudes 
Different atti-
tudes 
Don’t 
know 
1.          
2.          
3.          
…          
 
17. Are there any other actors—at the local or cantonal levels—with whom you discuss naturali-
zation matters once in a while with regard to naturalization politics in your municipality? 
 
  Yes 
   No 
 
17.a. [IF YES] Could you please name them and indicate whether or not you share similar atti-
tudes about naturalization politics with those persons.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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18. The contacts with the persons you have indicated have probably not been equally intensive. 
Which are the three actors of those you have indicated with whom you have had the most in-
tensive contact concerning citizenship politics in your municipality?  
 
1.  
2.  
3.  
 
19. Please indicate which one of these three contacts has been the most intensive? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. In the following list could you please indicate all those who, according to your personal opin-
ion, have had some power in naturalization politics of your municipality in recent years? You 
can also indicate yourself. For this question we are not simply interested in actors who have 
been involved in naturalization politics, but in those who have exerted some influence. Influ-
ential persons can be directly involved and force their point or they indirectly shape the atti-
tudes of the involved politicians. 
 
  Actors 
1.    
2.    
3.    
…    
 
21. Are there any other actors—at the local or cantonal levels—who have been influential in citi-
zenship politics of your municipality? 
 
  Yes 
  No 
 
21.a. [IF YES] Could you please indicate them?       
___________________________________________________________________________ 
22. Of all actors you have indicated as influential, which are the three persons who are, according 
to your personal opinion, the most powerful in naturalization politics of your municipality? 
 
1.  
2.  
3.  
 
23. And which of these three actors do you consider as the most influential person?  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
(3) Swiss Identity and Foreigners 
 
 
24. In this table, please tick how strongly you identify yourself with Europe, Switzerland, your 
canton, your region and your municipality.  
 
 Very 
strongly 
Rather 
strongly 
Rather little Very little Don’t know 
a. Europe           
b. Switzerland           
c. Canton           
d. Region           
e. Municipality           
 
25. In general, are you ... 
 
  very proud, 
  rather proud, 
  not so proud or 
  not proud at all 
 
... of Switzerland? 
 
  Don’t know 
 
26. What are you particularly proud of about Switzerland? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  Don’t know 
 
27. What are you not at all proud of about Switzerland? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  Don’t know 
28. In the following table we have compiled a list of statements that are related in the broadest 
sense with questions of foreigners and naturalizations. Those are statements that often have 
been made by different people. Could you please indicate for each statement to what extent 
you agree. ‘1’ stands for complete disagreement and ‘6’ for complete agreement. 
 
 
Statements about foreigners who live in Switzerland:  
 
Do not agree at all   Do completely 
agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
a. Foreigners who live in 
Switzerland are a cultural en-
richment for this country.  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
b. Due to a growing number of 
foreigners in my neighborhood 
I do no longer feel at home 
where I live.  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 183 
c. In general, the ratio of for-
eigners in Switzerland is too 
high and should be limited.  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
d. One day, immigrants from 
Turkey will be completely 
integrated in Switzerland.  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
In a political system, in which the citizens are strongly involved, as it is the case in Switzerland, one 
has to ask whether or not the citizens have the capacity to form their own opinion, and what is the role 
of the elite and education for the formation of an opinion. To what extent do you agree with the fol-
lowing statements? 
 
Do not agree at all   Do completely 
agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. We should be grateful to 
have leaders who tell us ex-
actly what to do and how to do 
it. 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
f. For their future, it is in gen-
eral useful for children to fol-
low their parents’ convictions.  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
g. School should mainly teach 
discipline and performance. 
            
 
 
Debates about foreigners are often related to the problem of growing criminality in Switzerland. What 
is your position towards the control of criminality in Switzerland? To what extent do you agree with 
the following statements? 
Do not agree at all   Do completely 
agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. The police should combat 
criminality more aggressively. 
            
i. For severe crimes the death 
penalty should be reintroduced 
in Switzerland.  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
29. How often are you in contact with foreigners? 
 
  Very often 
  Rather often 
  Rather rarely 
  Very rarely 
  Don’t know  
 
30. Are your contacts to foreigners very positive, rather positive, rather negative or very negative?  
 
  Very positive 
  Rather positive 
  Rather negative 
  Very negative 
  Don’t know 
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31. Some people assert that important characteristics of Switzerland are about to disappear and 
that this is related to the growing number of foreigners. With this statement, do you …  
 
  completely agree, 
  partially agree, 
  partially disagree or 
  completely disagree. 
  Don’t know 
 
32. Some people assert that the growing number of foreigners leads to an aggravated situation on 
the labor market. With this statement, do you …  
 
  completely agree, 
  partially agree, 
  partially disagree or 
  completely disagree. 
  Don’t know 
 
 
 
(4) General Questions 
 
33. How long have you been living in this municipality? 
 
____________ years           Have never lived in this municipality. 
 
34. What is your highest education?93 
 
  Keine Schulbildung (No education) 
  Primarschule (Primary school) 
  Sekundarschule (Secondary school) 
  Anlehre (Basic apprenticeship) 
  Berufslehre (Apprenticeship) 
  Diplommittelschule oder allgemeinbildende Schule 
  Handelsschule, Handelsdiplom (Commercial school) 
  Berufsmatura (A-levels for those who have accomplished an apprenticeship) 
  Matura, Seminar (A-Levels, general qualification for university entrance) 
  Höhere Fachschule (Krankenpflegeschule, Schule für Sozialarbeit, Medizin-technische As-
sistentIn) (Schools for nurses, social workers etc.) 
  Höhere Berufsausbildung mit Meisterdiplom, Eidg. Fachausweis oder gleichwert (Continu-
ing school for those who have accomplished an apprenticeship) 
  Fachhochschule, Technikerschule (Technical schools) 
  Universität, ETH (University) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
93 As school systems vary a lot between countries we did not translate the different categories, respectively only 
provided some approximate translations in brackets. 
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35. Are you member of a political party? 
 
  Yes 
  Non 
 
35.a. [IF YES] Of which political party are you a member? 
 
  SP (Social Democrats) 
  CVP (Christian Democrats) 
  FDP (Liberal Party) 
  SVP (Swiss People’s Party) 
  Grüne (Green Party) 
  EDU (Federal Democratic Union) 
  EVP (Evangelical Party) 
  Others: _______________________________________ 
 
35.b. [IF NO] Which party would you elect if national elections were held next Sunday?  
 
  SP (Social Democrats) 
  CVP (Christian Democrats) 
  FDP (Liberal Party) 
  SVP (Swiss People’s Party) 
  Grüne (Green Party) 
  EDU (Federal Democratic Union) 
  EVP (Evangelical Party) 
  Others: _____________________________________ 
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